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At the close of the 18th century, the maritime frontier on the Qing Empire’s southeastern 
edge became an increasingly unruly place. Small-time pirates plundered coastal villages as huge 
corsair fleets thrashed the Qing navy. At the same time, communal strife in southern Fujian and 
Taiwan frustrated the Qing territorial administration, while droughts and other environmental 
disasters impoverished small-time cultivators and helped spark large-scale rebellions. By the 
dawn of the 19th century, the littoral world of Fujian and Taiwan had emerged as a site that 
required robust attention—and it was the academy activists of Fujian that tackled the urgent 
issues confronting its maritime frontier. 
This dissertation explores activists of the Aofeng Academy and their roles in promoting 
solutions for problems afflicting the raucous maritime frontier of Fujian and Taiwan during the 
early 19th century. Founded in 1707, Aofeng occupied the center of Fujian’s intellectual life and 
emphasized a rigorous Neo-Confucian education with a bent towards practical studies. During 
the prosperous eighteenth century, alumni of the Aofeng Academy had routinely served in 
powerful official positions, focusing on issues related to the empire writ large. However, by the 
end of the Qianlong reign (1735-1796), scholarly life at Aofeng increasingly addressed Fujian’s 
local politics, particularly with regard to managing its troubled littoral regions.  
Using archival sources, academy gazetteers, and the writings of Aofeng alumni, this 
study argues that the academy activists assumed a localist orientation through their efforts to 
improve coastal society and the security of the maritime frontier. As Aofeng alumni inserted 
themselves into local teaching posts, they served as local advocates, circulated information about 
the maritime frontier, and lobbied Qing officials to effect meaningful change. Staking out a 




fundamental empire-wide shift in favor of local power, and the diminishment of the imperial 
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Academy Activists and the Maritime Frontier 
Early in the Jiaqing reign (1796-1820), Wu Yulin was exiled to Hunan. Wu was an 
instructor (jiaoyu), a very minor educational official in the vast Qing bureaucracy. His career as 
an instructor was productive: after earning his juren degree in 1777, Wu served seven successive 
stints as an instructor in various counties in his home province of Fujian and across the strait in 
the prefecture of Taiwan. Though regarded as ugly and hunchbacked (maoqin qie tuo) as a young 
man, he exhibited extraordinary energy and commitment to study, qualities that allowed him 
entry into Fujian’s premier educational institution, the Aofeng Academy.  
Driven by intense moral principles to serve locals in practical ways, Wu enthusiastically 
expanded the boundaries of his lowly bureaucratic teaching post by seeking to promote local 
benefit and dispel harmful practices (xingli chubi wei jiren). He was also an attentive observer of 
the local practices of his fellow Fujianese and wrote several collections of poetry based on his 
experiences working in different counties. At his final post in Fengshan County in southern 
Taiwan in 1799, he undertook several projects designed to promote local agriculture by 
revamping local waterworks, enlarging reservoir ponds, and facilitating irrigation.1 Only a few 
years after the Lin Shuangwen Rebellion (1787-1788), which saw widespread violence and an 
invasion of the island by imperial troops, Wu may have believed that returning people to 
productive life would forestall any future outbreaks of violence. The local magistrate was 
another problem, however. Wu unsuccessfully accused the local magistrate of forty counts of 
corruption and tried to get higher officials in Taiwan to intervene. Rebuffed and angry, Wu 
refused to welcome the magistrate back at the county line, as was customary, and loudly cited 
 




passages from the text of educational administration (Xuezheng quanshu) to justify his actions. 
For his outspokenness and lack of respect for a superior, Wu was framed, and forced into exile in 
Hunan.2 
At first glance, the saga of instructor Wu appears to be a story of an intensely energetic 
and idealistic man whose efforts and uncompromising principles eventually landed him in deep 
trouble. Just who did Wu think he was and what did he think he was doing? Why did he provoke 
powerful officials? Why did he believe he could influence them to intervene in sensitive political 
issues despite his relatively low position in the bureaucracy? Exploring his background, one 
discovers that Wu’s efforts and idealism were not simply the products of a single individual’s 
quixotic mind. Wu’s affiliation with the sprawling network of the Aofeng Academy alumni helps 
explain his behavior and that of his colleagues across Fujian’s maritime frontier. 
Founded in 1707, the Aofeng Academy in Fuzhou connected Wu to some of the most 
influential individuals in Fujian: generations of its alumni served in the Qing empire’s highest 
offices, assisted Qing emperors in crafting maritime and educational policies, and labored as 
educators and instructors across Fujian. Just as important, the Aofeng Academy imbued Wu and 
its alumni with an intensely muscular interpretation of Confucian learning which prioritized 
action and a commitment to finding practical solutions to problems. As the Qing empire entered 
the 19th century, the Aofeng Academy and its network of alumni increasingly oriented 









From Qianlong to Jiaqing: The Qing in Flux 
In recent years, Qing historians have expressed renewed interest in the early 19th century. 
As William T. Rowe has observed, historians have learned quite a lot about the “prosperous age” 
(shengshi) of the long 18th century and the self-strengthening reforms of the late 19th century.3 In 
contrast, the early 19th century, spanning the reigns of the Jiaqing (r. 1796-1820) and Daoguang 
(r. 1820-1850) emperors, received scant scholarly attention, save for a very influential chapter by 
Susan Mann Jones and Philip A. Kuhn in Cambridge History of China, which argued that the 
Jiaqing period constituted the transitional moment for the Qing empire and modern China. 
Evidence of Qing decline was in abundance: the empire faced sharp administrative decay 
stemming from years of Heshen’s mismanagement and corruption, a demographic crisis and 
increasing population pressure on the environment contributed to mass uprisings, most notably 
the White Lotus Rebellion (1796-1804). The Jiaqing emperor, though a capable and 
conscientious ruler, was unwilling or unable to fundamentally arrest imperial decay, setting the 
empire on a long, slow trajectory of decline.4 
In the last decade or so, Qing historians have expanded upon Mann and Kuhn’s 
pioneering work. This new scholarship has reassessed the causes of the Qing decline, the 
priorities of the Jiaqing court, and the creative energies of Qing literati who urgently addressed 
the empire’s many problems. One of the most important revelations of this new scholarship 
identifies a comparatively liberalized political atmosphere of the Jiaqing court. In his book, 
White Lotus Rebels and South China Pirates: Crisis and Reform in the Qing Empire, Wensheng 
Wang argues that military crises in the empire’s interior and coasts forced the Jiaqing emperor to 
 
3 William T. Rowe, “The Significance of the Qianlong-Jiaqing Transition in Qing History,” Late Imperial China 
(32.2) (December 2011): 74-88, 74. 
4 Susan Mann Jones and Philip A. Kuhn, “Dynastic Decline and the Roots of Rebellion,” in Cambridge History of 





stage a strategic political retreat from the interventionist ruling style of his father, the Qianlong 
emperor. At the same time, the Jiaqing emperor made significant changes at the court to counter 
administrative corruption and bloat, including bureaucratic standardization over the Grand 
Council and putting greater controls over the Imperial Household Department.5  He thus presents 
the Jiaqing emperor as engaged in a deliberate effort to transform the Qing administrative 
apparatus by scaling it back and by increasing oversight in order to make it more politically 
sustainable over the longer term.  
The Jiaqing emperor’s efforts were not limited to administrative reform. Deeply 
concerned about multiplying crises, the emperor attempted to revitalize the floundering imperial 
project by soliciting advice from officials and literati through opening the “pathways of words” 
(yanlu).6 Though the emperor got an unwelcome earful from various corners, and punished some 
officials—most notably Hong Liangji (1746-1809)—for their outspokenness in criticizing the 
emperor himself, the emperor’s willingness to empower Han elites as part of his reform agenda 
helped spur the literati to tackle emerging challenges, and commit to the study and practice of 
statecraft to revitalize the empire’s fortunes.  
The early 19th century, therefore, is now understood as a heady period of literati statecraft 
(jingshi), characterized by the rise of several individuals who significantly impacted Qing 
official circles and thinking, particularly with regard to military and economic matters. Recently, 
scholars have sought to illuminate the political and intellectual trends of the early 19th century by 
examining the lives and works of these prominent individuals.  These works include a study of 
Yan Ruyi (1759-1826) who conceived innovative “strategic hamlets” to combat White Lotus 
sectarians and developed new methods for borderland management as the state capacity of the 
 
5 Wensheng Wang, White Lotus Rebels and South China Pirates: Crisis and Reform in the Qing Empire 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2014). 




Qing weakened, particularly in its frontier areas.7 More recently, William Rowe’s book on Bao 
Shichen (1775-1855) examines his role as a consulting authority on fiscal matters, trade, and 
agricultural production, and popularizing the idea that supporting the individual pursuit of profit 
strengthened the fiscal health of the empire.8  
Han literati increasingly dominated reformist intellectual space in the 19th century. Wei 
Yuan (1794-1857), another activist literatus of the early 19th century, collected the innovative 
ideas produced by his peers and predecessors, and published them in a massive compendium of 
statecraft, the Da Qing jingshi wenbian (Collected essays on statecraft in the Qing) for the 
purposes revitalizing the floundering empire. Wei and other activist literati involved themselves 
in the expansion and consolidation of new forms of knowledge, particularly geographic 
knowledge, which previously had been the jealously guarded purview of the Qing court. Once 
restrictions on geographic knowledge loosened during the Jiaqing period, these literati engaged 
with new geographical information and spatial terms, perceived a fundamental geopolitical shift 
stemming from the rise of British India, and instigated the transition from a “frontier policy to a 
foreign policy.”9 The creative energies of the Qing empire increasingly lay in the hands of 
activist Han literati, who depended less and less on the court and status as officials to make a 
meaningful impact on Qing politics, knowledge, and culture.  
The more open atmosphere of the Jiaqing period not only allowed activist literati to make 
daring forays into reform, but also impacted local elites and their reorientation to local interests. 
Local elites increasingly assumed managerial positions once controlled by the state, such as tax 
 
7 Daniel McMahon, Rethinking the Decline of China’s Qing Dynasty: Imperial Activism and Borderland 
Management at the Turn of the Nineteenth Century (London: Routledge, 2015), 105-131. 
8 William T. Rowe, Speaking of Profit: Bao Shichen and Reform in Nineteenth-Century China (Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 2018). 
9 Matthew W. Mosca, From Frontier Policy to Foreign Policy: The Question of India and the Transformation of 




collection. A recent book by Seunghyun Han demonstrates that as the state withdrew, local elites 
took over former state functions, namely, the funding of infrastructure projects and philanthropic 
endeavors. Moreover, as state control over the enshrinement of local worthies and the 
publication of local literature relaxed, elites used these projects to celebrate themselves and their 
communities.10 Han also finds that imperial discipline over local society was considerably 
relaxed in the Jiaqing period. Whereas the Qianlong emperor severely punished local literati who 
engaged in examination strikes and collective action, the Jiaqing emperor lessened punishments 
for such behavior; moreover, while his father winked at the flogging of literati by officials—a 
violation of Qing law—the Jiaqing emperor actively punished officials for beating literati.11 Just 
as reform-minded literati depended less and less on the imperial court to be influential, so did 
local elites depend less and less on aligning their interests and cultural cachet with imperial 
interests to maintain local prominence.  
 
The 19th Century Maritime Crisis 
It was in this heady atmosphere of loosening state strictures, literati interest in statecraft, 
and renewed interest in the local that the Aofeng Academy and its network of alumni achieved 
newfound importance as authorities on the maritime frontier of Fujian and Taiwan. By the late 
Qianlong period, the maritime frontier on the Qing’s southeastern edge had become an 
increasingly unruly place. The massive Lin Shuangwen Rebellion in Taiwan in 1787 gave way to 
an entrenched and long-lasting piracy crisis during the Jiaqing period when small-time 
buccaneers robbed sea-faring merchants and coastal villages and transnational corsair fleets 
 
10 Seunghyun Han, After the Prosperous Age: State and Elites in Early Nineteenth-Century Suzhou (Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press, 2016). 
11 Seunghyun Han, “The Punishment of Examination Riots in the Early to Mid-Qing Period,” Late Imperial China 




thrashed the Qing navy. At the same time, long-standing problems of communal feuding (xiedou) 
frustrated the Qing territorial administration, while droughts and other environmental disasters 
impoverished small-time cultivators and helped spark large-scale rebellions. By the close of the 
18th century, the littoral world of Fujian and Taiwan had emerged as a site in desperate need of 
robust attention from the imperial center.  Instead, it was the literati activists from the Aofeng 
Academy network who took the initiative to deal with challenges on the maritime frontier. 
This dissertation explores academy activists and their roles in developing and promoting 
solutions for the raucous maritime frontier of Fujian and Taiwan during the early 19th century. It 
centers primarily on the heads, students, and alumni of the Aofeng Academy in Fuzhou. The 
Aofeng Academy was founded in 1707 and, as the province’s most famous academy, it occupied 
the center of Fujian’s intellectual life.  The Aofeng Academy emphasized a rigorous Cheng-Zhu-
style education with a bent towards shixue or “practical studies.” During the “long eighteenth 
century,” affiliates of the Aofeng Academy had routinely served in powerful official positions, 
focusing on issues related to the empire writ large. However, by the end of the Qianlong reign, 
scholarly life at Aofeng trended towards examining Fujian’s internal politics, particularly with 
regard to managing its troubled littoral regions.  
How did the shift to a local orientation and priorities occur? What institutional, 
intellectual, and political frameworks prompted this shift? How did an academy created for the 
purpose of cultivating elite Fujianese for official service increasingly concern itself with urgent 
security problems on its own doorstep? Through what means did its vast network of alumni 
tackle these and other long-standing provincial issues?  
This study will first examine the Aofeng Academy and its philosophical orientation, 




transformation in the early 19th century. Founded in the Kangxi period as part of the Qing court’s 
official embrace of Cheng-Zhu learning and lixue, the Aofeng Academy stringently maintained 
its philosophical stance throughout the 18th century, even as this way of thinking fell increasingly 
out of fashion, especially in contrast to the newer school of evidentiary studies (kaoju) coming 
out of the lower Yangzi region. Aofeng’s commitment to lixue ideals, particularly learning 
through observation (gewu) and practical action, provided philosophical justification for 
charismatic Aofeng heads to refashion the academy to a local and activist orientation. At the 
same time, Aofeng’s reorientation changed it into something beyond a mere academy and feeder 
into official positions. Its localist and activist reorientation also transformed the academy into 
something akin to a think tank in which Aofeng alumni conceived of and lobbied for practical 
solutions to maritime and local problems.  
Beyond the academy itself, this study examines the academy activists and their effort to 
effect change on the Fujian-Taiwan maritime frontier. In particular, it identifies the adaptation 
and occupation of an imperial institution, a sub-bureaucratic official position called “instructor” 
(jiaoyu and xundao), as pivotal to the strategy of the Aofeng activist alumni. Low-ranking 
members of the Qing bureaucracy charged with directing education and examinations at the 
county level, instructors were not bound to the law of avoidance, the stipulation that prevented 
officials from serving in their home province to thwart the emergence of local power bases, and 
served throughout counties in their home province. Derided as “idle officials” (xiancao), with 
ample leisure time, these 19th century instructors, who were also activist academy alumni, 
increasingly used the post to advance goals beyond the intended scope of the position, through a 
process some modern-day political scientists refer to as “institutional amphibiousness.”12 
 
12 X.L. Ding, “Institutional Amphibiousness and the Transition from Communism: The Case of China,” British 




Therefore, Aofeng Academy activist alumni who served as instructors, like Wu Yulin, used their 
positions to agitate for meaningful and practical solutions to local problems. Armed with 
Aofeng’s orthodox and extremely muscular Cheng-Zhu scholarly orientation, and with a belief 
that as locals they knew how to solve Fujian’s problems better than outsider officials, Aofeng 
Academy instructors also tackled the province’s urgent maritime problems by publishing 
treatises, lobbying officials, and even impacting the policies of the Qing court by relying on the 
extended network of Aofeng alumni scattered in posts throughout Qing officialdom. 
The central thrust of this study is that Aofeng Academy heads, students, and alumni 
fundamentally shifted to a localist orientation by pursuing local interests aimed at improving 
coastal society and the management of the maritime frontier. Although Aofeng had always 
maintained and celebrated its connections to the network of alumni at the central level, new 
graduates of the academy beginning in the early 19th century increasingly adopted an activist 
persona in order to achieve meaningful change at the local level, rather than strive solely to 
cultivate an illustrious official career. As the labor, knowledge, and service of Aofeng men 
increasingly served to address urgent local problems outside but parallel to official circles, these 
men carved out their own space in their corner of the empire and staked out—in their eyes— a 
legitimate voice on maritime and frontier policy and how things should be done on the local level. 
The dissertation’s chronology begins with a burst of intellectual activism in Fujian during the Lin 
Shuangwen Rebellion (1787) in the late Qianlong era and extends to the beginning of the 
Xianfeng reign where an alliance of retired intellectual activists and Fujianese commanders put 
down the Small Sword Uprising of 1853. This project relies on a wide variety of source material, 




gazetteers, ritual texts, genealogies, biographies and tomb inscriptions, and archival material 
from the Qing central bureaucracy.  
 
The Fujian Maritime Frontier 
 The “maritime frontier” as a concept in Chinese history, particularly in premodern 
Chinese history, might appear somewhat confusing to historians accustomed to studying China’s 
borderlands. Over the last twenty years, studies of the frontier and borderlands in late imperial 
China have proliferated and have provided valuable insights into the nature of imperial 
expansion, state competition and diplomacy, the creation of geographic knowledge, and the 
classification of people. These studies have primarily focused on the Qing experience in the 18th 
century, covering the reigns of the Kangxi, Yongzheng, and Qianlong emperors, an extended 
period of territorial expansion, particularly into the northwestern regions later known as 
Xinjiang.13 Studies have also examined the “internal frontiers” of the mountainous southwest in 
Guizhou, Sichuan, and Yunnan, and its gradual incorporation throughout the Ming and Qing.14 
 In contrast, China’s maritime frontier has not received similarly detailed scholarly 
attention. There are a few reasons for this. These range from the entrenched, if misguided, idea 
that China, valuing settled agriculture, simply did not care about the sea where people made their 
living by fishing or trade. Nor did China feel threatened by the sea in the same way it felt 
threatened by the vast northern steppes and its fierce nomadic peoples. During the late imperial 
 
13 Some representative works on the Qing northwestern frontier in recent years include, James A. Millward, Beyond 
the Pass: Economy, Ethnicity, and Empire in Qing Central Asia 1759-1864 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 
1998); Peter C. Perdue, China Marches West: The Qing Conquest of Central Eurasia (Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 2005); Johan Elverskog, Our Great Qing: The Mongols, Buddhism, and the State in Late Imperial 
China (Honolulu: University of Hawai’i Press, 2005). 
14 Some prominent works on the Qing southwestern frontier include, Leo K. Shin, The Making of the Chinese State: 
Ethnicity and Expansion in the Ming Borderlands (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006); Charles 
Patterson Giersch, Asian Borderlands: The Transformation of Qing China’s Yunnan Frontier (Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 2006); John E. Herman, Amid the Clouds and Mist: China’s Colonization of Guizhou (Cambridge: 




period, the maritime frontier did not noticeably expand the boundaries of the imperial state (with 
the notable exception of the settlement of the island of Taiwan), as did in the case of the 
northwest and southwest. After all, the provinces comprising the maritime frontier had been part 
of Chinese dynasties for hundreds of years, and developments along the coast took on the 
appearance of singular events rather than fundamental shifts, at least until the arrival of the 
European imperialists in the mid-19th century. Yet, the maritime frontier shared many similarities 
with China’s northwestern and southwestern frontiers including a complex geographical and 
ethnic landscape, interstate competition, and shifting and ambiguous identities of those that lived 
there. The history and social dynamics of the maritime frontier in Fujian are essential to 
appreciating fundamental changes in the 19th century.  
Geographically speaking, Fujian was a harsh world. The rugged landscape and 
population pressure squeezed Fujian’s sparse arable land, making the province chronically 
vulnerable to rice shortages and famine. With a shortage of arable land, landless Fujianese turned 
to the sea to earn their livelihoods. The poor eked out a living in handicraft production, salt-
making, and fishing, while others crewed long-range merchant ships plying the waters around 
the Philippines and Southeast Asia. Some overseas merchants became fabulously wealthy by 
running commercial empires with fleets of vessels that called at far-flung trading bases with the 
seasonal winds and the monsoon. The land squeeze was so intense and the draw of maritime-
based livelihoods was so great that approximately one half of all Fujianese earned their livings 
away from home.15  
Large corporate lineages (zongzu) dominated Fujian’s social and economic world. 
Becoming especially prevalent in the coastal regions in the mid-16th century, the growth of 
 
15 Dian Murray, The Origins of the Tiandihui: The Chinese Triads in Legend and History (Stanford: Stanford 




lineages stemmed from an increasingly commercialized economy and broad trading networks. 
Fujian’s lineages, the largest of which incorporated thousands of households, competed with 
each other in intense rivalries over access to coastal and overseas trade, and frequently waged 
bloody battles with each other to secure local dominance.16 From the perspective of imperial 
administrators, Fujian’s maritime economy, floating population, and lineage structure made the 
province especially challenging to govern. Officials appointed to the province quickly discovered 
that mountain ranges made access to the Fujian’s interior extremely difficult while petty pirates 
plagued the coasts, particularly during Fujian’s frequent famines. Occasionally, piracy posed a 
greater threat, such as during the Wakō crisis of the 1550s and 1560s in which Ming generals 
such as Ji Qiguang devised new tactical methods and military organization to fight highly mobile 
enemies.17 More routinely, however, the larger lineages bullied smaller ones and warred with the 
others in armed affrays known as xiedou. The lineages of coastal Zhangzhou and Quanzhou 
prefectures in southern Fujian were especially notorious for engaging in violent affrays and 
intimidating imperial officials who tried to intervene. With its maritime-centered economy, 
complex social and physical geography, and endemic violence, Fujian earned a lasting reputation 
for heterodox practices and dysfunction.  
Fujian’s complex social structure and endemic problems were exacerbated during the 
turbulence of the dynastic transition. The Qing conquest and political consolidation of Fujian had 
taken several decades, and the process upended the province’s social and economic life. After the 
capture of Beijing in 1644, loyalist Ming partisans faced off against the invading Qing forces in 
 
16 Harry J. Lamley, “Lineage Feuding in Southern Fujian and Eastern Guangdong under Qing Rule,” Violence in 
China: Essays in Culture and Counterculture, eds., Jonathan N. Lipman and Stevan Harrell (Albany: State 
University of New York Press, 1990), 38-39. 
17 Ray Huang, 1587, A Year of No Significance: The Ming Dynasty in Decline (New Haven: Yale University Press, 
1981), 166-171. During this period, Japanese and Chinese marauders attacked coastal China and besieged cities. 




increasingly southern theaters while rival rump Ming regimes attempted to unify anti-Qing 
resistance. The Southern Ming courts of the Longwu Emperor (Zhu Yijian, r. 1645-1646) and 
later the Prince of Lu (Zhu Yihai, r. 1645-1655) were based in Fujian, providing a political and 
military focus to Ming restoration efforts. Aided by the Zheng family’s commercial empire and 
naval forces, Fujian became contested land where Ming loyalists, Qing forces, and local 
opportunists clashed. Qing forces eventually executed the Longwu emperor in 1646 while the 
Prince of Lu died in 1655 on the island of Jinmen, finally shattering dreams of a Ming restoration 
in southeastern China.18 The commercial proto-state established by Zheng Zhilong and his son, 
Zheng Chenggong, however, continued to harass the Qing from the coasts and represented a real 
military challenge to the Qing consolidation of southeastern China. Abandoning their stronghold 
in Xiamen (Amoy) off the coast of southern Fujian in the face of Qing pressure, Zheng 
Chenggong expelled the Dutch from Taiwan in 1661 and reestablished the Zheng regime on the 
island. Though Zheng Chenggong died shortly after his victory over the Dutch, his son, Zheng 
Jing, continued to consolidate his family’s position on Taiwan, rebuilt the Zheng trading empire 
with connections to Japan and Southeast Asia, and made deft use of diplomatic overtures to the 
Dutch and Qing officials in order to ease military pressure on his island base.19 Qing control over 
the coasts and the southeast were once again in jeopardy, particularly after Geng Jingzhong (d. 
1682), the ruler of the Fujian feudatory, rebelled during the Rebellion of the Three Feudatories 
(1673-1681). The Qing’s military response to these dire threats was accompanied by a draconian 
measure to starve the Zheng regime out of mainland resources by forcibly evacuating the littoral, 
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which decimated the livelihoods of coastal Fujianese. After the Qing quelled the feudatories’ 
rebellion in 1681, it was able to turn its attention to eliminating the Zheng regime on Taiwan. 
Already weakened by defections of its military personnel to the Qing, the Zheng regime was 
finally eliminated by the Qing admiral Shi Lang, a former lieutenant of Zheng Chenggong, 
placing the island of Taiwan under Qing control in 1683.  
The addition of Taiwan to the new and expanding Qing Empire profoundly affected 
Fujian’s social and economic landscape. Administratively attached to Fujian as a prefecture 
(Taiwanfu), Taiwan began to be integrated into a new maritime trade network. The Qing court, 
no longer burdened by maritime adversaries with dynastic pretentions, gradually toned down 
military action and began to prioritize institutional reconstruction and economic development. 
The Kangxi court in 1684 lifted the ban on maritime trade, and pursued a new “Open Door 
Policy” that encouraged maritime trade in order to reset the southeastern economy and fill state 
coffers through the introduction of the customs office.20 With imperial encouragement, 
commerce between the mainland and Taiwan led the island to develop a vibrant export economy 
based on rice and sugar. Agriculture on Taiwan’s fertile western plains increasingly fed rice-
starved Fujian, making the province dependent on Taiwan for its food security. The island of 
Xiamen in Fujian’s south became southeastern China’s entrepôt, which linked trade between 
Taiwan, the mainland and overseas markets.21  
As Xiamen’s merchants grew wealthy managing the “Amoy trade network,” the Qing 
established its maritime customs office and based its navy there. One of the legacies of the 
Qing’s decades-long conquest of the southeastern coast was the continuing presence of its 
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massive military machine. Though the Qing encouraged maritime trade and agricultural 
exploitation of Taiwan, it remained highly sensitive to security threats. After the elimination of 
the Zheng regime, the Qing pressed the governor-general of Zhejiang and Fujian in Fuzhou in 
order to deal more efficiently with coastal defense; the Qing also maintained an expansive 
military institutional infrastructure featured two military intendants that outranked the provincial 
governor.22 The Qing stationed the Fujian naval commander in Xiamen; typically a native 
Fujianese, he was tasked with responding to any coastal threat, overseeing the maritime customs 
house, and preserving an orderly trading environment.23 At the same time, thousands of Green 
Standard troops were garrisoned throughout mainland Fujian and Taiwan, making Fujian home 
to the largest number of Green Standard soldiers of any province. Security of Taiwan remained a 
continuing problem for the Qing. The island not only provided Fujian with extra food security 
but also served as a “pressure valve” that could absorb the excess population in the land-starved 
province. As a result, thousands of migrants, particularly those from the southern Fujianese 
prefectures of Quanzhou and Zhangzhou and Chaozhou in eastern Guangdong, settled in Taiwan. 
The mostly male migrants frequently reproduced the “violent affrays” endemic to Fujian and 
eastern Guangdong, but instead of engaging in inter-lineage warfare, the clashes broke along 
sub-ethnic lines in which Quanzhou settlers battled those from Zhangzhou, Chaozhou, or the 
Hakka. Even more worrisome, large-scale rebellions would occasionally break out, while tension 
among Taiwanese aborigines and Han Chinese over land encroachment remained a permanent 
fixture of island society.24 Without large lineage organizations to help stabilize Taiwanese 
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society, the Qing depended on its military institutions and Green Standard soldiery to maintain 
order.25 As a result, the steep costs of administering and securing the island frontier made the 
Qing deeply ambivalent about expansion into new areas of Taiwan.  
 Historians like to point to the White Lotus Rebellion in the interior highlands as the 
defining event that marked the beginning of the decline of the Qing empire. Yet, the Lin 
Shuangwen Rebellion (1788), ironically one of the Qianlong emperor’s “ten perfect victories,” 
presaged the coastal turmoil of the first half of the nineteenth century. In contrast to glorious 
campaigns of expansion against foreign peoples, this “perfect victory” was a re-conquest of a 
previously pacified and settled territory waged against Qing subjects. From the perspective of 
those studying and teaching at the Aofeng Academy, the rebellion in Taiwan was the first 
indication that something was very wrong, not just in Fujian, but a more broad-based malady 
infecting the highest reaches of the Qing. There was more to follow. Beginning in 1790, massive 
pirate fleets invaded Qing territorial waters and raided the coasts from Guangdong to Zhejiang, 
thrashing the small and poorly equipped Qing navy. The Qing increasingly appeared to be unable 
to deal with crises nipping at its littoral.  
As rebellions, pirates, and famines battered Fujian, it was the Aofeng Academy activists 
who took the initiative to rebuild stability and security along the maritime frontier. Their 
organization, philosophy, and exploits made them indispensable partners in governing the 
maritime frontier, and presaged fundamental shifts in the relationship between state and society 









Sources and Chapter Outline 
 
 This dissertation contains four chapters. Its major sources include the writings of Aofeng 
heads, alumni, and associates, academy gazetteers, and Qing archival materials, and other local 
sources.  
Chapter One explores the founding, philosophy, students and leaders of the Aofeng 
Academy. Founded as part of the lixue movement of the early Qing, the academy’s particular 
philosophy, intellectual lineage, and Fujian orientation helped transform it into a “think tank” to 
address urgent local and maritime problems emerging in the early 19th century.  
Chapter Two examines the changing bureaucratic institution of county instructor (jiaoyu 
and xundao), a bureaucratic post frequently held by Aofeng alumni. Charged with managing 
county education and examinations, county instructors of the 19th century increasingly assumed 
roles as local advocates. As local Qing officials increasingly failed to deal with local crises, 
county instructors took the initiative in organizing local defense, proffering maritime strategies, 
and fighting official corruption.  
Chapter Three examines the case of two county instructors and Aofeng alumni, Xie 
Jinluan and Zheng Jiancai, and their impact on the Taiwan maritime frontier and attempt to 
reform local society. Through publishing treatises and deft manipulation of the Aofeng Academy 
network, they were able to achieve the strategic goal of Qing expansion into new areas of 
Taiwan to combat the pirate menace. Posthumously enshrined as local worthies, they became 
new models of local political action in 19th century Fujian. 
Chapter Four explores the reach of Aofeng’s intellectual and political influence in 19th 
century Fujian through an exploration of Lin Shumei. Lin, born into a lowly naval family in 




literary forms and association with Aofeng associates. Lin’s literary mastery and associations 















































Managing the Maritime Frontier: 
The Aofeng Academy as Think Tank and Center for Regional Advocacy 
In 1785, Zheng Guangce, an alumnus of the Aofeng Academy in Fuzhou, was invited to 
participate in special recruitment examinations (zhaoshi) held in conjunction with one of the 
Qianlong Emperor’s Southern Tours. The emperor used the special recruitment examinations as 
a device to locate promising talents from the large pools of jinshi and juren degree holders in the 
provinces.26 Zheng hoped that the exam would accelerate his career by providing a shorter path 
to an official appointment. Many years later Zheng’s son-in-law, the eminent scholar-official and 
Aofeng alumnus, Liang Zhangju (1775-1849), wrote about Zheng’s experience in a collection of 
miscellaneous jottings (biji).  
According to Liang’s account, Zheng proceeded to Hangzhou to sit for the examination 
held at the Fuwen Academy with other contenders from Fujian, Zhejiang, and Jiangsu. The chief 
examiner was none other than Heshen, the legendarily corrupt imperial favorite, who sat alone 
beneath the throne ready to accept the completed exams. Upon handing in their exams, the 
candidates were expected to genuflect to Heshen. Zheng was infuriated. When the time came for 
Zheng and the other Fujianese candidates to hand in their exams, they merely made a bow with 
their hands clasped in front of their chests as they withdrew. Heshen thereupon bound up the 
exams of the Fujianese examinees and did not read them, while the candidates from Jiangsu and 
Zhejiang looked on and laughed at their southern counterparts’ lack of political awareness. Filled 
with shock and disgust, Zheng retreated to Fujian, effectively closing the door on any chance of 
an official career.27  
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After returning to Fuzhou, Zheng dedicated himself to the study of statecraft (jingshi). At 
the same time, he also sought out the headship of several Fujianese academies, including his 
alma mater, the Aofeng Academy. As the head, Zheng used his position to address urgent 
problems afflicting the maritime frontier in Fujian and Taiwan. At the same time, he reoriented 
his academy’s curriculum from a focus on strict moral cultivation and lixue to a more expansive 
and explicit embrace of statecraft. As the 19th century dawned, Aofeng’s new mantra was 
practical utility. 
Although this incident may not have played out as Liang related it, writing as he did from 
the later Jiaqing period, the narrative, when read as a parable, is revealing. It dramatically 
illuminates disillusionment with the late Qianlong-era political and educational scene. It 
showcases ethically upright Fujianese scholars and sharply contrasts their behavior with that of 
scholars from the Jiangnan cultural core. It culminates with Zheng Guangce’s dramatic 
reorientation away from officialdom and towards jingshi-style education and a newfound 
concern with addressing urgent local problems. At the same time, it reenacts a key trend of the 
Qianlong-Jiaqing transition: the reorientation of scholar elites away from the court, and toward 
the locale.  
This chapter examines the evolution of the Aofeng Academy from its founding as an elite 
institution dedicated to the study and spread of Cheng-Zhu learning and lixue in the early Qing to 
a center for regional advocacy preoccupied with statecraft and local problems, particularly those 
concerning Fujian’s maritime frontier, in the early 19th century. Like recent scholarship on late 
imperial academies, this chapter examines how an academy functioned in local life, and assesses 




dynamics of the early 19th century.28 In this chapter, I argue that the heads, students, and alumni 
of Aofeng transformed the academy into a center for regional advocacy, a “think tank” for issues 
vexing the Fujianese and Taiwanese maritime frontier in the 19th century. By aligning 
themselves with the orthodox intellectual life of the Qing court while simultaneously celebrating 
their Fujian roots through the creation of an intellectual and ritual lineage, Aofeng alumni were 
able to navigate both the local and central worlds, empowering them to participate in local 
politics and shape national policy. 
The first section of this chapter examines the revival of lixue as a moral and ethical 
guiding light for Qing intellectuals in the 17th century. The second section further elaborates how 
these philosophical underpinnings were critical to the founding of the Aofeng Academy in Fujian 
by the lixue scholar and governor, Zhang Boxing. These underpinnings not only helped shape the 
views of successive leaders and students of the Academy, they were the basis for how the 
Academy expanded its influence across the region as a center of lixue learning and local political 
action. Finally, the third section of this chapter discusses the transformation of the Academy into 
an intellectual “think tank” capable of confronting local issues, particularly those affecting the 
maritime frontier.   
Part I: A New Qing Evangelism: Lixue in the 17th century 
The philosophical world of the early Qing was defined by a resurgence of Cheng-Zhu 
style lixue. The Song dynasty scholars, the Cheng brothers (Cheng Hao and Cheng Yi) and Zhu 
Xi, greatly influenced the trajectory of Neo-Confucian philosophy through the introduction of 
the “principle of heaven” (tianli, or simply, li). In their conception, principle (li) determined both 
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nature and moral principles; human beings, through the “investigation of things” (gewu) and by 
aligning themselves through the principles of the universe, could logically comprehend morality. 
Thus, knowledge of nature, morality, and human relations was understood to be a rational—and 
attainable—pursuit, which could be accomplished through diligent study. The backbone of this 
study was comprised of the Four Books identified by Zhu Xi—the Analects, the Doctrine of the 
Mean, the Mencius, and the Great Learning—and formed the basis of the civil service 
examinations in China until the end of the imperial period in 1911.29 The collapse of the Ming 
dynasty in 1644, its dysfunctional politics, and increasingly fluid social milieu convinced many 
early Qing thinkers that the world had drifted too far from Cheng-Zhu orthodoxy, and required 
urgent renewal.  
Lixue renewal in the early Qing hinged upon the energies of an impressive coterie of 
loosely connected scholars and officials haunted by the political dysfunction of the late Ming. 
For early Qing scholars, putting the nascent dynasty on an orthodox philosophical path defined 
by Neo-Confucian precepts constituted an essential—and urgent—moral mission. In order to 
accomplish this moral mission, Qing scholars preached a gospel of lixue and set about publishing 
and printing philosophical texts, converting the Qing court to their cause, and creating new 
academies to educate future generations of scholars. 
 The chaotic final years of the Ming dynasty and its fall in 1644 forced Chinese to come to 
terms with political catastrophe. An array of prominent Cheng-Zhu devotees, such as Lu Shiyi 
(1611-1672), Zhang Lüxiang (1611-1674) Yan Yuan (1635-1704), and Lu Longqi (1630-1693), 
wrestled with interpreting the collapse of the Ming and proffered theories about what went 
 




wrong.30 Two common points linked this cohort. The first was a rejection of the Ming-dynasty 
scholar-official (and Neo-Confucian philosopher), Wang Yangming and his “School of the 
Mind,” which claimed that individuals could achieve sagehood through didactic appeals in the 
context of a personal relationship between teacher and student and through one’s innate 
knowledge.31 According to the early Qing cohort of Cheng-Zhu devotees, Wang’s philosophy 
had dangerously deluded the masses and degraded proper social relations. At the same time, the 
rapid commercialization and urbanization of the sixteenth century and the gentry’s simultaneous 
abandonment of its paternalistic roles sparked further anxiety over the social order. As a result, 
the early Qing witnessed the emergence of “ritualism” that sought to undergird orthodox social 
relations through the formal performance of rituals in local institutions like ancestral temples and 
lineage halls, linking the gentry to the Qing regime while also re-inscribing local hierarchies.32 
The second was an emphasis on the practical aspects of lixue and its application to real world 
problems while simultaneously downplaying its metaphysical aspects. As a result, the early Qing 
lixue enthusiasts were also students of political economy who sought to put the empire’s 
economy back on track after the turmoil of the dynastic transition.33  
 As lixue advocates increasingly entered official circles in the early Qing, they became 
more influential in imperial affairs. The Kangxi emperor relied on two advisors and strong 
Cheng-Zhu advocates, Xiong Cili (1635-1709) and Li Guangdi (1642-1718), to help manage 
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both administrative matters and the imperial court’s literary projects.34 Significantly, Li compiled 
the Xingli jingyi in 1715, which was essentially an abridgement of an earlier anthology of Cheng-
Zhu Neo-Confucian thought for distribution to the empire’s schools. By purging the older 
anthology of its metaphysical aspects and reordering its contents to showcase its “essential” 
points for maximal pedagogical value, Li’s text reflected pragmatic strain of lixue thought 
rapidly becoming the early Qing’s dominant intellectual trend.35 As the Kangxi emperor 
gradually embraced lixue as orthodoxy in the latter part of his reign, the court elevated Zhu Xi as 
the philosophy’s central figure. It marked Zhu’s new status by installing his tablet in the 
Confucian Temple in Beijing in 1712 and published the Zhuzi quanshu, or the complete works of 
Zhu Xi.36 Armed with imperial patronage, propagated by elite devotees, and implemented in 
local institutions like schools and lineage halls, lixue and emerged as the ethical and intellectual 
guiding light for the new Qing empire and Zhu Xi its patron saint. 
 
Zhang Boxing and the Aofeng Academy 
Like many of his learned contemporaries, Zhang Boxing (1652-1725), the governor of 
Fujian and founder of the Aofeng Academy, was an ardent follower of Zhu Xi and proselytizer 
of lixue thought. Over his lifetime, he established himself as a prolific scholar and editor of 
numerous Zhu Xi and lixue-inspired texts, compiling a series of 15 publications that included the 
sayings of Zhu Xi and the Cheng brothers, rules for learning, and the distinction between various 
regional schools of lixue thought in Fujian, Shaanxi, Hunan, and Henan. In addition, Zhang also 
labored to popularize the writings and thought of the early Qing lixue luminaries mentioned 
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above, particularly those of Lu Shiyi—whose contributions to the lixue movement were 
generally unknown until Zhang’s intervention.37 His corpus of writings indicates that he was 
primarily preoccupied with collecting and transmitting the breadth of lixue thought from the 
Song founders through the new masters of the early Qing revival movement, creating an 
intellectual and philosophical lineage of sorts.  
In his official and private life, Zhang enthusiastically founded or restored local and 
provincial educational institutions as a strategy to propagate lixue philosophy. Zhang believed 
that moral rectification of the scholarly class through education was fundamental to moral health 
of the empire because it set the requisite conditions for successful administration and proper 
social order. Thus, building and maintaining schools and cultivating local talent counted as 
essential duties of a Qing administrator.38 Beginning in 1695, the death of his father compelled 
him to return to Henan for the requisite mourning period and afforded Zhang with the 
opportunity to begin implementing his lixue and educational goals locally. During the mourning 
period, he established community schools (yixue), and provided their students with modest 
stipends and appointed accomplished scholars as headmasters. His alma mater, the dilapidated 
Yinquan Academy, however, became his major project and set the pattern for his future academy 
ventures. Overhauling the structure completely, he refurbished the buildings and granted it land 
to rent to ensure a more stable financial future. Next, he invited local Henanese scholars to 
manage the academy and to teach a Cheng-Zhu curriculum. Renaming it the Qingjian Academy, 
Zhang lectured there for the duration of his formal mourning period.39  
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When Zhang reentered official service, he continued his lixue evangelism in each of his 
posts by founding new academies. As the Jinan circuit intendant in Shandong in 1703, for 
instance, he established two new academies and renovated a third. He provided each academy 
with financial support in the form of dedicated lands, donated Zhu Xi and lixue texts, and 
recruited local teachers and academy heads with a solid scholarly background. Deeply involved 
in his academies’ curriculum, finances, and choice of instructors, Zhang also ordered that Zhu 
Xi’s Bailudong shuyuan xuegui (White Deer Grotto Academy Rules for Study) serve as each 
academy’s pedagogical backbone.40 Zhu’s rules gave students a guide for understanding the 
classics and commentaries, a reading schedule, and a code of personal conduct to cultivate a 
receptive mind for study. Significantly, in addition to supplying students with an educational 
program and strict ideological orientation, the rules also embedded a practical outlook within its 
study program so that students would tackle real-world problems in their personal and official 
lives. In fact, the rules assumed there was no inherent separation between study and action.  In 
this way, Zhang seeded the provinces in which he served with new academies in order both to 
expand and entrench lixue learning and to generate a new corps of practical problem-solvers. 
Zhang took seriously Zhu Xi’s injunction on the inseparability of learning and action in 
his own life and career. During the mourning period for his father, Zhang caught official notice 
for taking the lead in damming a dike break in his hometown of Yifeng in 1699 and for 
overseeing extensive repairs in the dike systems the following year.41 Thus earning a reputation 
as an “expert” of river management, Zhang re-entered official life as a vigorous administrator 
with a particular penchant for tackling natural disasters and helping those affected by them, and 
for providing economic relief and assistance for small time cultivators. Zhang’s interest in 
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economic matters closely mirrored the interests of other early Qing lixue thinkers whose study of 
political economy compelled them to restore the empire’s economic health.42 In fact, by the late 
18th century when lixue fell out of fashion in scholarly circles, Zhang’s reputation as a practical 
troubleshooter had eclipsed his scholarly contributions: only one of his works, a “useful” text on 
river conservancy was kept in the imperial manuscript library and acknowledged by the 
compilers of the Siku quanshu as worthy of preservation. 
As he settled into his new post, Zhang took stock of the particular challenges he faced as 
the ranking official in a notoriously complex province. Like many writers, past and present, 
including native Fujianese, officials, and contemporary historians, Zhang understood that 
Fujian’s mountainous topography and proximity to the ocean engendered a range of 
administrative challenges and shaped Fujianese social and economic life. Moreover, Zhang was 
aware that these endemic problems were compounded by the province’s recent emergence from 
the turbulence of the dynastic transition.  
When he arrived as the new governor in 1707, Zhang immediately confronted famine 
conditions in Fujian and Taiwan, a destructive typhoon, and a wave of small-scale piracy—
issues common to the southeastern coastal regions.43 As an experienced administrator, Zhang 
was committed to continuing Qing economic and institutional reconstruction efforts in Fujian.44 
He also had a more expansive vision for Fujian.  He sought to integrate the province more firmly 
into the maturing Qing empire by linking it intellectually and spiritually into the Neo-Confucian 
movement.  
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Zhang launched a program of cultural reform in accordance with orthodox norms. He 
attacked expressions of popular religion by destroying images of the gods of pestilence (Wushen) 
and transformed their temples into community schools (yixue) where students and teachers 
would sacrifice instead to Zhu Xi. In the same vein, he memorialized the court in 1709 
recommending that Roman Catholic churches in Fujian and other provinces be transformed into 
community schools. Next, displeased over the large number of Buddhist nuns in Fuzhou, Zhang 
commanded that girls from poor families tonsured as nuns be redeemed by their families with the 
assistance of official funds.45 By transforming temples and churches into schools and by 
reintegrating girls into the family, Zhang clearly intended to discipline local culture and 
commoners along Neo-Confucian lines. The centerpiece of Zhang’s Neo-Confucian integration 
strategy, however, was the creation of a new academy.  
 
Part II: The Aofeng Academy  
As the governor and founder, Zhang exercised a great deal of control over the academy, 
its curriculum, and its rituals in order for it to accord with his vision of a robust lixue education. 
Zhang built his new academy at the foot of Jiuxian Mountain in an area known as Aofeng in the 
southeastern part of Fuzhou. Aofeng had been a local scenic spot that attracted sightseers since 
the Song dynasty, and its natural beauty had inspired locals to pen poetry extolling the site. The 
new Aofeng Academy ascended vertically up the hill, and its structures were gradually expanded 
over the years to include a pond, pavilions, library, lecture halls, shrines, grottos, student 
dormitories, and a garden with exotic plants.46 With a meditative atmosphere and a suitable 
historical and literary legacy, the setting appeared to Zhang the ideal location for an academy 
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intended to promote lixue in Fujian. Through its promotion of Qing philosophical orthodoxy, the 
Aofeng Academy also became a cite for the celebration of Fujianese identity, scholarly virtuosity, 
and political action. 
 
The Aofeng Academy Founding and Mission 
Zhang’s singular goal for his academy was the moral renewal of Fujian though 
transformation (jiaohua). In an implicit contrast to officials who viewed the province as morally 
wayward and prone to violence and heterodoxy, Zhang struck an optimistic tone in his record of 
the Aofeng Academy (Aofeng shuyuan ji). Flatly declaring that Fujian was “the land of 
Confucius and Mencius,” Zhang insisted that the province embrace Song Neo-Confucians as 
ethical models as the Kangxi emperor had done. He also highlighted Zhu Xi’s origins in Fujian.  
He imagined that Aofeng students would instruct their fellow provincials in a hierarchical 
exchange of moral discipline from scholar to commoner, thereby entrenching the academy’s 
philosophical precepts at the grassroots level.47 From the outset, Zhang provided Aofeng with a 
moral mission and expected its students to transform the province along Song Neo-Confucian 
precepts. 
Zhang required students to follow a specific program of moral instruction.  He imposed 
the same set of rules that he had applied in the academies he had built previously. Based on Zhu 
Xi’s academy rules, the Zhuzi bailudong jiaotiao, and academy rules produced by lixue 
philosophers in the Song and Ming such as Hu Juren (1434-1484) and Lü Zuqian (1137-1181), 
and by Zhang himself, the Aofeng rules governed students’ conduct, decorum, and attitudes 
 




towards study.48 In studying, entering or leaving the academy, eating and drinking, dressing, or 
writing characters, Aofeng students were required to practice self-cultivation. Zhang anticipated 
that Aofeng students would build themselves into moral exemplars who would remake Fujian 
along orthodox lixue precepts in their post-Aofeng lives.  
 
The Aofeng Directors 
 The duty of academy directors (shanzhang) was to manage the academy, instruct students, 
and set the scholastic tone. From the time of its founding until the end of the dynasty, the Aofeng 
Academy had thirty-three directors who served terms of different lengths. The directors 
nominally served at the pleasure of the Fujian civil authorities, and governors confirmed their 
positions, filled the post if vacant, or—rarely—removed a sitting director. The typical director at 
Aofeng was a jinshi degree holder and a retired Qing official. The vast majority of the directors 
were native Fujianese; only nine—less than one third—originated outside the province. The non-
native Fujianese directors’ tenures were concentrated in the earlier part of the 18th century; the 
last non Fujian-native to serve as the Aofeng director did so in the later Qianlong period. The 
directors from the late Qianlong period through the end of the dynasty were all native Fujianese. 
Many were, in fact, alumni of the Aofeng Academy. The composition of the directorate 
underscored the particular Fujianese flavor of the academy’s philosophical stance (Minxue) and 
accentuated a sense of continuity that linked the Aofeng community to its Song and Ming 
forbears and to the province’s history of scholarly accomplishments. At the same time, their 
professional backgrounds as former officials connected the academy to intellectual trends and 
elites beyond the province’s borders and helped them reach into power circles in Beijing. 
 




 Continuing in the same the philosophical vein as Zhang Boxing, the Aofeng directors 
linked the academy to the 18th century Neo-Confucian revival.  Appointed by governor Zhang 
Boxing, Cai Bi, a man of 60 sui from Zhangpu County in southern Fujian served as Aofeng’s 
first director. Not coincidentally, he came from a lineage with a long and impressive lixue 
pedigree. One of his ancestors, Cai Yuanding (dates unknown), had been a famous scholar in the 
early Song who posthumously earned plaudits from Zhu Xi for his broad learning and teaching. 
More recently, Cai’s own father had been a disciple of Huang Daozhou, a scholar official famous 
for his lixue scholarship, moral rigor, and loyalist martyrdom after the fall of the Ming. As a 
talented young scholar and a devotee of Cheng-Zhu scholarship, Cai Bi was selected as a tribute 
student, and spent five years in Beijing in the Imperial College (Taixue). Declining official posts, 
he returned to Fujian to pursue a life of teaching. Later on, while serving as the instructor 
(jiaoyu) of Luoyuan County, Zhang Boxing invited him to teach at Aofeng as its founding 
director. He was accompanied by his son, Shiyuan, who assisted with printing essential texts at 
the academy.49 Cai’s presence at Aofeng imbued the new academy with the bona fides of a 
distinguished and scholarly lineage, whose affiliation to Fujianese strand of lixue learning and 
national affiliation was carried on by his son, Shiyuan, and the eminent official, Li Guangdi. 
 Li Guangdi noticed Shiyuan during his stint as a Hanlin compiler and a newly minted 
jinshi degree holder (1717). Familiar with his father and excited about the new Aofeng Academy, 
Li recruited the younger Cai—a Song-learning enthusiast—as an editor to produce the Xingli 
jingyi, the foundational text of Qing Neo-Confucian thought stripped of metaphysical content. 
After Cai Bi passed away, Li Guangdi lobbied the Fujian governor to name Cai Shiyuan the next 
Aofeng director. Li’s letter to the governor described the wayward state of the Fujianese literati 
 




and the miserable state of its popular customs. He perceived the Aofeng Academy to be an 
essential vehicle for moral and practical renewal in Fujian, and argued that his disciple, Cai 
Shiyuan, should train the new generation of moral reformers along robust lixue principles. 
Significantly, Li referenced the relationship between imperial officials and academy directors 
during the Song and Yuan periods. He made the claim that historically, officials and directors 
had cooperated in an atmosphere of mutual support and respect in order to effect changes on the 
ground.50 In his letter, Li imagined a similarly cooperative relationship between Qing officials 
and academy directors.  
Though not enshrined at Aofeng, Li Guangdi was regarded by future generations of 
Aofeng leaders and students as something of a founding inspiration. After Cai Shiyuan assumed 
the post of Aofeng director, Li took a leave of absence to visit his home in Anxi County. When 
he arrived in Fuzhou, he declined invitations by the governor and governor-general to present a 
talk in favor of delivering a series of lectures at the Aofeng Academy at Cai’s request. At Aofeng, 
Li touched on the just completed Xingli jingyi, addressing the nature of xingli and again 
criticizing the philosophy of Wang Yangming. He also summarized the commentary of several 
Song and Ming lixue scholars to clarify Cheng-Zhu philosophy’s relationship between 
knowledge and action. The lecture then transformed into a seminar of sorts; Cai invited the 
Aofeng students to pepper his mentor with difficult questions.51 Li’s lectures at Aofeng 
underscored the early Qing rejection of scholarship for its own sake in favor of employing study 
as a vehicle to achieve practical change and bring about moral transformation.  
In his stewardship of Aofeng, Cai Shiyuan echoed precisely the same themes as Li 
Guangdi had presented in his talks. While Cai labored to promote a muscular lixue philosophy at 
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Aofeng to stimulate provincial renewal, he maintained a strong affiliation with the leading 
champions of Cheng-Zhu studies on the national level. After his tenure at Aofeng, Cai returned 
to official service in Beijing as one of the Qianlong emperor’s tutors. While working at the 
imperial court, he also collaborated with scholarly luminaries like Zhu Shi and Fang Bao (1668-
1749) who labored to strengthen the Qing court’s support for Cheng-Zhu studies and its 
representation in the imperial examinations.52 For the early Aofeng leaders like Li Guangdi, 
Zhang Boxing, and the Cais, connecting the academy to national intellectual trends elevated the 
academy to the forefront of Qing Neo-Confucianism movement.  
The Aofeng directors maintained the academy’s adherence to lixue philosophy and 
Cheng-Zhu studies, even as those traditions became unfashionable relative to new modes of 
evidentiary scholarship (kaoju) emanating from Jiangnan. Throughout the 18th and early 19th 
centuries, Aofeng was headed by a series of charismatic directors with a strong commitment to 
Cheng-Zhu studies and lixue philosophy and a concomitant driving sense of moral mission. Even 
though the academy’s philosophical stance was increasingly eclipsed by cutting edge evidentiary 
studies, Aofeng students still managed to hold their own on the national stage, winning jinshi 
degrees and entering official service at all levels.  
Rates of success in the examinations may also have been influenced by another early 18th 
century Aofeng director, Zhu Shixiu, and his monthly testing of Aofeng students’ abilities in 
guwen (ancient-style) writing. Originally a style of writing favored by the likes of Ouyang Xiu 
and Wang Anshi in the Song dynasty, 18th century scholar-officials, such as Fang Bao and Yao 
Nai, in an attempt to blunt the increasing dominance of Han learning, argued before the Qianlong 
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emperor that this guwen as manifested by the eight-legged essays in the civil examinations was 
deeply linked to the imperially-sanctioned Song learning.53 Guwen therefore featured as a major 
aspect of education at Aofeng. Liang Zhangju (1775-1849), an Aofeng alumni and eminent 
official active in the early 19th century, defended the use of guwen and the eight-legged essay. In 
a text titled, Zhiyi zonghua (Collected comments on the crafting of eight-legged civil 
examination essays), Zhang extolled the aesthetic contribution of the guwen-inspired eight-
legged essays, and alleged there was no other viable alternative.54 By the time of its printing in 
1806, the Aofeng Academy gazetteer listed 154 jinshi degree winners, and added another 95 
names by the time of its reprinting in 1838.55 Additionally, Aofeng boasted many more juren 
degree winners who were scattered throughout Fujian and embedded in low-level educational 
posts (jiaoyu and xundao). The section of the Aofeng Academy gazetteer that details the 
examination success of its alumni assumes an almost apologetic tone, implying that Aofeng 
virtuosity in the civil examination contradicts its stated mission of spreading Cheng-Zhu gospel, 
yet admitting that competing in the civil examinations was an inevitable, if unfortunate, aspect of 
academy life.56 Whether or not this tone was genuine, as a result of their examination success at 
the provincial and national levels, Aofeng alumni were dispersed throughout the Qing empire in 
a network that extended from sub-bureaucratic educational posts in Fujianese counties to high 
ranking positions in the capital. 
The Aofeng Academy incorporated teachings and texts grounded in evidentiary learning 
by the Daoguang period (1820-1850), thanks to the efforts of a new director, Chen Shouqi 
(1771-1834). Chen, the son of an instructor of various Fujian academies, became known as a 
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talented scholar in his youth. His scholastic talent allowed him to enter the Aofeng Academy 
where he studied lixue under the director, Meng Chaoran, himself a former Aofeng student and a 
charismatic authority on Cheng-Zhu studies. After completing his studies at Aofeng, Chen 
attained his jinshi in 1799 and entered the Hanlin academy in Beijing. One of his examiners was 
the eminent official and kaozheng scholar, Ruan Yuan (1764-1849). Impressed with Chen, Ruan 
treated him as a disciple, and actively patronized Chen’s career. When Ruan assumed the 
Zhejiang governorship, he employed Chen as an instructor in Hangzhou’s Fuwen Academy 
while simultaneously inviting him to teach at the Gujing jingshe (Retreat for Glossing the 
Classics), an academy built by Ruan with the explicit purpose of training students in Han 
learning.57 Subsequently, Chen served in various provincial educational administrative posts 
before returning to Fujian as the director of the Qingyuan Academy in Quanzhou and finally the 
Aofeng Academy in the early Daoguang period.  
During his tenure at Aofeng, Chen introduced students to kaozheng learning and its 
methodologies, but Chen would not have regarded himself as a Han learning purist. Rather, Chen 
was concerned with combining the intellectual rigor of kaozheng studies with the moral 
imperatives of Cheng-Zhu studies to address urgent problems emerging across the Qing Empire. 
In that regard, he might be considered a syncretist of Song and Han learning, echoing some 
literati of the early nineteenth century, including another influential Aofeng alumnus, Chen 
Genghuan (1757-1820). In fact, years earlier during his stint as an examiner for the 1807 Henan 
provincial examination, Chen wrote a report in which he claimed that Song and Han learning 
both constituted the philosophical underpinnings of governance.58 Though enamored with 
kaozheng methodologies, Chen remained a deep admirer of Li Guangdi, Cai Shiyuan, and other 
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Song learning adherents and their moral commitment to shixue, or substantive studies.59 He was 
particularly concerned with the unity of righteousness (yi) and benefit (li). Troubled that the 
current age was defined by the pursuit of benefit without a concomitant commitment to 
righteousness and propriety, Chen sought to rebalance the equation by arguing that yi and li were 
self-constituting—a view that would sound familiar to other Song learning adherents.60 At the 
same time, Chen was becoming increasingly concerned that the Qing Empire was unable to 
develop new talent that could address emerging challenges of the Jiaqing and Daoguang eras. 
The main culprit, in Chen’s view, was the civil examination’s lack of practical content. In an 
essay, Chen cited Zhu Xi and Ming thinker Gui Youguang (1506-1571) to argue that pursuit of 
literary virtuosity at the expense of meaningful and practical knowledge merely fulfilled the 
career goals of ambitious men, and resulted in great harm to the country.61 Chen Shouqi was 
clearly troubled by what he perceived to be moribund institutions and their ability to produce 
new talent in order to tackle new governing challenges in creative ways. His effort to introduce 
kaozheng studies at Aofeng was an attempt to superimpose a rigorous methodology over the 
academy’s long tradition of moral learning (lixue) and emphasis on practical studies (shixue). 
Chen understood that a familiarity with kaozheng studies allowed Aofeng alumni to engage with 
scholars from outside Fujian, and ally with them as statecraft-minded officials to address the 
empire’s challenges as he had done with Ruan Yuan. Chen’s syncretic vision for Aofeng 
reflected an increased sense of urgency among educated elites towards Qing institutions, and 
signaled an attempt to draw upon various schools of thought in order to create new model 
thinkers to address the empire’s regional and national problems.  
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Aofeng Students and Financial Support 
In addition to the intellectual influence of the Academy’s directors on the Fujian region, 
the academy attracted the most promising scholars from the entire province and exerted a 
broader reach than was typical for most academies. Most academies in Fujian and across the 
empire—both private and official—served students either within a single county, or if an 
institution had more economic resources, a prefecture. Over the Qing period, approximately 470 
academies were founded in Fujian; only five of these, including Aofeng, matriculated students 
from the entire province.  
In order to sustain students from beyond the immediate vicinity of Fuzhou, Aofeng 
provided them with a stipend, room and board, clothing, and travel expenses. Student stipends, 
however, were contingent on performance. Students were tested three times a month. Those that 
performed well received small monetary rewards, while those that failed to meet expectations 
had their stipends cut. Students who continued to exhibit poor performance were expelled from 
the academy.62 As a result, student life at Aofeng was highly competitive in nature. 
Providing for students’ expenses, salaries for teachers and academy heads, ritual 
celebrations, and physical maintenance was expensive. Zhang Boxing therefore endowed Aofeng 
with land on the lower reaches of the Min River outside of Fuzhou in order to support the 
academy through funds accrued through rent, a strategy similar to other communal organizations 
such as temples, lineage shrines, and community schools. Over time, Aofeng’s rental lands 
increased through purchase and donation, and the grain generated from these lands totaled more 
than 15,000 catties a year.63 Other than funds generated by its endowed land, Aofeng regularly 
received monetary donations from official patrons and occasionally from the imperial court. In 
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1733, the Yongzheng emperor donated 1000 taels to the academy; five years later in 1738 the 
Qianlong emperor presented the academy with another 1000 taels.  
Apart from monetary gifts, the emperors of the high Qing also signaled their approval of 
the Aofeng academy through symbolic marks of distinction. Soon after the academy’s founding, 
the Kangxi emperor gifted the academy with a scroll of his calligraphy in 1711 and presented the 
academy with a gift of three texts on calligraphy in 1716. Years later, the Qianlong emperor 
followed suit with his own gift of a text and scroll of his own calligraphy as a mark of imperial 
favor.64  
The relative wealth of Aofeng contrasted with the more typically precarious financial 
circumstances of other late imperial academies. Aofeng heads, Qing officials serving in Fujian, 
and other patrons appeared to understand that the financial support of students at the province’s 
most esteemed academy was something to be carefully maintained. With such patronage and 
financial support, Aofeng students understood that they were the scholarly cream of the province, 
and enjoyed a coveted academic status, and a special destiny as future Qing officials and in the 
maintenance of Fujian’s scholarly traditions. 
 
Aofeng Academy Library and the Distribution of Lixue Texts 
Aofeng scholars’ access to one of coastal China’s most impressive libraries served as a 
further means by which Aofeng could disseminate information and in particular, lixue texts 
throughout the region. Initially seeded by a donation of books by Zhang Boxing, the library’s 
collection steadily grew through book purchases, donations by supportive officials and private 
individuals, and even gifts from the imperial court., eventually reaching more than one thousand 
 




titles by the early Jiaqing period. Although the Aofeng collection possessed a rich assortment of 
texts on lixue philosophy, the collection included generous offerings in the classics, histories, 
geography, commentaries, literary collections, as well as books on art, calligraphy, agriculture, 
medicine, law and novels. Strict rules governed the use of the collection and maintained its 
integrity; students who damaged or lost books were fined to cover the cost of their replacement.65 
The library and its extensive collections sealed Aofeng’s reputation as the most significant 
academy in Fujian, and provided ample resources for students to maintain their scholarly 
dominance in the province. 
Aofeng not only possessed one of the most significant libraries in southern China, but it 
also sponsored reprints of important and rare lixue texts, helping spread the gospel of lixue 
throughout Fujian. As the clout of the academy among official and private circles expanded the 
library’s collections over time, some officials worried that the concentration of texts in Aofeng 
impeded efforts by other academies in Fujian to develop their own textual collections.  
Chen Hongmou, a statecraft-oriented official and a Cheng-Zhu devotee, was a great 
admirer of Zhang Boxing and the mission of the Aofeng Academy to reform Fujian through 
cultivating generations of students steeped in lixue learning. When serving as the governor of 
Fujian in the 1750s, Chen patronized the academy by donating 170 titles on lixue philosophy and 
guanxue learning with the order that the Aofeng students use the texts in order to devise 
agricultural improvements for the province.66 At the same time, Chen conducted an audit of the 
library’s inventory and discovered that it possessed duplicate copies of texts acquired from well-
meaning donors. After his discovery of the extra texts, Chen ordered that Aofeng reprint its 
essential texts and have them distributed to other schools and academies in Fujian in order to 
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more reach more students in other parts of the province—a key theme of Chen’s approach to 
administration and education.67 Therefore, Aofeng’s library and its print projects help seed 
literary collections in other provincial academies, further spreading and entrenching the gospel of 
lixue across Fujian.   
 
Aofeng Shrines: The Creation of an Intellectual and Ritual Lineage 
 A program of rites honoring selected worthies further undergirded and articulated the 
academy’s intellectual commitments.  Ritual worship at the Aofeng Academy constituted an 
essential component of academy life. According to the academy’s rules, the Aofeng director 
(shanzhang) would lead students to each of several shrines to burn incense at the beginning of 
each month. In each spring and autumn, the director, students, and teachers would carry out a 
much bigger ceremony involving incense, ritual music, and the consumption of sacramental 
foods in order to celebrate those enshrined.68 The choice of which worthies to honor in the 
academy’s shrines made a strong statement about its philosophical orientation and local roots 
and also had implications for its program of scholarship and moral-political action. More 
importantly, the tiered Aofeng shrines effectively created a spiritual and intellectual lineage for 
the academy, and the Aofeng students constituted its descendants and worthy heirs.  
The shrines at Aofeng consisted of three hierarchical tiers. The first tier belonged to the 
core cohort of Song Neo-Confucians and the progenitors of regional lixue schools, namely Zhou 
Dunyi (1017-1073), Zhang Zai (1020-1070), the two Cheng brothers, Cheng Hao (1032-1085) 
and Cheng Yi (1033-1107), and Zhu Xi (1130-1200). Of these five core philosophers, Zhu Xi 
was indisputably the patron saint of Aofeng. As the most prominent lixue philosopher and a 
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Fujian native and thus the progenitor of Minxue (“Fujian learning”), Zhu Xi occupied Aofeng’s 
central ritual space. Rites honoring Zhu Xi connected Aofeng students to the ongoing 
transregional Neo-Confucian revival movement, while students, by labeling their practice 
Minxue (“Min Studies”; Min is an archaic name for Fujian province), celebrated local Fujianese 
identity.  
Zhang Boxing and early associates of the Aofeng Academy next searched the Song 
History (Songshi), Ming History (Mingshi), the Fujian provincial gazetteer, and the Daonan 
yuanwei, a collection of biographies of prominent Confucians, and selected twenty-three 
Fujianese lixue adherents to receive ritual worship at Aofeng for the academy’s second tier of 
shrines.69 Spanning the Northern Song through the Ming dynasties, the individuals of the second 
tier celebrated Fujian’s achievements in lixue studies, amplified Zhu Xi’s prominence, and 
frequently modeled virtuous action and integrity under severe duress. Several of the enshrined 
individuals were Fujianese disciples of Zhu Xi and the Cheng brothers.  
Many of those in the second tier served as high officials during the late Northern Song 
dynasty, grappled with the collapse of the Song court and the Jurchen Jin invasion, and 
transmitted Neo-Confucian thought in the new Southern Song regime. Chief among this group 
were individuals like Li Gang (1083-1140), Yang Shi (1053-1135), You Zuo (1053-1123), and 
Hu Anguo (1074-1138). At the close of the Northern Song dynasty, individuals in this group 
advocated a vigorous military response to the invading Jin and continued to maintain a hawkish 
anti-Jin stance during the early years of the Southern Song. Prominent among this group, Li 
Gang, in addition to his capacity as a high official, was also a general who directed the military 
during the Jin siege of Kaifeng, shepherded the “mobile court” of the Southern Song emperor, 
 




and managed the new Song defenses below the Yangzi River.70 Intellectually—and politically— 
this group opposed the New Policies (Xinfa) of the scholar-statesman, Wang Anshi (1021-1086) 
and his later partisans, like Cai Jing (1047-1126). Because the controversial New Policies had 
been ascendant during the Huizong reign, conservatives blamed the fall of the Northern Song on 
Wang and the influence of his reforms. In response, Southern Song Neo-Confucians and anti-
Wang scholars produced new interpretations of the Zhouli (Rites of Zhou), the text on which 
Wang based his New Policies, in order to reclaim the text and undermine the foundation for his 
political and social programs.71 Emblematic of this intellectual trend, Yang Shi, an ally of Li 
Gang, used his post as chancellor of the National University to attack Wang and New Policy 
officials. Credited with transmitting Neo-Confucianism to south China, Yang wrote treatises 
attacking the New Policies and his disciples authored new interpretations of the Zhouli in order 
to reinstate conservative policies in the nascent Southern Song dynasty.72   
The anti-Wang Anshi stance articulated by many of the Song scholars enshrined at 
Aofeng suggested a tacit support for Wang’s archrival, Sima Guang. In contrast to Wang’s 
conceptualization of an activist government using its power to increase state wealth and social 
equality, Sima advocated for a far more limited governmental role in the maintenance of local 
society. Sima argued that the government had no meaningful role in encouraging the production 
of wealth, nor should it seek to produce a more equal society and break down social distinctions. 
Instead, local elites should use their position and influence to maintain the social order and 
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encourage productive work among all classes. Other Qing dynasty adherents of Song studies and 
Cheng-Zhu philosophy had a similarly dim view of Wang Anshi and his activist New Policies. 
Notably, Chen Hongmou embraced Sima’s “conservative” social and political stance, yet he was 
far more sanguine about the role of state to produce to make a positive impact on the economy, 
production, education, than Sima would likely have condoned; however, Chen identified deeply 
with the Song thinker’s emphasis on moral self-cultivation and “humanistic approach to the tasks 
of governance.”73 For early Qing officials and thinkers, identification with Sima Guang certainly 
did not preclude the use of state power to achieve economic and social goals, but a purely 
technocratic interpretation of governance was to be eschewed. Good governance—and use of 
state power to influence the economy and society—demanded a commitment to moral self-
cultivation.  
The anti-Jin stance of the men enshrined at Aofeng was potentially subversive. Their 
embrace of Neo-Confucianism and their achievements in transmitting the philosophy in the 
Southern Song was matched by their militant opposition to the Jurchen Jin, from whom the 
Manchus claimed direct decent. The question of the Qing rulers’ status as an alien people and 
their claims of political legitimacy to rule China remained a highly sensitive question well into 
the 18th century. Song criticism of the Jin could easily be interpreted as a veiled attack on the 
Qing. Hu Anguo, an opponent of Wang Anshi’s reforms and a transmitter of the Neo-Confucian 
way in the Southern Song, and his sons Yin and Hong (all of whom were enshrined in Aofeng) 
studied the Spring and Autumn Annals and devised principles in order to evaluate historical 






highly influenced Zhu Xi’s guide to organize historical facts to render ethical judgments.74 At the 
same time, the elder Hu and his sons wrote trenchant attacks on the Jin using highly charged, 
racialized terms. Denunciation of the Jin in the 12th century could be employed as criticism of the 
Qing in the 17th and 18th centuries—and it was. In one example, Wang Fuzhi (1619-1691), a 17th 
century Ming loyalist scholar from Hunan, studied the vision of history as laid out in the Hushi 
chunqiu zhuan and cited Hu Anguo’s Zhuo rangyi zun Zhou zhi dayi (On the principles of 
expelling the barbarians and venerating the Zhou) in his own anti-Manchu texts.75 Certainly, the 
anti-Jurchen position of some of the enshrined men and their texts could have been used by anti-
Qing partisans to attack the dynasty.  
In fact, the 23rd and final individual enshrined at Aofeng was Huang Daozhou (1585-
1646), a Ming loyalist from south Fujian who fought against the Qing. Huang had been a high 
official and scholar in the late Ming and an enthusiastic member of the Donglin clique and 
Restoration Society (Fushe) pushing for political reform. His outspokenness and moral rigidity 
during the Tianqi and Chongzhen reigns caused him to be demoted, banished, and imprisoned.76 
Huang deftly cultivated a reputation for loyalty and filial piety, which increased his political 
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appeal to other late Ming reformers.77 After the collapse of the Ming, Huang joined the court of 
the Prince of Tang based in Fuzhou. Disappointed with the military inaction of the opportunistic 
Zheng Zhilong, he led his own low budget military campaign out of Fuzhou, hoping that the 
people would rise up against the Qing. Yet, it was not to be. He was captured a few months later 
and executed at Nanjing. Huang was enshrined at Aofeng in recognition of his scholarship and 
for embodying the virtue of loyalty—loyalty to ethical principles in the face of intense political 
pressure and then for his loyalty to the fallen Ming. While the anti-Jin stance of Southern Song 
Neo-Confucians retained a subversive subtext under the Manchus, the Qing court later embraced 
Ming loyalists like Huang for embodying core ethical values. In contrast to “twice-serving 
officials” (erchen huan) The Qianlong emperor praised Huang as a “perfect man for the age” 
(yidai wanren) and enshrined him in the Confucian temple.78 
Aofeng’s second tier pantheon is notable for its celebration of both scholarly attainment 
and political action. The individuals of the second tier manifested their scholastic talent—and 
sincere belief in in lixue ideals—through actions intended to benefit the state and the orthodox 
social order, often at great personal cost. These enshrined individuals therefore constituted a 
model of Fujianese intellectual and political tradition from the Northern Song to the close of the 
Ming—a tradition that was to be carried on and transmitted by Aofeng students, the natural heirs 
to this lineage. Membership in this fictive lineage implied that Aofeng students, assuming they 
acquired the requisite lixue orientation, possessed a legitimate political voice and could use it in a 
way to similarly benefit the state and social order. 
 The final tier of Aofeng shrines honored both officials posted to Fujian who patronized 
the academy and charismatic Aofeng directors (shanzhang). Called the “Shrine to the three 
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worthies and five teachers” (San xian wu xiansheng ci) the shrine later expanded to include 
twenty-three officials and directors, including former patrons like the governor Chen 
Hongmou.79 Nearby, Zhang Boxing was posthumously honored with a separate shrine, befitting 
his status as the academy’s founder. Finally, Aofeng also included a Wenchang pavilion 
dedicated to a popular Daoist deity beloved of scholars built in 1752 by Chen Hongmou, and a 
shrine to the local earth god.80 
 Over the course of a year, ritual life at Aofeng continually reinforced the academy’s core 
moral, philosophical and localist messages. Participation in the monthly rituals and the biannual 
celebrations bound Aofeng students into a larger imagined community, constituted in relation to 
a muscular lixue philosophy, a proud tradition of local scholarship, and the duty to put thought 
into practicable action—particularly in the political field. The Aofeng Academy created a 
distinctly Fujianese tradition of lixue philosophy and action embodied by native luminary Zhu Xi 
and the enshrined Fujianese Song and Ming adherents. The Aofeng shrines constituted 
(architecturally) an intellectual and spiritual lineage. The directors, students, and alumni of the 
Aofeng Academy were the heirs to this lineage which had local and empire-wide implications. 
 
Part III: Aofeng and Regional Advocacy in the 19th Century 
 The Academy’s role as a ritual center at the heart of a network of like-minded alumni laid 
the foundations for its transformation into a regional think tank to promote, popularize, and 
lobby in support of pressing provincial issues. The Aofeng directors and alumni leveraged their 
position and expertise to develop proposals which they presented to officials in Fuzhou and 
Beijing. In the late Qianlong period, Aofeng men perceived a disturbing decline in the state’s 
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ability to manage an increasingly troubled maritime frontier. In an effort to bolster the state’s 
effectiveness and to promote the interests of the province—particularly economic and security 
interests—Aofeng directors and alumni provided officials with “expert” information regarding 
local maritime policy, thereby translating Cheng-Zhu commitments into action. Intersecting with 
the rising influence of statecraft in Qing intellectual life in the early 19th century, the directors 
and alumni of the Aofeng “think tank” confronted serious local issues and developed plans of 
action to resolve them.  
  
Aofeng Academy in the 18th Century 
While Aofeng men had often served as ad hoc experts on the maritime frontier and 
hawkish campaigners for the Qing colonization of Taiwan even in earlier periods, their influence 
on Qing policy grew during the nineteenth century. 18th century antecedents provided a useful 
model for 19th century affiliates intent on applying their knowledge to a muscular vision of 
maritime governance that included expanding the Qing presence on Taiwan.  Li Guangdi, one of 
the academy’s honorary founders, originally caught the eye of the Kangxi court not for his lixue 
scholarship but for his role in the Qing conquest of Fujian and Taiwan. Living through the Ming-
Qing transition and personally affected by the turmoil—alternately kidnapped by bandits and 
pressed into the service of a rump Ming regime—Li won the confidence of the Kangxi emperor 
by guiding the Qing armies into Fujian at great personal risk. Li furthermore was an enthusiastic 
proponent of the Qing taking over Taiwan and proposed using the admiral Shi Lang, a former 
confederate of Zheng Chenggong, to carry out the task.81  
 




Cai Shiyuan, the Aofeng Academy director and Li Guangdi’s former protégé, was also 
extremely bullish on the Qing colonization of Taiwan. From his position as the Aofeng Academy 
director, he advised the governor-general and other high ranking officials on how to govern the 
island, manage local violence there, and promote stability through grain cultivation and cross-
strait grain shipments.82 After his tenure at Aofeng, Cai returned to official service in Beijing. 
There, the Yongzheng emperor created a short-lived office for the rectification of Fujianese 
customs (Fujian guanfeng zhengsu shi) and recruited Cai to head it.83 From this position, Cai, 
now an “expert” on Fujianese affairs in the eyes of the emperor, provided Yongzheng with inside 
information about the maritime frontier. 
Lan Dingyuan (1680-1733), another Aofeng affiliate, also advised the Yongzheng 
emperor on coastal affairs. Regarded as an expert in maritime affairs and geography by 
information-starved Qing officials, Lan briefed the emperor on the history of the region, its 
geography, and techniques for governing Taiwan. Due to his expertise on maritime affairs and 
geography, the Yongzheng emperor appointed Lan to administrative posts in coastal Guangdong 
where he assiduously promoted Song- learning. In one dramatic episode reminiscent of Zhang 
Boxing’s conversion of Christian churches into Zhu Xi shrines, Lan expropriated the shrine of a 
heterodox cult and transformed it into an academy that sacrificed to Song philosophers.84 
 Personal and familial ties, rather than academic predilections, inspired Aofeng men to 
take an interest in Taiwan and maritime affairs. Li Guangdi and his family suffered personally 
due to the disorder that accompanied the dynastic transition. Lan Dingyuan, a native of coastal 
Zhangpu County in southern Fujian, was part of a larger naval lineage. His maritime and Taiwan 
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“expertise” stemmed from his experience accompanying his cousin in the Qing navy during the 
outbreak of the Zhu Yigui Rebellion in Taiwan (1721), and his subsequent publication on the 
history of that rebellion, the “Record of the Pacification of Taiwan” (Ping Tai ji). Cai Shiyuan’s 
family had business interests in the cross-strait shipping sphere. A year after his accession as the 
Yongzheng emperor’s expert on rectifying wayward Fujianese customs, Cai’s son was 
implicated by the governor-general of Zhejiang and Fujian for fraudulently issuing shipping 
license to maritime merchants.85 From these examples, it is clear that Aofeng alumni and their 
extended families were deeply embedded within the business and security concerns of the 
maritime frontier. 
The Aofeng alumni of the early 18th century maintained strong connections to the 
maritime frontier, Fuzhou officials, and Beijing politics. They used their position to influence 
Qing policy on the provincial and national level. By the end of the Qianlong period and the 
beginning of the 19th century, however, a shift was underway. Dissatisfaction with the court in 
Beijing and a progressively turbulent maritime frontier compelled Aofeng directors and alumni 
to influence Qing policy more locally and with increasing urgency. The directors more 
consciously elevated Aofeng as a think tank to advocate for pressing maritime issues and began 
to shift the educational curriculum towards statecraft and governance. 
 
Aofeng in the 19th Century 
 The likes of Li Guangdi, Cai Shiyuan, and Lan Dingyuan laid the groundwork for 
Aofeng’s 19th century embrace of statecraft and its overriding concern with provincial and 
maritime affairs. It was the tenure of Zheng Guangce (1759-1804), however, that caused the 
 




decisive shift at the tail end of the Qianlong reign. As readers will recall from the anecdote at the 
beginning of the chapter, Zheng’s disillusionment at the corrupt state of the Qing court pushed 
him away from an official career and compelled him to return to Fujian. The pull to pursue 
statecraft and address urgent local issues arrived in the form of a disconcerting sign of waning 
Qing power, the rebellion of Lin Shuangwen in Taiwan.  
 The Lin Shuangwen Rebellion in Taiwan and the massive Qing military response in 1787 
to quell it struck Zheng and other Fujian elites as an existential threat to the province, its security, 
and its ability to feed itself. Seizing the moment, Zheng lobbied the Qing commander, Fukang’an, 
with a plan detailing the re-conquest of the island. The first eight points dealt directly with 
military strategy, such as making use of local braves to fight the rebels, making efficient use of 
Qing resources by smashing the rebels’ strongholds, and opening up villages to disperse the 
rebels’ power. The final four points addressed what Zheng perceived to be the root cause of the 
disturbance—economic and agricultural instability. Zheng, like generations of thinkers before 
him, recognized the vulnerability of Fujian and Taiwan to cycles of drought, surges in grain 
prices, and famine. He also understood the centrality of merchants to the economic health of the 
province and island, and the essential role they played in ensuring consistent supplies of grain at 
stable prices. Therefore, Zheng suggested, as the Qing looked forward to reconstruction, that 
commercial links between Taiwan and the mainland be restored and broadened, that regulations 
regarding trade be loosened in order to encourage more merchants to ship rice and essentials 
across the straits, and that the safety of merchant ships from pirates take top priority.86  
 Fukang’an was extremely impressed with Zheng and his proposals and invited him to 
serve on his staff in Taiwan as a muyou. Zheng declined the offer, however, citing the need to 
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take care of his aged mother. After the rebellion was put down, Zheng again lobbied the new 
Fujian governor the following year on his proposals for reconstruction that would mitigate future 
violent outbreaks. As in his previous plan presented to Fukang’an, Zheng’s proposals dealt 
mostly with economy and production. Zheng’s plan detailed methods to return peasants, 
particularly the most destitute ones, back to the land. At the same time, the government needed 
to exercise closer management of property disputes and the responsibility to run military farms in 
order to assert closer oversight and prevent disputes from metastasizing into larger 
disturbances.87 
 The rebellion in Taiwan compelled Zheng to examine the uprising’s social dynamics and 
to use his position and influence to address long-running problems with Fujian’s particular 
ecology and vulnerabilities. In Zheng’s view, the most essential things were to ensure 
productivity among small-time cultivators and incentives for sea-faring merchants.  These 
commitments presaged a longtime preoccupation with economic and agricultural security. 
Mirroring contemporary thinkers like Hong Liangji and Bao Shichen, Zheng was deeply 
concerned with production, finance, and profit (li). Acutely aware of the connection between 
economic hardship and social violence in Fujian and Taiwan, Zheng was primarily concerned 
with the precarity of smalltime cultivators, seafaring merchants, and coastal residents who eked 
out a living producing salt. He was most forceful in his advocacy of the improvement and 
expansion of irrigation infrastructure to support the agricultural economy. Though most 
obviously concerned with the outlook in his home province, Zheng was also concerned about the 
economic health of the Qing Empire and the need to maintain agricultural output in order to 
sustain basic subsistence. Zheng understood that the empire’s agricultural health was primarily a 
 




problem of geography. Although the southern half of the empire enjoyed favorable climate and 
plentiful water, the land itself could not sustain the rapidly increasing population. The problem in 
the north, however, was precisely the opposite: land was plentiful, but water was scarce. Adding 
to the geographical pressure was the ponderous tribute rice system. Thus, Zheng advocated a 
massive expansion in irrigation infrastructure in the north to expand cultivation and increase 
agricultural productivity. In turn, a more prosperous north would relieve the economic pressure 
in the south.88 
 Zheng Guangce’s experience with the rebellion in Taiwan and his deep interest in 
statecraft became the central thrust of his teaching philosophy as the director of the Aofeng 
Academy. During his tenure, Zheng worried about the increasing disconnect between study and 
utility.  He argued that students ought to learn for the purpose of bringing about real-world 
results (jing bang ji shi), and designed lessons that reflected his commitment to statecraft. At the 
same time, he encouraged Aofeng students to dedicate themselves to a worthy cause, study what 
previous thinkers had written about a particular topic, and use the classical tradition to make a 
reasonable judgment in order to achieve meaningful, real-world results (shi xi pi yan). In the 
heady atmosphere of the early Jiaqing reign, Zheng drilled statecraft studies into his students, 
and encouraged them to read and think broadly and practically. One of his students, Lin Zexu, 
would later record his teacher’s formative impact at Aofeng and recall his exhortation to 
“understand the substance of things and become useful” (mingti dayong). Clearly, Zheng wanted 
to raise a new generation of morally-grounded scholars explicitly oriented towards practicality 
and statecraft at Aofeng, even as he lobbied ranking territorial officials with his administrative 
and economic proposals. 
 




 The turn to statecraft began during the early 19th century and accelerated under Chen 
Shouqi’s tenure as the academy director. In the late Jiaqing period, Chen had replaced You 
Guangyi, the successor of Zheng Guangce. A native of Xiapu County in northern Fujian, You 
(jinshi winner of 1789) had served in the territorial administration in Shaanxi in the early Jiaqing 
period. There, he took advantage of the new emperor’s opening the pathway of words (yanlu) in 
order to voice criticism regarding the selection and alleged misuse of personnel in the Qing 
administration. Although the details of his complaint remain obscure, You’s criticism greatly 
displeased Jiaqing. The emperor ordered him removed from his post, but You was tapped to be 
the new director at Aofeng following his disgrace.89 At Aofeng, You presided over the 
publication of the academy’s first gazetteer, and solicited prefaces from the governor-general, 
governor, and other ranking officials in Taiwan. A product of his historical moment—making his 
career at Aofeng after angering the Jiaqing emperor with his political criticisms—You eventually 
displeased a later governor who alleged that his oversight of students was lax. Chen was 
appointed to discipline Aofeng by reinstituting Zhang Boxing’s rules based on Zhu Xi’s 
academy regulations.  
 Born the son of an academy director, Chen shared many he shared several points of 
reference and interests with Zheng Guangce. As a young man of 18 sui, the Lin Shuangwen 
Rebellion also constituted a formative experience, and he composed a widely circulated poem 
praising the military response and extolling Fukang’an, the campaign commander. Deeply 
interested in the Fujianese lixue tradition, Chen eventually matriculated into the Aofeng 
Academy and studied under the same charismatic lixue advocate, Meng Chaoran. Unlike Zheng, 
however, Chen enjoyed an official career. As previously mentioned, his affiliation with Ruan 
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Yuan changed his scholarly perspective somewhat, and he developed a Han-Song syncretist 
approach. Chen’s changing perspective was not only due to Ruan’s influence, but also stemmed 
from an increasing sense of urgency and danger from the massive pirate fleets during the early 
Jiaqing period. As Chen taught at the Fuwen Academy in Hangzhou, he looked on with worry 
and dismay as his mentor assumed the governorship of Zhejiang and struggled to deal with pirate 
raids that were now extending along the coasts of Guangdong, Fujian, and Zhejiang.  
 Fears over maritime security, unrest in Taiwan, food security, and the vulnerable 
economic lives of coastal peoples inspired Chen’s Fujian and maritime advocacy during his 
tenure as the Aofeng Academy director. Like his predecessors, Chen used his position at the 
Aofeng Academy to influence ranking officials in residence in Fuzhou. Chen wrote frequently to 
the governor-general, governor and other high officials on urgent local and Fujianese affairs, 
particularly anti-pirate strategy, local affrays (xiedou), grain shipping networks between the 
mainland and Taiwan, fluctuations in rice pricing, the salt and fishing trades, the state of 
provincial waterworks, and opium.90 Like his predecessor, Chen was most impressed with the 
linkage between economic insecurity and violence. He evinced particular concern with the lot of 
who worked in vulnerable professions, notably smalltime cultivators, fishermen, and salt-makers. 
His proposals laid out Fujian’s maritime affairs in the context of the province’s history, 
geography, and natural and social ecology in order to provide transient imperial officials with a 
frame of reference and “expert” opinions. The Aofeng directorship was becoming a center from 
which to catch the ear of resident officials and influence local policy.  
 Why would local officials pay attention to the Aofeng directors and entertain their policy 
proposals on governing the maritime frontier? The institutional and cultural authority of the 
 




academy and the characteristics of the directorship may provide some clues. First, Aofeng 
enjoyed endorsement and support from three Qing emperors, and its philosophical outlook 
matched the Qing orthodoxy of lixue. The academy also enjoyed a close working relationship 
with Fuzhou officials themselves—officials proctored one of the Aofeng examinations (guanke) 
and oversaw the academy finances. Second, the Aofeng directors were frequently former 
officials themselves and at least holders of the jinshi degree. In Beijing, they ran in the same 
social circles, and understood courtly and official life Thus, the directors were the peers of the 
officials, providing them a source of affinity. Officials and Aofeng directors were both socially 
and spatially proximate: because the provincial and prefectural yamens were all clustered in 
Fuzhou, and thus a consultation with the Aofeng director was easily procured.  
Adding to this mix was the increasing cultural clout of the Aofeng Academy in the early 
19th century, particularly under the leadership of Chen Shouqi. Within Aofeng, Chen 
reinvigorated the strict Zhu Xi-inspired regulations, and instituted an educational agenda that de-
emphasized the pursuit of examination success in favor of a more expansive educational vision, 
in which utility and practical problem-solving assumed a more central focus for Aofeng 
Academy students. As Chen sought to personally embody the virtue of utility by lobbying 
Fujian’s officials with statecraft-inspired proposals, he also took seriously proposals by other 
Aofeng alumni scattered throughout Fujian in sub-bureaucratic posts and helped popularize them, 
as will be shown in Chapter Three. Additionally, he campaigned to elevate Aofeng notables 
beyond the academy gates and expand their cultural clout. First, he lobbied Fujian officials to 
have several distinguished Aofeng alumni be granted entry into the Shrine for Local Worthies 
(Xiangxian ci). Included in the shrine was Chen Genghuan, an early proponent of Han-Song 




changed Qing policy on the central level. Second, Chen was successful in elevating one of the 
Aofeng lineage members entry into the Confucian Temple in Beijing: Huang Daozhou. The 
Aofeng Academy would now have one of its own enshrined in the capital. From Fuzhou to 
Beijing, the enshrinement of Aofeng alumni and lineage members reinforced their increasing 
relevance and activism in local and national political life. 
 Indeed, Aofeng alumni and associates who did not possess a jinshi degree or enjoy an 
illustrious official career were becoming more politically active in local political life. And 
whereas the directors of Aofeng lobbied officials with from a position of complementary peerage 
and cooperation, those occupying a lower social station and scattered throughout the province 
were often much more confrontational. As will be detailed in later chapters, Aofeng alumni who 
worked in the sub-bureaucratic post of instructor (jiaoyu and xundao) in particular were 
becoming more active politically. 
 
Instructor Agitation and Aofeng Alumni Protests 
In one example, an Aofeng alumni named Wu Yulin (juren 1777) served in seven 
successive stints as an instructor in various Fujianese and Taiwanese counties. In keeping with 
the Aofeng ethos, Wu expanded the boundaries of his teaching post by seeking to promote local 
benefit and dispel harmful practices (xingli chubi wei jiren). Additionally, he was a close 
observer of local practices, and wrote several collections of poetry based on his experiences. In 
his final post, he was stationed in Fengshan County in southern Taiwan, where he actively 
stimulated agricultural production by revamping the local waterworks, enlarging the reservoir 
ponds, and facilitating irrigation. At the same time, Wu exposed the magistrate’s administrative 




officials but was rebuffed. In an act of defiance, Wu refused to welcome the magistrate back at 
the outskirts of the county, citing passages from the text of educational administration (Xuezheng 
quanshu) to justify his actions. For his outspokenness and lack of respect, Wu was framed, and 
forced into exile in Hunan.91 Clearly, Wu understood his role to be more than that of a mere 
teacher: by improving the livelihoods of residents in concrete ways and exposing the misdeeds of 
the magistrate he elevated himself as a local advocate, even at great personal risk.  
 Aofeng alumni continued to assert themselves in Fujian’s politics in the Jiaqing period, 
and targeted official corruption through dramatic displays of mass action. In one instance in 1817, 
a strange case of corruption and suicide gripped Fujian. Li Gengyun (1754-1817), the Fujian 
buzhengshi, was arrested for alleged corruption. Interrogated by the governor-general, Wang 
Zhiyi, and the governor, Wang Shaolan, he strenuously protested his innocence, and hanged 
himself in his cell. The shocked Jiaqing emperor dispatched imperial envoys to Fujian in order to 
get to the truth of the matter. As the envoys approached Fuzhou, they were met by four hundred 
literati protesters and several thousand other participants led by an Aofeng alumni, Lin 
Guangtian. Lin was another of the famed Meng Chaoran students, and a devotee of Zhu Xi. 
While a promising student, he did not achieve much examination success. Becoming a 
shengyuan in 1807, he made his living as a tutor. As the envoys approached, Lin and the 400 
literati presented them with a petition that called for justice for the dead Li and an investigation 
into his persecutors, particularly the governor-general and governor. The envoys also discovered 
that Lin and the literati protesters had also constructed a shrine to the dead Li (aizhuan ci). 
According to Lin’s biography, he requested that Chen Shouqi compose a record (ji) for this 
 




shrine, but I have not located it.92 Qing archival documents preserve a list of the names of the 
literati protestors. As the leader of the literati protest, Lin’s name appears first. The other names 
are categorized according to degree status from juren down to tongsheng, and finally ending with 
the local elders  (qi min). Not a single jinshi holder appears in the list.93 As a result of the 
envoy’s investigation, Wang Zhiyi and Wang Shaolan were removed from their posts and 
permanently barred from an official career. There appears to have been no negative 
consequences for Lin or the literati protesters for their dramatic action. 
 Why would four hundred literati protestors led by a tutor from the Aofeng Academy care 
so passionately about “justice” for a dead official? There are no clear answers why Lin and his 
band felt such disgust towards the ranking Fujian officials that it prompted so dramatic an action. 
At the same time, another Aofeng alumni named Zhang Jiliang observed the unfolding events 
and included his thoughts on the affair in a private collection of biographies. In Zhang’s gossipy 
backstory, the whole affair was entirely due to a clash of rival officials within the Fujian 
administration. It was touched off by Wu Xiangxian, yet another Aofeng alumnus and jinshi 
degree holder. Wu, a close associate of the governor-general Wang Zhiyi, asked Li Gengyun to 
release a robber who was a friend of his son. Li refused the favor, and the governor-general bore 
him a grudge. The corruption charge provided a convenient pretext to get rid of Li. After Li’s 
suicide, an ambitious circuit intendant named Sun Erzhun whipped up public sentiment against 
Wang and the governor. He made particular use of aggrieved salt merchants who were angry 
over the policies of the governor-general. The public pressure eventually caused the removal of 
Wang Zhiyi, and Sun Erzhun took his position as the new governor-general.94 Whatever the truth 
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of these allegations and whatever the source of Zhang’s information, the account is notable for 
its utter disgust with the state of officials in Fujian (and even with one Aofeng alumni). 
Presented as out of touch and more concerned more with petty advantage in the service of career 
advancement than good administration, Zhang appeared to channel the frustration felt by his 
fellow classmates and lower-degree holders against provincial officials. One could also read 
Zhang’s biographies as a didactic tale of the consequences of bad administration: the horrifying 
coda of the Li Gengyun affair resulted in the carnage of the Sun Erzhun administration. In the 
following biography of Sun, Zhang related how a disturbance in Taiwan compelled the new 
governor-general to cross the strait and massacre innocents there in a cynical ploy to ingratiate 
himself with the Jiaqing emperor.95   
 From the 18th to the 19th century, there appears to have been a shift in the orientation of 
those Aofeng alumni involved in regional advocacy. Those like Cai Shiyuan and Lan Dingyuan 
maintained a dual provincial and national orientation, and directly appealed to Qing emperors 
based on their presumed expertise in maritime affairs and with the understanding that important 
matters were decided at Beijing. By the turn of the 19th century, Aofeng directors, deeply 
troubled by corruption and dysfunction at the Qianlong court, focused their advocacy at 
provincial levels, targeting officials in residence in Fuzhou. At the same time, directors like 
Zheng Guangce and Chen Shouqi intensified their efforts to promote statecraft education at the 
Aofeng Academy in order to foster new generations of students less concerned with examination 
success than with affecting meaningful change on the local and provincial levels. Their efforts 
appeared to have been at least somewhat effective. Former Aofeng students were scattered 






They also occupied sub-bureaucratic posts in counties throughout Fujian and Taiwan. Anxious to 
bring about practical help for people in their locality, they were also increasingly unafraid to 
challenge Qing officials. Indeed, Wu Yulin the instructor and Lin Guangtian the lowly tutor 
showed real contempt for Qing officials perceived to be corrupt or incompetent. Over the early 
19th century, the Aofeng Academy had fostered new generations of empowered alumni eager to 
confront backyard challenges, and obstreperous enough to challenge imperial administrators.  
 
Conclusion 
This chapter traced the evolution of the Aofeng Academy over two centuries, from an 
institution rooted in the intellectual commitments of 17th century lixue to a center for advocating 
solutions to local maritime issues in the 19th century. This change of the reflects a long-term 
trend of broadening participation by graduates of the Academy in conducting local affairs and 
consequentially, the devolution of responsibility for regional issues to lower ranking officials. 
This process was made possible by the convergence of several factors. The first was the role of 
the Aofeng ritual lineage which celebrated former worthies who had been involved in pressing 
local affairs and implicitly encouraged living members of the lineage to do the same. Thus, 
successive generations of Aofeng alumni were legitimized in their efforts to become involved in 
local affairs. Such involvement of Aofeng alumni contributed to an already emerging provincial 
orientation and identity in Fujian by the 19th century. Increasingly, the Aofeng Academy 
emphasized the study of statecraft focused on officials impacting change as opposed to obtaining 
knowledge for the sake of scholarship.  Finally, Aofeng alumni benefitted from a willing 
audience in Qing officials who were willing to listen to them because of they were regarded as 







The Surprising Significance of the Insignificant: The Social Life of the County Instructor 
In his classic study, Local Government in China Under the Ch’ing, T’ung-tsu Ch’ü 
devotes a section of his analysis of the structure of the county government to discuss “the 
insignificance of subordinate officials.” Ch’ü argues that all subcounty county functionaries, 
regarded as “idle officials” (xiancao) and “superfluous officials” (rongguan), played no 
meaningful role in county government, thereby forcing the local magistrate and his staff to 
shoulder the wide-ranging burdens of county administration. Included in Ch’ü’s list of “idle 
officials” were the county educational officers (jiaozhi), the instructor (jiaoyu), and assistant 
instructor (xundao).96 But just how insignificant were these subcounty officials, really? And did 
their role change over time?  How might the picture change if we examine archival sources and 
the writings of educational officials themselves? And how might renewed attention to their role 
change our perspective on how state and society operated at the lowest levels? This chapter 
explores the institutional and social roles of subcounty educational officials, namely the county 
instructor. Officially, these “idle officials” oversaw county educational and ritual life, but 
unofficially their work was more complex. While instructors labored as low-level bureaucrats, 
they often did so within their home province and retained strong local ties. Because they 
performed services vital to the state by controlling students and monitoring local literary life, 
their connection to their home province and ability to marshal local resources presented 
instructors with opportunities to become advocates for local issues and achieve a degree of 
political influence in the 19th century. 
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Instructors: A short introduction 
Instructors and assistant instructors represented the deepest reach of the Qing state in the 
realm of education. They staffed the county school (ruxue) established in each district, and the 
schools were typically staffed with one instructor and one assistant instructor each.97 As 
members of the state education apparatus, their primary responsibilities were to teach the 
shengyuan of the county, manage their progress, prepare them for the examinations, and draw up 
lists of candidates qualified to take the exams. The curriculum the instructors taught was 
regulated by the government and tied explicitly to the state examination system. The government 
selected and distributed the textbooks, particularly the Four Books and Five Classics.98 Therefore, 
the central purpose of the instructors was to instruct and raise a new crop of degree winners and 
potential officials to staff the state bureaucracy.  
As low-ranking government functionaries, instructors were bound within a web of 
administrative oversight. County instructors were overseen by the Provincial Director of 
Education (xuezheng), tasked with supervising local- and provincial-level examinations.99 Lists 
of instructors in county gazetteers and Qing archival documents demonstrate that the ranks of 
instructors were drawn from lower-degree winners, particularly gongsheng and juren-degree 
holders, yet instructors generally appeared to have higher educational credentials than assistant 
instructors. The Qing government took an active interest in maintaining the quality of its county 
instructors.  The Shunzhi and Kangxi emperors advocated annual testing of instructors to ensure 
teaching standards. Instructors whose test scores were substandard could be forced to return to 
their studies until the next round of testing; others who performed exceptionally poorly would be 
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dismissed from the service outright.100 Ironically, county magistrates who displayed 
unsatisfactory job performance could be demoted to county instructor.101 In addition to routine 
testing, the Kangxi emperor also purged office-buyers from the ranks of county instructors in a 
move to maintain performance standards.102 Finally, in an effort to boost instructor dedication 
and professionalism of the county instructors, the Qianlong emperor raised their ranking by one 
degree and granted each instructor a full salary.103 According to various gazetteer records and 
entries within the Qing Huidian, instructors could expect to receive about 40 taels per annum, 
putting their salary slightly behind that of county magistrates.104 Instructors served 6-year terms 
before being reviewed by both the Provincial Director of Education and the provincial governor, 
and approved by the Board of Personnel in Beijing.105 Assuming that the instructor did not 
commit any crimes or demonstrate behavioral problems during his tenure, and was in reasonably 
robust health, an instructor could serve another 6-year stint in his county, be transferred to a 
school in a different county, or even be promoted to the rank of magistrate. 
The routine evaluation of one Zhang Zhunian demonstrates a typical career of an 
instructor. The tiben from the Board of Personnel reveals that Zhang, a native of Hongya County 
in Sichuan, was a former second-tier tribute student (gongsheng) who was selected to serve as an 
educational official. He served as an assistant instructor (xundao) in Qingfu County from 1803 to 
1809. After he received a passing evaluation, he again served as the assistant instructor of Qingfu 
county, but the death of his father forced him to return home in 1811 to observe the ritual 
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mourning period. In 1818, he was selected to serve as the instructor (jiaoyu) of Jintang county 
but had to defer to follow the mourning protocol for his deceased mother. After his mourning 
obligations were completed, Zhang went on to serve as instructor of Jintang county. He received 
a favorable evaluation in 1824 and remained in that post for another term. Three years later in 
1827, he was evaluated again. By this time, he was 51 sui. Upon review, the provincial 
authorities found Zhang to still be conscientious, in good health, and a talented teacher. 
Specifically, he had paid his taxes in full and was able to control the students under his charge. 
He was not implicated in any crimes or mischief, nor did he engage in any lawsuits. His 
evaluators on this basis recommended that Zhang be promoted to magistrate.106 Zhang’s case 
was typical. Beginning his career as a tribute student, he was employed as an instructor for 24 
years in Sichuanese counties, gradually making the transition from assistant instructor to full 
instructor. Assuming the Board of Personnel agreed with the recommendation of his evaluators, 
Zhang would have served as a magistrate somewhere outside of his home province.  
The evaluation process appears to have remained more or less the same over the course 
of the Qing, even up until the end of the dynasty. Wang Congqian, aged 44 sui, was up for his 
6th year evaluation as the instructor of Huating County in Gansu in 1905. A native of Gaolan 
County in Gansu, Wang had previously won the juren degree in 1891 and the jinshi degree in 
1898 and was then selected to serve as an educational official. He was posted to Huating County 
to serve as its instructor the same year he won the jinshi and took up his post early the following 
year. In 1904, he completed his term and was evaluated by the Provincial Educational Director 
and the governor and found to be satisfactory. The report was sent to the central government in 
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Beijing.107 It is likely that Wang continued to serve as an instructor, whether in Huating or in 
another county.  Alternatively, he might have been promoted to a magistrate, as Zhang had been. 
The cases above also show that instructors served in county schools in their home 
province. Notably, despite being members of the Qing bureaucracy, instructors were not subject 
to the same law of avoidance that governed other territorial officials which barred them from 
taking up posts within their native province. Instructors served in their home province but were 
prohibited from taking office in their home prefecture. This had not always been the case. In the 
Ming dynasty, instructors were barred from serving in their native province like other officials. 
In 1571, the law was changed to exempt instructors, along with a few other subcounty posts from 
serving outside their home province. The reason for the change was due to the very low salary of 
these functionaries, which made travel to outside provinces an enormous financial burden. 
Frequently, instructors were unwilling to bear the cost, and declined the post outright. Others, 
after their terms of office ended, were unable to afford the return journey home, and were 
stranded. Because these officials were not responsible for governing, the Ming court reasoned, 
there was little danger of them forming local political bonds that would challenge the state. The 
updated regulation appears to have been implemented more or less immediately: lists of 
instructors and their native places in county gazetteers demonstrate that in the late Longqing and 
early Wanli periods, instructors were nearly all native to the province. Yet, despite the ostensibly 
apolitical nature of the post, the Kangxi emperor issued an edict that forbade county instructors 
from interfering in public affairs and warned regular officials from handing over administrative 
duties to them.108 The emperor’s prohibition implies that county instructors did occasionally 
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assume administrative responsibilities, making them more active locally than the imperial 
government intended.   
The county schools in which the instructors worked consisted of a square-shaped gated 
compound which housed lecture halls and shrines to Confucius and Zhu Xi (wenmiao). The 
compound often contained rooms for the instructors’ living quarters. Instructors were responsible 
for the maintenance and upkeep of the school and shrines; failure to preserve the structure could 
result in administrative consequences. In the winter of 1905, a fire suddenly broke out at a school 
in Zhili province. The instructor and his students charged in to snuff it out, but not before the fire 
burned through some of the shrines. After an investigation revealed other incidents with fire the 
year before, the instructor was found culpable due to his carelessness and forced to restore the 
shrines and replace the ritual implements.109 In another incident, in 1815, a fire forced a county 
instructor in Fujian to transform one of the school shrines into his residence. Investigators were 
shocked to discover a vegetable garden growing in the courtyard, and books, teapots, and daily 
implements strewn over the school shrines. For his lack of decorum, the instructor was duly 
cashiered.110 Clearly, maintaining a level of decorum and respecting the school and shrines 
represented a core feature of the instructor’s public persona.  
In addition to teaching and preparing students for the examinations, instructors also 
functioned as ritual technicians who sacrificed at the shrines attached to the county school. 
Instructors took charge of the spring and autumn sacrifices at shrines that were attached to the 
county school and Confucian temple, namely the shrine to prominent local officials (minghuan ci) 
and the shrine to local worthies (xiangxian ci). They could also perform sacrificial duties at the 
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shrine to loyal and filial personages (zhongxiao ci) and the shrine to chaste women (jieyi ci).111 
Information gleaned from biographies of instructors in gazetteers and contained in other local 
publications demonstrate that county instructors frequently took the initiative to renovate local 
shrines and plan for their maintenance and funding.112 The writings of one county instructor 
named Zheng Jiancai demonstrate his deep preoccupation with the role of shrines in local life. 
Serving in Taiwan during the early Jiaqing reign, Zheng witnessed raids by massive pirate fleets, 
local rebellion, and the lingering effects of the Lin Shuangwen Rebellion from the late Qianlong 
reign. Zheng therefore took it upon himself to review cases and compile lists of individuals killed 
in the recent disturbances in order that they receive sacrifices in Taiwan county’s Manifest 
Loyalty Shrine (zhaozhong ci) and the Shrine for the Loyal, Righteous, and Filial and Fraternal 
(zhongyi xiaoti ci).113 At the same time, he and another instructor surnamed Xie compiled a 
revised gazetteer for Taiwan county, another project often undertaken by county instructors. 
Therefore, instructors’ service as ritual specialists in local state-sponsored shrines that honored 
the virtues of loyalty and filiality placed them at the center of a performance that celebrated both 
orthodox values and local memory.  
Performing their essential duties in the realm of education and ritual, the day-to-day 
routine of working in county administration was often stressful. Archival sources document 
numerous instances of instructors squabbling with other sub-bureaucratic personnel or even with 
the county magistrate. In several cases, these petty conflicts could erupt into an open brawl. In 
one such instance, Yan Jie, the instructor of Fengtai county in Shanxi, bore a grudge against a 
yamen clerk for displaying ostentatious behavior. One day in 1780, there was a ceremony to burn 
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incense in the county school. Before the ceremony began, Yan saw the clerk coming down the 
road riding in a sedan with four bearers. Incensed over the clerk’s breach of decorum, Yan raced 
out onto the road and smashed the sedan. Yet, the clerk was not cowed. Shortly thereafter, he 
rode in another sedan with four bearers, again provoking the instructor to attack it. This time 
only the window was smashed. The ongoing fights between the instructor and clerk became 
something of a running joke in Fengtai county, but did not amuse the county’s higher officials. 
An investigation into the incident revealed a notoriously ill-tempered instructor with a tendency 
to berate subordinates. For his unseemly disposition and public brawling, he was cashiered.114  
Conflicts between instructors and lower county functionaries often involved petty 
jealousies or personal incompatibilities. Clashes with county magistrates by contrast tended to 
erupt over “turf wars” of administrative boundaries. In many archival documents, county 
instructors accused magistrates—often falsely—of corruption or with mistreating shengyuan 
over conflicts involving students and funding for local schools. If magistrate intervened in what 
instructors considered to be their affairs, instructors could become territorial, even to the point of 
bringing false charges in order to protect their prerogatives. In turn, magistrates often charged 
instructors for displaying tyrannical behavior towards their students or with corruption. Often 
these charges were true.  
Because instructors had ultimate responsibility over their shengyuan and compiled the 
rolls of those eligible to take the civil examinations, opportunities for taking advantage of their 
charges were plentiful.  In one case, the instructor of a county in Sichuan forced students to pay 
him a bribe to include their names in the examination rolls.115 The need to maintain and renovate 
the school provided instructors with another motivation to take advantage of their students 
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financially. In 1786, the two instructors of a county in Zhili province discovered that a 
shengyuan surnamed Nie had purchased a concubine during the mourning period for his mother. 
Instead of reporting the matter to the magistrate, the instructors blackmailed their student for 
money in order to repair the school. When the affair came to light, the instructors were cashiered 
for overstepping their authority. Nie was stripped of his student status as well.116  
Serving as low-level officials within their home province, county instructors were 
unusual within the Qing bureaucratic hierarchy. Tasked with the instruction of students, 
preparing them for examinations, and sacrificing in local shrines, instructors served the 
educational and ritual needs of both the imperial state and local society. Their connection to the 
state bureaucracy and local ties compelled them to be at home in both worlds.  They (at least in 
theory) assisted in the state’s mission of spreading “benevolent” government and the norms of 
civilization through educational attainment. They also provided a degree of educational and 
ritual standardization within each county of the empire. At the same time, the instructor’s role in 
local society was often quite fraught. As we will see in the following sections, instructors were 
responsible for controlling shengyuan and overseeing local literary life. At the same time, they 
often used their provincial connections and status as a means to lobby for local initiatives.  
 
Controlling Shengyuan 
The shengyuan (government students and winners of the county-level exam) of Fu’an 
County in northern Fujian were causing trouble. One of the shengyuan was accused of beating up 
a local runner and resisting the local magistrate. Other students stole into the Confucian temple 
in the middle of the night to use as a base of operations for deviant activities. Furious, the county 
 




magistrate ordered that the wayward shengyuan be beaten. For violating statutes on beating 
shengyuan, the magistrate was cashiered. However, it was the local instructor, Xia Minglei, who 
was held ultimately responsible for the behavior of the wayward shengyuan. He was accused of 
“being unable to restrain” his students and was subsequently cashiered.117 The case of Xia 
Minglei illustrates one of the biggest responsibilities and challenges county instructors faced: 
controlling their own students. 
Controlling the county shengyuan was perhaps the county instructor’s chief duty. Though 
their status of elevated them into the county elite, shengyuan had something of a dubious 
reputation among both county residents and magistrates. The explosion of shengyuan numbers in 
the Ming dynasty without a parallel rise in the quotas for juren and jinshi degree winners forced 
students to turn away from the educational system and instead seek employment as government 
clerks, litigation masters, and tax farmers—activities that made county administration more 
complex.118 As a result, magistrates frequently fingered shengyuan as local troublemakers. 
Shengyuan intransigence manifested in a myriad of ways, such as resisting tax collection, 
organizing local uprisings, and contributing to bureaucratic backlog through their roles as 
songshi or “litigation masters.”119 No less a thinker than Gu Yanwu (1613-1682), the famed 
philosopher and statecraft thinker, accused shengyuan of abandoning their original function as 
expectant officials in favor of fomenting trouble for officials and commoners.120 Gu’s criticism 
of shengyuan, however, was also linked to their exemption from taxation (youmian) and the 
subsequent decline in state revenues; that shengyuan frequently sought employment in 
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insalubrious occupations such as litigation masters or county clerks certainly contributed Gu’s 
perception that they were parasites.121 Local officials in places like southern Fujian were 
especially suspicious of shengyuan. When officials experienced cases of egregious litigation, 
local disturbances, or communal affrays, they typically blamed shengyuan as the ringleaders.122 
For local officials, shengyuan constituted a demographic that was prone to local troublemaking 
and criminal activity, so when incidents emerged, local officials frequently sought to cast the 
blame on the shengyuan as convenient scapegoats. The Qing court also recognized the 
troublesome nature of shengyuan, devoting an entire chapter in a text on education 
administration to “restraining” their ranks.123 The imperial government placed responsibility for 
shengyuan behavior squarely on the shoulders of county instructors, and forced them to answer 
for shengyuan crimes.124 Because instructors were directly responsible for shengyuan conduct, 
unruly students could land instructors in trouble. In egregious cases, county instructors could be 
cashiered and removed from office, as was the case for Xia Minglei.  
Certainly, local officials hoped that instructors could exert a stabilizing effect over 
students and curb their potentially disruptive behavior through the logic of transformation 
through education. In some cases, instructors appeared to have been successful in mollifying 
unruly students. In 1725, Wang Guodong, the Provincial Director of Education in Henan 
submitted a memorial to the Yongzheng emperor requesting that the routine transfer of the Lushi 
county instructor be placed on hold. Previously, Lushi county experienced local disturbances in 
which angry county residents had surrounded the yamen and harassed the local officials. The 
county shengyuan were reported to have been in the unruly crowd. Wang reported that although 
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the atmosphere in the county remained tense, Liu Jin, the Lushi county instructor had been able 
to control his shengyuan and prevent more disturbances from breaking out. Wang wrote: 
The scholars are the eyes and ears of the common people. The education officials 
are examples for the scholars. All the educational officials under me are 
invariably conscientious…125 
 
Yet, Wang feared that once Liu was transferred out, the replacement instructor would be unable 
to restrain the shengyuan. Because Liu “understood local conditions” and ably suppressed the 
rowdy shengyuan, Wang reported, he was essential to maintaining a peaceful social milieu in 
Lushi county.126 In Wang’s hierarchical conception of social order, diligent instructors provided 
a moral example for the shengyuan, who, in turn, kept order among the commoners. An ideal 
county instructor therefore anchored the local social structure in order to ensure a well-ordered 
county life. 
Despite Liu Jin’s adroit handling of the Lushi county students, controlling shengyuan 
could prove an impossible and dangerous task for county instructors. In 1855, shengyuan in three 
counties in Henan formed a tuanlian organization for protection against marauding Nian rebels. 
The shengyuan, however, used their organization as a vehicle for organizing locals to challenge 
officials and resist remittance of tax grain, as well as for robbing other locals. The instructors, 
including one who had been appointed the year before, were afraid to challenge their locally 
powerful students. One assistant instructor did, impotently, warn the shengyuan against using the 
tuanlian organization to stir up trouble during the monthly examinations, but his warnings had 
little impact. The wayward tuanlian therefore had to be smashed by official troops, and the 
rebellious shengyuan leaders were executed. Despite the obvious power differential, the Henan 
governor blamed the incident on the instructors for not properly restraining the shengyuan and 
 





not reporting earlier on their behavior, resulting in the establishment of the rebellious tuanlian 
organization. For their supposed failure to reign in their wayward charges, the governor 
recommended that the instructors be cashiered. The Xianfeng emperor called for the assistant 
instructor who warned the shengyuan during the monthly testing sessions to be cashiered, and he 
ordered another instructor to serve in the military to atone for his negligence.127 This case reveals 
how closely the fate of instructors was tied to the behavior of their students. Overseen from 
above by officials who demanded they control unruly students, county instructors’ power to 
change wayward shengyuan was likely limited. 
Of course, it is possible that county instructors were also used as convenient scapegoats 
to deflect criticism away from other officials during instances of egregious student behavior. In 
one instance in 1774, the governor of Shandong accused shengyuan and one wusheng (military 
students) of being involved in bandit gangs planning to burn parts of Qingzhou and robbing ships.  
The governor blamed the county instructors for their students’ alleged crimes. For their failure to 
properly teach the students to the point where they could “not tell right from wrong,” the 
governor recommended that the instructors be punished.128 Because instructors were directly 
responsible for the shengyuan they supervised, higher officials could scapegoat them when 
reporting on incidents involving students and to thereby deflect further inquiries. 
Despite the dramatic examples detailed above, most of the instances in which instructors 
were punished for shengyuan misbehavior tended to result from disputes leading to low-level 
violence with locals or with yamen runners over tax arrears. These incidents often came to light 
only because provoked magistrates beat unruly shengyuan, which constituted a violation of 
imperial statutes. In short, shengyuan misbehavior tended to land the entire county governing 
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structure in trouble. The county instructor needed to exercise a high degree of control over the 
county shengyuan and channel their energies away from “deviant” activities. By controlling this 
volatile stratum of local elites (an often impossible task), the instructor—ideally— anchored the 
county social hierarchy. 
 
Controlling Information 
In 1731, the students of Xia county in southwestern Shanxi made an alarming discovery. 
An anonymous handbill had been posted on a wall. In doggerel verse the placard proclaimed the 
innocence of a bandit surnamed Lü, and threated violence. The students ran to inform Gao Zhen, 
the county instructor, and brought him to view the placard. Gao peeled the bill off the wall and 
took it to the county yamen. During the investigation, the instructor and students insisted that 
they did not know who wrote the placard. Upon being informed of the event, the Yongzheng 
emperor was pleased with the instructor’s diligence and honesty in reporting the seditious text.129 
The case of the anonymous placard demonstrates the intimate, and often fraught, role county 
instructors played in dealing with information and provincial intellectual life. Instructors’ 
proximity to students and the educated elite of their home province made them useful personnel 
for the state’s literary projects and enforcers of scholarly orthodoxy. During moments of imperial 
paranoia over the disposition of the empire’s literati and during the massive literary projects of 
the Qianlong emperor, Qing officials turned to county instructors to implement intellectual 
policies on the local level. As native provincials familiar with local intellectual circles and 
literary works that circulated among them, county instructors were sometimes used by the Qing 
 




state as agents of intellectual control to eliminate heterodox material, root out anti-Qing literati, 
and identify seditious literature.     
 Imperial surveillance of students, instructors, and schools was an innovation of the early 
Ming dynasty. As shown by Tilemann Grimm, the office of education intendant was devised in 
1436. These “officials in control of schools” traveled around the province acting as a kind of 
censor making sure schools operated appropriately and adhered to regulations, that instructors 
taught the approved classical curriculum and maintained orthodox rites, and that students 
dedicated themselves to study and moral cultivation. Ideally, the educational intendant would 
visit each county school once a year; however, the difficulty of travel within a province made the 
accomplishment of that goal a rarity. Thus, inspections were only superficial. Nonetheless, the 
efforts of the educational intendant office did promote a degree of standardization in the 
educational curriculum, rites, and form and content of examination essays. The succeeding Qing 
dynasty continued to use educational intendants to oversee and manage educational matters in 
each province.130 
Despite this overarching bureaucratic apparatus, county instructors performed the actual 
everyday surveillance of students and their curricula. Keeping students aligned with orthodox 
doctrines was an essential function of the instructor’s job. One case in Shanxi province 
demonstrates how perceived laxity in instructor supervision could land the county educational 
establishment in trouble. In the late Qianlong period, Meng Ercong, a shengyuan in Fengtai 
County was accused of befriending a bandit woman (feifu) from whom he learned an unnamed 
heterodox doctrine. The magistrate reported that Meng took vegetarian meals, made offerings to 
the Buddha, and tried to beguile the county residents with his undefined heterodoxy. Testimony 
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from Meng indicated that not only was he more interested in spreading his beliefs and stirring up 
the masses than he was in studying, he also was unable to read (at least unable to read texts in the 
prescribed curriculum). The provincial educational authority recommended that the county 
instructors be cashiered for not detecting Meng’s activities or curbing his unorthodox beliefs.131 
From the perspective of the provincial educational authority, the failure of the Fengtai county 
instructors to properly supervise and instruct led to Meng’s apostasy. The provincial educational 
authority was concerned about the effect Meng and his heterodox beliefs could have on the 
county’s residents. The instructors’ failure to properly supervise Meng thus had implications for 
the rest of the county and its customs. 
Due to cases like that of Meng Ercong, the Qing government fretted about what happened 
behind the closed doors of local schools. From early in the Qing reign, the state was preoccupied 
with controlling the political and intellectual energies of literati and students. The Sacred Edict 
of the Kangxi emperor issued in 1685 commanded students to commit themselves to orthodox 
learning and avoid heterodox ideas.132 Afterwards, the Yongzheng emperor issued an edict 
requiring county school instructors to lead their students in a monthly recitation of the Sacred 
Edict in order to drive the message home through constant repetition. In order to dissuade 
schools from becoming centers of political activism or hotbeds of unorthodox intellectual 
experimentation, each school and academy was required to house tablets forbidding students 
(among other stipulations) to form associations, publish their private writings, or argue with their 
teachers.133 From the Kangxi to the Qianlong eras, the emperors routinely issued edicts 
 
131 Chen Songqing, memorial of JQ 18/12/15, MQA. 
132 Ibid. 
133 Alexander Woodside, “State, Scholars, and Orthodoxy: The Qing Academies, 1736-1839,” In Orthodoxy in Late 
Imperial China, ed., Kwang-Ching Liu, ed., (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990): 158-184, 166; R. Kent 
Guy, The Emperor’s Four Treasuries: Scholars and the State in the Late Ch’ien-lung Era (Cambridge: Harvard 




condemning illicit student behavior in order to channel the thwarted ambitions of unsuccessful 
literati away from political action.134 With so much imperial emphasis on controlling student 
behavior and intellectual content, the emperors of the first half of the Qing betrayed a deep 
insecurity over the regime’s acceptance amongst the literati. 
 During sensitive political moments, scholars were most at risk of provoking state 
scrutiny. The reign of the Yongzheng emperor was particularly marked by crackdowns on 
individual literati or literary associations perceived to be critical of the emperor. R. Kent Guy 
attributes the Yongzheng emperor’s suspicion of scholars to the intense literati factionalism of 
the late Kangxi era, in which some scholars who received imperial patronage in Beijing engaged 
in political maneuverings to support one or another of Yongzheng’s rivals for the throne. To 
prevent literati meddling in imperial politics, Yongzheng cut the numbers of literati employed in 
the Hanlin Academy and reduced patronage of individual scholars in favor of stipends given to 
students in official academies; he also revamped the Ming dynasty’s system of educational 
intendants by personally selecting “government school inspectors” (xuezheng) who supervised 
provincial schools, students, and instructors in an attempt to bring their activities under imperial 
purview.135 As the Yongzheng emperor increasingly regularized educational life of the empire, 
he also cracked down on politically wayward literati in the provinces. 
 In 1726, the Yongzheng emperor persecuted Wang Jingqi and Cha Siting, two literati 
from Zhejiang whose writings appeared to be seditious. Wang was rounded up as part of the 
investigation of Nian Gengyao (1679-1726), whose staff he hoped to join in 1724. Investigators 
discovered in Wang’s writings sections critical of contemporary Qing officials and the Kangxi 
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emperor, and other passages were interpreted as encouragement for Nian to revolt.136 Cha was a 
metropolitan official sent to conduct the juren examination in Jiangxi. One of the topics he chose 
for the examination included characters that resembled the characters of “Yongzheng,” only with 
the top sections removed, which investigators interpreted as a subversive call for the emperor’s 
decapitation.137 After Wang was executed and as Cha languished in prison, the Yongzheng 
emperor, perhaps recalling the case of Lü Liuliang (1629-1683) a Zhejiang literatus whose 
writings attacking Manchus influenced a poor scholar named Zeng Jing to attempt an overthrow 
of the emperor, stewed over their cases and the wayward tendencies of Zhejiang literati.138 In an 
edict, he denounced students’ moral laxity, and their corrupting influence on customs and local 
society. Notably, he blamed educational officials for the sorry state of scholars’ moral fitness, 
declaring that educational officials were old and lazy, and their ranks filled with middling talents. 
Greedy for money and status, they masked their wayward ways and bad habits under the guise of 
preparing students for the examinations. With models such as these, the emperor mused, how 
could students not be corrupted? In order to rectify the practices of instructors and their charges, 
the provincial educational authorities needed to exert greater oversight over the instructors, and 
remove those lacking in energy and moral vigor.139 From the emperor’s point of view, stricter 
bureaucratic control was needed to discipline the ranks of county instructors and thereby 
improve the moral quality of the empire’s students, and prevent scholars from dabbling in and 
spreading politically sensitive literature. 
 
136 Hummel, 813. 
137 Hummel, 22. 
138 For a narrative history of the Zeng Jing case and its aftermath, see, Jonathan Spence, Treason by the Book (New 
York: Viking, 2001). 





 In contrast to the emperor’s dim views of instructors, other provincial officials argued 
that county instructors could be used to more effectively control students and exert greater 
oversight over students’ literary consumption. In a memorial to the throne, Zhu Wang, the 
provincial treasurer of Hunan, echoed the emperor’s views on the morally corrupt nature of 
students, and agreed that they exerted a baleful influence on the customs of commoners in that 
province as well. Like the emperor, he identified the county instructor as an official who 
influenced the habits of local students. Unlike the emperor, however, Zhu approached the issue 
less as an ethical problem than as a structural problem: instructors were charged with preparing 
students for the examinations, and not fundamentally concerned with their moral cultivation. The 
measure of success for a county instructor was contingent on their students’ success in the 
examinations, not whether they were moral individuals. “Affairs of the county” were not the 
purview of the instructor, yet instructors were still held responsible for students’ behavior and 
activities outside the school.  
Zhu implied that if county instructors wielded more power over their students, taught 
outside the narrow confines of the examination, and exerted more control over educational life—
and by extension, educated elites—in the county, reform of local life would naturally occur. In 
short, Zhu advocated the empowerment of county instructors to control students and to teach 
beyond the purposes of examination preparation. Whereas the emperor sought out a bureaucratic 
solution to an ethical problem, Zhu sought an ethical solution to a structural problem. The 
emperor, however, was unimpressed. Rejecting Zhu’s assertion that the quality of educated elites 
in his province was worse than those in Zhejiang (“They can’t be as bad as that!”), the emperor 
asserted that Zhu’s prescriptions would be impractical from a policy perspective.140 Given the 
 




emperor’s low opinion of county instructors as talentless parasites and his drive to regularize 
Qing administration and law, such a proposal was unlikely to be met with imperial approval.  
Years later, during the Qianlong reign, the state took advantage of county instructors’ 
local connections and affiliations in order to obtain books for the massive Siku quanshu project. 
Embarking upon his literary project, the Qianlong emperor became frustrated with insufficient 
numbers of texts being turned over for imperial perusal, particularly those containing politically 
sensitive content. A part of the problem was that the project banned county yamen clerks and 
runners (who were local and reviled) from collecting texts to prevent them from extorting 
commoners.  Officials did not know which families possessed valuable or illicit texts. In order to 
find effective agents to seek books, the governor-general of Huguang decided to use expectant 
county instructors to seek out texts from local families. Instructors had the advantage of being 
part of the provincial bureaucratic apparatus, but more importantly, as members of the provincial 
educated elite who spent years studying in local schools and academies, they knew who 
possessed valuable—or deviant—texts. Therefore, the governor-general ordered expectant-
instructors proceed to their home areas to seek out texts or persuade families who possessed texts 
to hand them over to a familiar—and perhaps less intimidating—local face. By way of incentive, 
the expectant instructors who collected many texts would find their names at the top of the list 
for educational posts; those who collected the fewest would find their names at the bottom.141 
Beginning in Zhejiang, the policy was emulated in other provinces. Ranking officials recognized 
the policy as an efficacious method to obtain texts in a less threatening way. By sending 
 




educational officials back to their home areas to seek out texts from local families and friends, 
officials began to obtain more titles and with fewer disturbances to locals.142  
The provincial connections of county instructors made them adroit agents of educational 
and literary control on the local level. They oversaw county shengyuan, promoted orthodox 
curricula, and exposed the creep of heterodox ideas into local educational life. Their local 
connections also made them useful agents of literary control for the state (or a cause of imperial 
anxiety in the case of the Yongzheng emperor). Besides their watchdog function over local 
students, county instructors knew the educated elites of their home province and were acquainted 
with the contents of their private libraries. The success of the Qianlong emperor’s Siku quanshu 
project was predicated upon the efforts of expectant county instructors to discover important or 
proscribed texts possessed by their provincial scholarly community. As the High Qing faded and 
the governing challenges of the 19th century emerged, instructors’ informal roles and local 
connections became more important to maintain the Qing’s local control during times of 
upheaval and rebellion. 
 
Organizing Local Defense 
Late imperial China was a dangerous place. Studies have shown that despite a normative 
abhorrence of violence reflected in elite literati culture, China was at least as violent as other 
contemporaneous societies, and perhaps much more violent.143 Rooted in in unequal economic 
relationships, social tensions, and popular religion among other phenomena, violence in China 
found expression through a wide range of practices like lineage feuding, ethnic violence, 
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banditry, and large armed conflicts and rebellion.144 Moreover, instances of violent disturbances 
may have actually increased after the mid-Qing period as increasing population pressure drove 
impoverished people to the margins of the law to engage in violent pursuits as a survival 
strategy.145 The distribution of county instructors throughout every county made them vulnerable 
to physical danger during violent affrays. Yet, due to their dispersion within each county and 
their nominal status as bureaucratic functionaries, county instructors frequently organized local 
defenses during disturbances. In times of duress, county instructors transformed into defensive 
personnel of last resort, and thereby helped maintain nominal state control.. 
During periods of violent confrontations and rebellion, county instructors braved the 
same dangers as other territorial officials and local residents, but their status as educators did not 
afford them safety. Yet, the government perceived county instructors as local state agents, and 
therefore took threats to their physical safety or deaths at the hands of ruffians to be a severe 
offense. In June of 1789, during the aftermath of the Lin Shuangwen Rebellion in Taiwan, for 
instance, testimony from one of the local rebel leaders led to the identification of the murderer of 
Ye Mengling (a former Aofeng Academy student) and Chen Longchi, the instructors of 
Fengshan County. The rebel leader fingered one of his followers, Li You, an impoverished man 
of 41 sui without family or children, as the assassin. For killing the two instructors, Li was 
sentenced to death.146 
Even as it punished those who harmed county instructors, agents of the Qing state lauded 
instructors who defended their county from marauders. For instance, Fukang’an, the commander 
of the Qing forces who crushed the Lin Shuangwen Rebellion, commended an instructor named 
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Jiang Hao for his efforts to organize local resistance in Jiayi County and for sustaining injuries in 
battles with the rebels.147 More than a century in later in 1902, Yuan Shikai, then governor-
general of Zhili, extolled a county instructor in a memorial to the throne during the aftermath of 
the Boxer Rebellion. In Yuan’s account, Li Yue, the 70-sui instructor of Lingshou County flew 
into a rage when foreign soldiers occupied the school and burned the spirit tablets housed within. 
Cursing and attempting to block the invaders, he was beaten to death. Yuan commended the 
loyalty of Li and the county magistrate who had thrown himself into a well and recommended 
that they receive sacrifices in the county Manifest Loyalty shrine.148 
Official commendation of county instructors who organized defenses, like Yuan Shikai’s 
exaltation of Li Yue, frequently emphasized that the educators bore no formal responsibility for 
the protection of their locality (wu shou tu zhi ze / wu difang zhi ze). Their lack of defensive 
responsibilities combined with their duties to educate local students (a wen pursuit) contrasted 
dramatically with their emergency assumption of martial (wu) roles. The county instructor’s 
latent martial function became especially apparent in periods of acute military crisis. During the 
Taiping Rebellion (1850-1864), county instructors became heavily involved in organizing 
tuanlian (local militia) organizations. Initially pioneered during the early 19th century White 
Lotus Rebellion, tuanlian organizations were typically led by a lower-degree holder or local 
gentry who could assemble the people in his locality across class-lines for the purpose of mutual 
defense.149 As the Taiping Rebellion progressed, the dispersal of instructors within each county, 
their status as degree-holding elites, their position as fellow provincials, and ostensible 
connection to the Qing governing structure made them ideal figures to organize tuanlian 
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organizations. In the summer of 1855, the governor of Anhui recognized a county instructor for 
organizing a tuanlian organization and for his efforts in holding off rebels and training local 
braves, despite “not being responsible for [local defense].”150 The following year, the acting-
governor of Huguang extolled a county instructor and two local students for assembling a 
tuanlian organization and making generous contributions of money to local defense. He then 
recommended that the instructor be promoted to the rank of magistrate, and the two students 
promoted to assistant county instructors (xundao).151 As local elites and degree holders, a county 
instructor might even be more valuable to the defense of his home area than as a teacher in 
another county. In 1855, the governor of Zhejiang memorialized the throne to request that Zheng 
Xianyu, the newly chosen instructor of Suichang County, delay his departure in order to continue 
his work in managing a local tuanlian organization in his home prefecture.152 These cases 
demonstrate that Qing territorial officials readily apprehended the value of county instructors in 
organizing and leading local defenses during military emergencies. As low-ranking bureaucrats 
and provincial natives, county instructors could transform into military personnel of last resort 
and serve both state and local defense interests. 
In addition to organizing local defenses during times of emergency, county instructors 
also strategized independently on pressing military affairs. Chen Jincheng (1802-1852) was one 
such example. Born the son of a tutor in coastal Hui’an County in the south of Fujian, Chen was 
a promising student and studied at the Qingyuan Academy under the headship of Chen Shouqi, a 
former Aofeng Academy student and future Aofeng Academy head. In his days as a student, 
Chen traveled to Beijing with his father-in-law, the scholar, Sun Jingshi, where he lectured on 
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the Book of Changes at the Quanzhou travel lodge. Later on in 1838, Chen was selected to 
become the county instructor of Gutian and Liancheng counties, and was employed as a county 
instructor when the Opium War broke out the following year.153  
As Chen followed the trajectory of the war with the British, he wrote a detailed plan for 
the defense of Fuzhou. Chen envisioned a deeply localist vision in which Fuzhou residents, 
provided with a little training, shouldered the duties of the city’s defense. Once organized into 
staggered tuanlian units guarding strategic areas around Fuzhou and the mouth of the Min River, 
locals would provide the backbone of the Fuzhou defensive structure and play supportive roles 
for the professional soldiers. Claiming his ideas stemmed from theories articulated by the famed 
Ming pirate-fighter, Qi Jiguang, and Zheng Zhilong, the founder of a powerful maritime 
confederation during the Ming-Qing transition and father of Zheng Chenggong, as well as 
contemporary events in Sanyuanli in neighboring Guangdong, Chen perceived that strong and 
cohesive local organization would beat this new maritime threat. Besides providing tactical plans 
for Fuzhou’s defense, Chen’s treatise also waded into wider strategic circles by theorizing about 
the nature of the British and the necessity to thrash them militarily before any peace settlement 
could be reached, implicitly criticizing Qing court factions eager to negotiate an end to the 
war.154 
Motivated as Chen was, how could he, a mere county instructor placed at the bottom rung 
of a vast bureaucratic machinery, hope to disseminate his plan among official circles in order to 
put it into action? Relying on normative bureaucratic connections would certainly condemn his 
plan to obscurity. Yet, through an extensive informal network of educated Fujian elites, the 
county instructor was connected to powerful men outside of official channels. Therefore, in order 
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to draw attention to his ideas, Chen relied on his academy connections and its well-placed 
alumni. Chen turned to a classmate from his days at the Qingyuan Academy, Su Tingyu. Su had 
enjoyed a distinguished official career, occupying numerous posts in the territorial bureaucracy 
and eventually becoming the acting governor-general of Sichuan. Reading Chen’s plan, Su 
declared it to be “the Great Wall of Fujian,” and sent the draft on to Yiliang, who became the 
new governor-general of Fujian and Zhejiang in 1842.155 Luckily for Chen and Su, Yiliang 
shared their drive to confront the British militarily. Previously in 1838, Yiliang served as the 
governor of Guangdong. He was a strong supporter of Lin Zexu and his uncompromising anti-
opium stance, and together he and Lin carried out the opium embargo and expelled British ships 
from Guangzhou. In 1841, Yiliang maintained his hardline stance against Qing peace overtures, 
and brought about the downfall of Qishan by reporting to the court the terms of the agreement 
which ceded Hong Kong to the British.156 After Su consulted with him, Yiliang enthusiastically 
endorsed Chen’s plan, and ordered the instructor to proceed to the Fuzhou area to organize and 
train a local defense force. Heeding Yiliang’s endorsement, Chen hurried to his new post laden 
with locally raised funds and accompanied by his band of local followers, five blacksmiths, two 
bullet makers, and twelve sharpshooters from his native Quanzhou.157 
 The war ended as Chen arrived in Fuzhou. The close of the conflict came as a shock, 
forcing Chen to deal with the humiliating defeat. His disappointment over missing the 
opportunity to organize Fuzhou’s local defenses was matched by his disgust with the peace 
settlement and his sorrow over the loss of high-ranking Fujian military personnel. After the war, 
Chen was promoted to an official post in Yunnan, but he channeled his rage and despair into 
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political writings on the impact of the war and its settlement for the remainder of his life. First, 
he wrote essays commemorating deceased Fujian naval commanders, including a Taiwanese 
veteran of the Jiaqing-era pirate campaigns who had died of illness and old age in Penghu before 
he could fight the British. Chen was even more effusive over the combat death of Chen 
Huacheng, a high-ranking naval commander from the instructor’s native Quanzhou in southern 
Fujian. In an act of historical parallelism, Chen compared the dead general to the famous Li 
Changgeng, the Fujianese commander-in-chief during the Jiaqing-era pirate raids, whose death 
during a sea battle a few decades before cemented his legacy among activist literati for his 
commitment to duty under intense official antagonism.158 Clearly, Chen wanted to emphasize the 
historical legacy of Fujianese guarding the maritime frontier, which had emerged as site of 
increasing importance and instability for the Qing since the early 19th century. Second, Chen was 
incensed at what he saw to be Fujian’s raw deal in the terms of the Qing-British peace treaty. As 
part of the treaty, five ports were opened to British trade, two of which were located in Fujian at 
Fuzhou and Xiamen. Chen therefore believed that Fujian was unfairly shouldering the burden of 
a new and insulting system and argued in several essays to remove Fuzhou as a treaty port, 
leaving only Xiamen open to British trade in the province. Chen’s understanding of the 
province’s strategic geography and Fuzhou’s pivotal position within it informed his preference 
that Xiamen become the sole treaty port in Fujian. Monitoring events in Fujian from Beijing in 
1844, Chen watched with trepidation as the British established themselves in Fuzhou and heard 
reports detailing how the foreigners were building a tower on the high peak of Wushi Mountain 
overlooking the city.159 Finally, Chen was horrified over the expansion of British infrastructure 
in Shanghai. When returning home to Fujian from Beijing in 1850, Chen stopped in Shanghai 
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amid an outcry against a planned British road cutting through fields and gravesites. Local 
officials, caught between British requests and local protests, did not know how to respond. 
Therefore, Chen helped organize local protestors, compelling the British to cancel the planned 
road.160 Clearly, Chen’s postwar years were marked by his transformation from local educational 
functionary to activist. 
 County instructors in late imperial China continually faced the possibility of impromptu 
military service. Their spatial diffusion throughout the empire and proximity to local 
disturbances transformed them into commanders and military organizers of last resort, 
particularly during the disturbances of the mid-19th century. Instructors’ twin identities as low-
level educational bureaucrats and provincial natives made them figures acceptable to officials 
and locals who could provide a state-organized local defense force, namely in the establishment 
of tuanlian units. As in the case of Chen Jincheng, instructors could even devise grand strategies 
during major conflicts. Although he was a lowly instructor, Chen marshaled significant local 
resources in order to put his ideas into action. By putting his ideas into print, leveraging his 
academy connections with fellow alumni, and emphasizing his status as a self-proclaimed local 
expert, he won the support of high-ranking officials necessary to implement his military plan for 
Fuzhou. Ironically, through Chen’s embrace of his Fujian identity and manipulation of local 
resources, he provided an urgent military service for the central state. Chen’s trajectory also 
demonstrates how his passionate participation in local defenses informed his postwar incarnation 
as an activist who wrote political essays arguing against the terms of the peace treaty with the 
British. Instructors’ bureaucratic status, provincial identity, and ability to marshal local resources 
 




in the service of local issues provided for avenues for them to become activists as the Qing’s 
governing capacity waned in the early 19th century.  
  
The Making of an Activist: The Case of Lin Yuhua 
The education and local orientation of county instructors posed risks for agents of the 
imperial government. In instances of corruption or other malfeasance, zealous instructors could 
attempt to embarrass local officials by calling attention to their abuse of power. One such 
instructor was Lin Yuhua. His famous run-in with a corrupt local official and his subsequent 
punishment made him into a celebrity in Fuzhou literary circles in the early 19th century. Lin’s 
exploits against official corruption and his concerns over pressing problems affecting Fujian’s 
maritime frontier transformed him into a political commentator and local activist. 
Lin, a native of Min county (Fuzhou), won the juren degree in 1768. Thereafter, he 
served as a county instructor in nearby Ningde county in north coastal Fujian.161 While working 
in that position, Lin fell afoul of local Qing officials and was thrown in jail. The particulars of his 
fall from grace are not entirely clear. According to his own account, a cashiered student named 
Lin Fangjie bore a grudge against him. The student’s brother-in-law wrote an accusation that 
claimed Lin Yuhua failed to maintain order among his students, who were running amok and 
stealing. The magistrate ignored the accusation, so the student next bribed the local prefect to 
investigate Lin and charge him with crimes.162 Other accounts suggest something more dramatic 
was occurring behind the scenes: two lineages, the Lins and Xues of Changtai county, were 
engaged in xiedou (communal feuding), and one of the lineages bribed Qing officials were 
bribed to support their claims. When Lin Yuhua heard about the details, he took advantage of the 
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Lantern Festival after the New Year to make several lanterns inscribed with a poem mocking the 
corrupt officials. The officials, incensed, persuaded the aforementioned student to file a charge 
against the instructor, and the prefect of Fuzhou then threw him in jail. Whatever the exact 
circumstances, all accounts include the themes of “false charges” filed against Lin and “corrupt 
officials” plotting to bring the instructor down.  
 Lin’s punishment was severe: after three months in jail, he was exiled to Xinjiang.163 
Once there, the military governor hired him to manage local schools where he promoted lixue 
studies. Three years later in 1797, Lin was pardoned and returned to Fujian from exile. Upon his 
return to Fujian, he composed a poem mocking the prefect who imprisoned him, and then 
recorded his travails in guwen-style essays.164 His writings were collected, circulated, 
commented upon by educated elite of Fuzhou, and eventually published. Lin’s experiences and 
writings made the instructor into something of a local celebrity renowned for his refusal to admit 
guilt despite intense pressure from corrupt local officials. In one essay he recounted an extended 
conversation with the jailer detailing his moral qualms over whether to falsely admit guilt and 
thereby secure release.165 In another essay, he detailed his interrogation by the prefect:   
I had been imprisoned for seven months, but then it seemed I was about to be 
released. I was next taken to the prefect’s yamen. 
The prefect asked, “Have you done much reading in jail?”  
I responded, “It’s true that I’ve had some difficulties with that, but if I don’t read, 
what does it matter?”  
He asked, “You haven’t admitted your guilt. How about today?” 
I said, “You can find any excuse to punish me more. Go ahead and torture me.” 
He pointed to a wooden cage and said, “Please sit here.” 
 I said, “I am an educational official. I am not a bandit; I’m not a rebel. How can 
you cage me?” 
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 In the end, I was forced inside. The cage was small and narrow, and the door was 
locked tight. I could just barely breathe. As I was being pulled away, I shouted, 
“Even if you want to kill me, I am innocent!” 
 They ignored me and took me away. As we went out through the west gate, I 
continued to shout about the injustice.166 (Italics mine) 
 
In his account, Lin reiterated his defiant resistance to official pressure to confess. By 
emphasizing his status as an educational official (county instructor) and detailing his morally 
reasoned refusal to confess to trumped-up charges, he drew a sharp contrast with the powerful 
and morally corrupt officials persecuting him. He continued his account of moral martyrdom by 
describing how, still locked in the cage, he was placed aboard a ship to be sent to another 
location. While on board, Lin was harassed by men he assumed were hired to murder him. Going 
on a hunger strike for fear of poisoned food, he threatened to lodge a lawsuit against his 
tormentors in heaven as an angry ghost. He managed to stave off disaster until his cage was 
taken ashore where his shouts alerted passersby who then notified some of his relatives to escort 
him to safety.167  
 With his moral credentials proven by danger and exile, Lin returned to Fuzhou as an 
incisive commentator on problems afflicting Fujian. As an educated elite, Lin was of course 
concerned about the moral condition of his fellow Fujianese, singling out the practice of 
cremation as a particularly evil custom.168 More pressing, however, was the explosion of piracy 
during the early Jiaqing reign and Fujian’s vulnerability to famine. In 1807, Lin drafted a policy 
to blunt the pirate threat by compelling brigand leaders to surrender in return for rewards and 
rank in order to induce dissention among their ranks.169 At that time, the Qing efforts against the 
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pirate fleets were not going well. While the complexity of the administrative geography of the 
southern coasts made a coordinated response by a weak and undermanned naval force nearly 
impossible, ranking officials sent to fight the pirates disagreed among themselves and with the 
Jiaqing emperor on how best to confront the pirate threat.170  The emperor and many other 
officials wanted to use the Qing naval forces to wage an aggressive sea war in the hopes of 
defeating and exterminating the pirate fleets, but others were dubious about the navy’s ability to 
defeat skilled and well-equipped pirate fleets, arguing that even if the navy won a few 
engagements, it could not ultimately eradicate the massive numbers of pirates and their ships. 
Nanyacheng, appointed governor-general of Guangdong in 1804, used a new strategy first 
devised by Yan Ruyi to combat White Lotus rebels in the Hunan highlands, which de-
emphasized offensive warfare and focused instead on defense, community mobilization, and 
mass clemency.171  
While it is unclear if Lin was aware of the debates among officials and the throne, it is 
likely that he would have been aware of the see-saw nature of Qing policy towards pirate 
suppression as it veered from aggressive sea war, prosecuted in large part by the Fujian navy, to 
local defensive organization.172 Examining the situation, Lin all but declared a military solution 
hopeless: with the pirates’ ability to hide on the high seas, fighting and retreating at will, and 
possessing the ability to resupply along the vast coastline, the Qing forces exhausted themselves 
chasing the brigands up and down the littoral, unable to trap their fleets in a decisive 
engagement. He declared that the defeat of the pirates would be even more difficult than the 
pacification of the Miao by the legendary Yu the Great, perhaps a sly reference to the arduous 
 
170 Dian Murray, Pirates of the South China Coast, 1790-1810 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1987), 99-136. 
171 Daniel McMahon, “Qing Highland Precedent, Yan Ruyi, and the Defense of the Guangdong Coast, 1804-1805,” 
Asia Major, Third Series, Vol. 23, No. 2 (2010): 1-32. 
172 In a separate poem, Lin stated his dissatisfaction with Li Changgeng and other naval commanders, preferring an 




suppression campaigns against the Miao in Hunan only a few years before. Instead of fighting 
the pirates in naval engagements—as the Qing had been doing for a decade by that point—Lin 
proposed that the government should actively induce pirate leaders to surrender with their 
followers. After surrendering, the former pirates would be treated leniently and encouraged to 
pursue a peaceful livelihood, presumably agriculture. The instructor found a historical precedent 
for his policy during the reign of Emperor Xuan of the Han dynasty (r. 74-49 BCE): during an 
outbreak of piracy in the Bohai Sea, the imperial forces made little headway in combat with the 
pirates, perturbing the emperor. Only with the introduction of an official named Gong Sui who 
saw the pirates not as a military problem, but as an economic problem to be rectified by 
benevolent government, were the pirates finally suppressed. In Lin’s telling, Gong fired the 
officials charged with capturing pirates, and instead induced the brigands to surrender by settling 
them on the land and providing them with agricultural implements.173 Though Lin may have 
understood this historical episode to be apocryphal, it underscores his belief that the root of the 
pirate crisis was fundamentally an economic issue, and could only be solved by addressing the 
problem of livelihood, especially for many impoverished Fujianese who treated piracy as a part-
time occupation to supplement their income.  
Indeed, Lin, like many other Fujianese educated elites, frequently expressed anxiety over 
the economy, rice supply, and effect of natural disasters upon his province’s agricultural scene. 
Cycles of drought, poor harvest, and exploding rice prices fed inter-lineage warfare and petty 
piracy along Fujian’s coasts, while non-native officials unfamiliar with the peculiar natural and 
human ecology of the province attempted ineffective relief efforts. In one instance of drought 
and rice shortage, Lin addressed a letter to the prefect of Quanzhou. In the missive, Lin laid out 
 




the recent history of Fujian’s droughts and the mistakes of previous officials, described the 
effects of a rice shortage as it spread through Fujian’s cities and into the countryside, and finally 
offered a proposal to distribute grain in the public granaries before speculation and deep 
shortages triggered riots.174 Lin’s delineation of the problem and its history underscores his 
preoccupation with the fragility of Fujian’s economy and its social effects, compelling him to 
voice his thoughts with the prefect. As Lin wrote the letter, he remained sensitive about his lowly 
status as an instructor, asking rhetorically, “How can an educational official exceed the bounds 
of his station to comment upon such matters?” Counting on the prefect’s reputation for modesty 
and receptivity, Lin also alluded to Mencius and his predilection for speaking frankly to kings.175 
Apparently, Lin assumed that the similarly educated prefect would understand his message to 
look beyond the bounds of status and position to the salience and sincerity of advice, no matter 
its origins. Thus, a lowly county instructor could comment upon and offer advice to officials on 
pressing local problems.  
Lin Yuhua did not observe and write about pressing issues afflicting his province in 
isolation. He achieved relevance by means of his associations with eminent Fujian elites and the 
circulation and publication of his writings.  At the height of the pirate crisis in 1806, Lin helped 
form a small group called the zhenshuaihui 真率會, or the “Sincere and Forthright Society,” 
which met several times a month to discuss texts from the remote past to the present day.176 
Many members of this society were alumni of the Aofeng Academy, including a cousin of the 
instructor who published his own collection of statecraft writings. Lin Yuhua’s uncompromising 
stand with a corrupt official and his drive to solve problems afflicting Fujian ranging from the 
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pirate crisis to rice shortages made him a favorite in Aofeng circles, whose members circulated 
and commented upon his writings. In 1830, Lin published his collection of guwen-style essays 
and poetry with accompanying prefaces and commentary written by prominent Aofeng members.  
These included Zheng Guangce the former academy head preoccupied by Fujian’s maritime 
problems, and the eminent officials and Aofeng members, Liang Zhangju and Chen Ruolin. 
Perhaps the most famed Aofeng alumnus, Lin Zexu, whose father was a founding member of the 
Sincere and Forthright Society and brought his son to their gatherings as a young man, 
remembered the old instructor in a preface. The anti-opium crusader recalled the outrage over 
Lin’s persecution as a child and admired his commitment to teaching and devotion to practical 
affairs as a young man.177  
Lin Yuhua appears to have deliberately fashioned himself as an activist. After his return 
from exile in Xinjiang, the instructor wrote about his suffering at the hands of corrupt local 
officials to create a gripping read for his admirers. Certainly, Lin’s narrative had a performative 
quality, and it allowed him to establish his moral authority as an observer and commentator on 
local issues. His uncompromising personality, status as a Fuzhou celebrity, and interest in Fujian 
affairs afforded him entry into local literary societies of like-minded elites. These societies 
composed of Aofeng Academy heads and students met regularly, circulated their writings, and 
discussed the state of current affairs. Like Lin, they also put their ideas on reforming the 
province into print and leveraged their connections order to influence officials as Fujian faced 
mounting pressures on its maritime littoral. With his established moral credentials and the 
support of provincial educated elites, Lin Yuhua the instructor therefore articulated his own 
thoughts on maritime affairs and proffered advice to officials on how to manage them. 
 




Conclusion: Putting Learning into Practice 
In gazetteers such as the Fujian tongji, there is a section of biographies of scholars titled, 
“Confucians who put learning into practice” (ruxing 儒行). The individuals included within this 
section are celebrated less for their scholastic accomplishments than for their tangible 
achievements on the ground. Many of them belong to the ranks of county instructors; the 
biographies detail their practical efforts to deal with local problems like quelling unruly students, 
mediating disputes, renovating county infrastructure, and fighting pirates. Theirs was a muscular, 
results-oriented brand of Confucianism. Indeed, a good instructor needed to possess an action-
oriented personality that obligated him to take on many roles in navigating the complexities of 
county social life. This chapter has shown that instructors performed essential services for the 
state and locality by controlling students, monitoring literary life, and sacrificing in local shrines. 
It also demonstrates the significance of subcounty personnel in the inner workings of county 
administration and their mediating functions between state and local society.178 
 The gazetteer section of ruxing biographies also indicates a turn in the activities of county 
instructors beginning in the 19th century. Not only were instructors celebrated for improving 
affairs in their county, but they also started to become more proactive in confronting challenges 
faced by the province itself, like managing affairs on the maritime frontier, confronting corrupt 
officials, and heading defensive forces—activities not typically associated with instructors in the 
early Qing. Thus, instructors like Chen Jincheng and Lin Yuhua were feted as “Confucians who 
put learning into practice” as Fujian confronted new maritime and natural threats. County 
instructors in the Qing always possessed significant local resources, particularly in terms of their 
ties to the educated elite of their province and their academy networks. But it appears that, in the 
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case of Fujian at least, county officials increasingly marshaled their local resources in the greater 
service of the province and state beginning in the early 19th century.  This coincided with the 
diminished governing capacity of the central state. Against the backdrop of the Qing empire’s 
shifting political orientation, it was the county instructors as intellectual activists who assumed 
new roles to press for local and provincial reforms. In the following chapter, we will see how 
two county instructors used the resources of the Aofeng Academy to remake the maritime 






















Inside Information: The Case of Two County Instructors in Early Nineteenth-Century Fujian and 
Taiwan179 
 In the spring of 1807, Zheng Jiancai shocked his friends and patrons. Zheng, who had 
won distinction for defending Taiwan county (Tainan) from a massive pirate incursion while 
serving as a lowly county instructor, had declined a promotion to the post of magistrate in 
Jiangxi. Zheng preferred to remain an instructor in Fujian or Taiwan instead. Zheng’s friends 
were perplexed. Why would Zheng, an educated degree winner who had lived among the elite of 
the Qing Empire in Beijing, and who had written constantly about administration and defense 
choose to decline an opportunity to wield real power, and instead continue in his capacity as a 
minor sub-county functionary? Zheng, however, had a different perspective. He argued that it 
was in fact due to his position as a county instructor, unburdened by strict oversight and 
unencumbered with administrative responsibilities, that allowed him to observe larger forces at 
work and compelled him to achieve practical changes on the ground. As a magistrate in Jiangxi, 
he would be little more than an administrative drudge unable to accomplish a real difference, but 
as a county instructor operating in his home province he could style himself as a local expert to 
achieve tangible changes. Zheng knew that by becoming an expert on local affairs, compiling 
local information, and deftly managing local levers of influence, he could affect affairs in his 
home province, and exercise a level of influence far beyond that of a mere county magistrate.180 
This chapter examines the activities and writings of Zheng Jiancai and Xie Jinluan, two 
county instructors serving in posts in Fujian and Taiwan over the course of the Jiaqing reign. As 
they took up educational posts on the island of Taiwan, massive pirate fleets attacked the coasts, 
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vexing Qing officials and military. This event served as a call to action of sorts, compelling the 
two instructors to assume the mantle of local activists. Theirs was an activism realized through 
the production and strategic dissemination of information: writing treatises and allying with the 
Aofeng Academy’s national network of Fujianese scholars and officials to publish and spread 
their proposals, Zheng and Xie took action where regular Qing officials were unwilling, and 
embarked upon ambitious campaigns to remake maritime strategy, incorporate new regions of 
Taiwan into the administrative map, and push for increased autonomy for instructors and 
students to stabilize local society. The Aofeng Academy played a central role in the 
transformation of the instructors into local activists by making their proposals acceptable to Qing 
officials, who increasingly required legitimate sources of information outside bureaucratic 
channels in order to address local crises. The activism and literary production of the two 
instructors, and the Aofeng Academy’s central role in bridging the gap between local political 
enterprises and official endorsement, underscores the increased space for local activism through 
literary production as the high Qing faded and the Jiaqing reign unfolded. The activism of the 
two instructors in turn set the stage for intensified literati political involvement in the Daoguang 
reign, and provided models for a new crop of activist scholars with national ambitions on the eve 
of the Opium War. 
 
The Early Life of Zheng and Xie 
The actions of Xie and Zheng can only be understood in their contexts as county 
instructors and Fujian natives who were educated at the Aofeng Academy. As the high Qing 




as county instructors allowed the two men to enter the world of local activism, and devise 
strategies to confront challenges in their home province.  
Xie Jinluan was born in the late 1750s in Houguan county 候官縣 just outside of Fuzhou. 
His father, a juren-degree holder, was employed as an assistant magistrate in Jiangsu and county 
instructor, but left his wife and children impoverished upon his death.181 His mother died not 
long after his father, placing young Xie in charge of the household and making him responsible 
for the care of his younger siblings.182 His lack of means forced him to adopt an austere lifestyle, 
which he later turned into a point of pride—in an effort to underscore his own virtue to stand in 
contrast with other Qing officials, whom he suspected of corruption. 
A successful student, Xie later entered the Aofeng Academy where he met his friend and 
future colleague, Zheng Jiancai. Zheng was born in 1758 as the fourth son of a medicine and 
fengshui enthusiast in the central Fujian county of Dehua, and part of an extended lineage based 
there.183 Despite being an enthusiastic student, he did not find academic success until his mid-
twenties at the age of 25 sui when he passed the county-level exam.184 A few years later, the 
governor of Fujian had appropriated extra funds to support students from outside Fuzhou 
prefecture to attend the Aofeng Academy, and Zheng was invited to attend.185 While studying at 
Aofeng, he relied on his older brother for material support, suggesting that Zheng’s family was 
more financially comfortable than Xie’s.186 Zheng was, however, regarded by his relatives as 
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something of a miser who refused to send any money home to his sons or contribute funds to 
help out with lineage affairs.187  
In their early studies, the two men evinced a strong passion for lixue. Xie was an 
enthusiastic devotee of early Qing lixue scholars—Hu Wei, Gu Donggao, Ren Qiyun, and Fang 
Bao—and of Kangxi-era lixue scholars from Fujian, notably Cai Shiyuan and Lei Hong.188 
Zheng’s intellectual models were the late Ming and early Qing lixue scholars, Sun Qifeng and 
Huang Zongxi, as well as the Song scholar, Wu Deng.189 At Aofeng, both Zheng and Xie further 
immersed themselves in study, guided by the former official and academy head, Meng Chaoran, 
yet another renowned lixue scholar, former Aofeng student, and favorite of Chen Hongmou.190 
As a result of their intellectual upbringing, Xie Jinluan and Zheng Jiancai scorned scholars who 
they perceived to be bookworms ignorant of current affairs and sought practical applications for 
their knowledge. 
In order to accomplish real-world results, Zheng and Xie needed more than just 
intellectual commitment and a penchant for activism. They also needed well-positioned allies. 
Their entry into the Aofeng Academy was important not only for the education they received at 
Fujian’s preeminent educational institution, but it also because it drew the men into an extended 
network of alumni who were employed in positions in the central, territorial, and sub-
bureaucratic levels of the Qing administration. Such connections would prove to be invaluable 
when Xie and Zheng drew on the Aofeng network in Fuzhou and Beijing to mobilize officials in 
support of their causes when they were employed as county instructors. One such connection 
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was their classmate, jinshi-degree winner, Hanlin academician, and Aofeng Academy head, 
Chen Shouqi, who would champion their causes in life and had them officially canonized as 
local worthies after their deaths. 
After their years at Aofeng, the trajectories of Xie and Zheng diverged somewhat. Xie 
was awarded the juren degree in 1788, but was not employed as a county instructor until 1801. 
His experiences during the intervening thirteen-year period remain unclear. In contrast, Zheng 
spent much of the next decade in Beijing. He was selected to be a tribute student and also 
traveled to the capital thanks to patrons from among officials he had met during their service in 
Fujian.191 While residing in Beijing, he established connections of patronage with other Beijing-
based literati, especially Wang Tingzhen, a Hanlin complier, whom he would seek out in the 
future as a useful contact for his Fujian initiatives.192  Remaining in the capital for several years, 
he was presumably supported by his patrons while also continuing to receive assistance from his 
older brother, even when his family experienced economic hardship during one of Fujian’s 
frequent famines.193 At the same time, he also supported himself by working as a teacher for the 
Plain Blue Banner.194 Zheng’s extended residence in Beijing and his network of patrons in the 
capital appear to demonstrate his ambition to live and work in the capital’s cosmopolitan circles. 
He does seem to have been motivated: after finally winning the juren degree at the age of 41 sui, 
he took the metropolitan examination eleven times, failing each attempt. After that, he 
exchanged his life in the capital among friends based in the Hanlin Academy for a life as a 
county instructor, navigating the world of local Fujian politics and often braving physical danger 
with his friend Xie. This position would prove be fortuitous for both men: working as county 
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instructors during the turbulent years of the early Jiaqing period along the maritime frontier 
allowed the two men to put their ideas into action, enhance the political impact of local voices 
through their official post, assert themselves in guiding local affairs, and provide models for 
local activism for a future generation of scholars.  
Xie and Zheng became employed as county instructors in Taiwan as mature men in their 
40s during the early Jiaqing period just as massive pirate fleets bore down on the island. Facing 
the crisis, they manipulated their positions as county instructors and status as local Fujianese to 
agitate for practical solutions to enhance the security of the maritime frontier, becoming local 
activists in the process.  
 
Bringing Gemalan into the Map 
As Zheng Jiancai and Xie Jinluan took up their positions in Taiwanese counties in the 
first decade of the 19th century, well-organized pirate fleets ravaged the coastline from 
Guangdong to Zhejiang. Previously, these pirates had provided naval forces for warring 
Vietnamese factions engaged in civil war. When that conflict ended, the men who crewed the 
fleets began to raid the southeastern coasts of China.195 The superior ships of the pirates and their 
fighting élan overwhelmed local Qing officials and navy tasked with combatting the brigands. 
From 1804 to 1806, Taiwan was under attack from pirates from without and wracked with 
uprisings from within. The two instructors, witnessing the escalating pirate attacks and the 
hapless Qing response to the crisis, took an active part in the defense of their counties, protecting 
the gates at Tainan, and organizing gentry and commoners into defensive forces in Jiayi county. 
When the crisis died down, the instructors, dissatisfied with the government’s lackluster response 
 




to reconstruction, were inspired to ensure long-term security by remaking the administrative 
geography of the southern maritime frontier through the incorporation of the northeastern region 
of Taiwan known as Gemalan (now Yilan). Embarking on a campaign to incorporate the new 
region, Xie and Zheng, produced treatises, allied with local officials, and used the Aofeng 
Academy scholarly network to take the issue to Beijing in order to bring it to the attention of the 
Qing court. The instructors’ campaign to incorporate Gemalan demonstrates the increased space 
for provincial elites to determine local affairs in the Jiaqing period and their strategy to achieve 
their goal of maritime security through an informational campaign. 
Gemalan (also called Hazinan), on the northeastern coast of Taiwan, was an attractive 
base for pirates, therefore constituting a danger to Qing control of the island. Consisting of a 
wide, fertile plain surrounded by high mountain ridges, the pirate leader, Cai Qian, attempted to 
seize Gemalan and transform it into a base of operations, but was repelled by a coalition of 
Chinese settlers and aborigines. Xie and Zheng, realizing the danger of this strategic region 
falling to pirate hands and the effect it would have on the security of Taiwan and its economic 
relationship to mainland Fujian, plotted to make the administrative incorporation of Gemalan an 
essential part of Taiwan’s reconstruction. In order to build support for bringing Gemalan into the 
map, the instructors needed to find allies within the regular Qing administration. They found a 
kindred spirit and activist personality in the prefect of Taiwan, Yang Tingli (1747-1813). A 
native of Guangxi, Yang spent almost the entirety of his nearly thirty years of official service in 
Fujian and Taiwan. Due to his long tenure in Taiwan and personal experience in putting down 
the Lin Shuangwen (1787-1788) and Chen Zhouquan (1795) rebellions, he developed a 
reputation as a military troubleshooter for Taiwan. Also recognizing the potential of Gemalan as 




it, Yang was keen to see it incorporated into the regular Qing administration. Therefore, he 
collaborated with his local activist allies, Xie and Zheng, to make formal incorporation a reality. 
Whatever momentum an official patron may have provided, the Gemalan campaign faced 
headwinds when Yang was recalled in 1806 to face allegations of administrative malfeasance. 
Despite this setback, Xie began writing a treatise entitled Hazinan jilue, “A brief record of 
Hazinan.” This treatise was an argument in favor of the administrative incorporation of Gemalan 
as well as a piece of positive propaganda for Yang Tingli that highlighted his indispensability to 
Taiwan and his outstanding reputation among the Han population there. Once printed, the 
treatise circulated among elite and official circles to win political support for the administrative 
incorporation of Gemalan and implicitly to garner the support needed to have Yang reinstated to 
an official post in Taiwan. 
Though the treatise contained multiple sections, Xie’s strategy to win support for 
incorporation was to highlight the history of Gemalan, the vulnerabilities of its residents, and 
their desire to be formally admitted into regular Qing administration. Not only was incorporation 
strategically necessary for Taiwan and Fujian, but morally essential for the state to bestow 
benevolent administration upon the residents of the vulnerable maritime frontier. The settlement 
of Gemalan, the instructor wrote, was the brainchild of a Zhangzhou native named Wu Sha who 
organized a motley crew of Zhangzhou, Quanzhou, and Cantonese natives, led them into 
Gemalan, cleared the land, and established fortresses for defense.196 Portrayed as a kind of 
cultural hero who cleared the wilderness for settled agriculture, Wu was adept at managing and 
preventing violence among his polyglot group of emigrants. Xie takes Wu’s civilizing impulse 
farther by claiming that Wu had unsuccessfully implored Qing officials to set up administration 
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in Gemalan so the settlers could provide taxes like other liangmin, “good people.” Even after Wu 
Sha’s death, the settlers proved their loyalty when they faced off against Cai Qian’s pirates on 
their own initiative, thwarting the brigands’ invasion, and forcing them back out to sea.197 Xie 
concluded that despite the settlers’ efforts in Gemalan, they were vulnerable to pirates and 
hostile aborigines as long as they fell outside the Qing administrative apparatus. Devoted 
allegiance to the state would naturally follow after administrative incorporation. 
 Xie addressed his historical, strategic, and moral argument for incorporating Gemalan to 
people who considered annexation impracticable. Taking the long view of the Qing experience in 
Taiwan, the instructor reminded his audience that the island itself was once considered 
impossible to govern. The same people who suggested that Gemalan was an unsuitable candidate 
for regular Qing administration were forgetting that during the early years of the dynasty many 
had their doubts about colonizing Taiwan in the first place. Failure to regularize administration 
in Gemalan would comprise a strategic disaster and allow pirates to entrench themselves; from 
such a natural fortress, their influence over Taiwan, Fujian, and the maritime frontier would be 
difficult to dislodge. It would also be a moral catastrophe to abandon subjects who appeared to 
crave inclusion in regular Qing administration as they bravely resisted pirate invasions. Xie 
criticized the timidity of nameless officials who did not want to go through the trouble of 
intervention, or whose only goal was to pass on the responsibility to others.198 For Xie, Gemalan 
and its people deserved the protection and benevolence of the state. Its incorporation represented 
a clear ethical and strategic imperative. Without a regular Qing presence staffed by “benevolent” 
(i.e. “activist”) officials, Gemalan would be filled by elements harmful to the security of the 
empire’s maritime frontier. 
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Yang Tingli provided the treatise’s preface, praising Xie for his comprehensive grasp of 
Gemalan’s history, geography, and security challenges. He echoes Xie’s major arguments 
against abandoning the region, stating unequivocally that letting Gemalan fall prey to pirates and 
brigands would be disastrous for Taiwan and Fujian.199 In addition to presenting the treatise’s 
central argument in the preface, Yang also took a starring role in the text itself. Xie detailed 
Yang’s activities in Gemalan and Taiwan, effectively providing the prefect with a piece of “good 
press.” In this bit of propaganda, Yang Tingli represents the benevolence of the Qing state due to 
his prescient concern with Gemalan, its people, and his understanding of Taiwan’s security. In 
Xie’s flattering account, Yang immediately apprehended the danger posed by the pirate fleets to 
Gemalan and its residents, and visited the region in person to ascertain its needs.200 Implicitly, 
Yang’s noble but lonely quest to “soothe” Gemalan demonstrates that his insight into local 
affairs, his qualities as an official, and benevolent disposition were all essential to the 
administration of Taiwan during a perilous moment, contrasting starkly with other local officials 
who merely worked to maintain the status quo. Xie’s endorsement of Yang was a call for 
governance by far-sighted, activist-oriented personalities—qualities that mirrored his own moral 
and intellectual disposition. Finally printed by Yang Tingli, the text reflects a cooperative effort 
between the official and local worlds for the purpose of changing policy on the central level. 
As treatise was being written by Xie and published by Yang, Zheng Jiancai monitored its 
production, and took it upon himself to lobby for the Gemalan cause on his journey to the 
mainland on his way to take the jinshi examination. It would be his fifth attempt.201 Leaving 
Tainan to set sail to mainland Fujian from the port at Lugang, the popular instructor received a 
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raucous send-off from well-wishers.202 As he arrived on the mainland in the late fall of 1807, he 
learned that Yang Tingli had been recalled.203 In addition to popularizing the Gemalan 
incorporation issue, he began lobbying for Yang Tingli’s return to the island.  
Soon after Zheng arrived, he sought an audience with the governor of Fujian, Zhang 
Shicheng (1762-1830), to impress him with his personal observations of the situation in Taiwan 
and to lobby for the reinstatement of Yang Tingli as prefect. During the audience, the instructor 
detailed recent events in Taiwan, the struggle against the pirates, and the difficulty of getting the 
officials and people to cooperate in defense. The instructor singled out officials in Taiwan for 
their ineffectiveness in military affairs, and for using “bandits” as a pretext to excuse shoddy 
administration. In contrast to this bleak picture, Zheng identified Yang Tingli as a necessary and 
locally beloved official presence. Without Yang in Taiwan, Zheng mused, things might soon spin 
out of control.204 Like Xie, Zheng urged government by activist officials to stem administrative 
malaise. 
Why did Zheng believe he was qualified to comment on political affairs and Qing 
personnel decisions? Zheng acknowledged that as an educational official he was not strictly 
entitled to comment on matters of governance, yet personal experiences and observations forced 
him to speak up on matters confronting Taiwan.205 More importantly, his letter to the governor 
revealed that his conception of the role of an educational official went beyond the mere 
instruction of students, and extended to the political and social life of the county and region. The 
instructor argued that those who held the reins of government in Taiwan did not convey the 
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sentiments and conditions of the people to the emperor, thereby disappointing those whom they 
governed and losing popular support.206 Zheng continued,  
In my opinion, those in charge are completely [regular] officials, but education 
officials are not separate from the people. The educational official’s occupation is 
between officials and the people. Therefore who knows better about the 
circumstances and sentiments of officials and the people than educational officials? 
In the past, officials and people both knew each other, so affairs were managed 
and commands were implemented. Nowadays, officials and the people are unable 
to know each other. If there is some contradictory thing that cannot be solved, 
educational officials will try to reach a resolution. The virtue of an educational 
official does not derive from those in charge, [but because] they are not far from 
the people, it is easy to understand the peoples’ circumstances.207 
 
In short, Zheng conceived of the education official as a mediator between regular officials and 
local residents. On one hand, instructors were centrally appointed, worked within the county’s 
bureaucracy, and, as degree holders, frequently harbored dreams of becoming regular officials 
themselves. On the other hand, they hailed from the same province as those whom they 
instructed and were in close proximity to the educated elite of their districts. The instructor thus 
could serve as a link between officials and people to smooth over disputes and enhance local 
governance. The instructor could also transmit local grievances to higher levels as Zheng was 
doing in his audience with the governor of Fujian. In that sense, instructors could serve as a local 
censorate, and act as watchdogs over administrators. Zheng also assured the governor that Fujian 
had many capable county instructors who were highly conversant with practical affairs. He took 
the opportunity to recommend Xie Jinluan, as an example of an educational official who had 









After his audience with the governor, Zheng journeyed to Beijing to sit for the jinshi 
examination. After his arrival in Beijing, Zheng sent a letter to Xie recounting his lobbying 
activities. He described the governor as sincere; yet while sympathetic to Zheng’s request that 
Yang be reinstated, the governor, could do little.209 In the same letter, Zheng waxed enthusiastic 
about the opportunity his trip to Beijing afforded him to share Xie’s Gemalan treatise with 
officials in the capital. He proposed showing the treatise to his mentor Wang Tingzhen, who was 
had recently been promoted to Academician of the Grand Secretariat, and another friend, Xin 
Congyi, who was a compiler in the Hanlin Academy.210 With their connections and political 
clout among metropolitan officials, they could be useful allies in the campaign to incorporate 
Gemalan.   
Despite failing the jinshi exam for the fifth time, Zheng remained in Beijing. During that 
time, he wrote three letters to Wang Tingzhen emphasizing the importance of incorporating 
Gemalan into the regular Qing territorial administration. He first introduced Gemalan and the 
threats that it faced. He framed the issue of incorporation in moral and strategic terms, echoing 
the arguments made by Xie.211 Zheng then introduced Xie Jinluan and his treatise. He proposed 
to forward a copy of the treatise for Wang to peruse and possibly provide a preface. “Someday,” 
Zheng wrote, “Gemalan will be conjoined [to Taiwan], [Xie’s] treatise will be put into effect, 
and your excellent prose will shine brightly overseas.”212 Zheng offered the preface as an 
opportunity for Wang to attach his name to a winning enterprise, and thereby enhance his 
reputation by association. Zheng then waited until Xie sent him a draft of the treatise, and 
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forwarded it to Wang for his perusal.213 According to another letter, Wang did, in fact, compose 
a preface for the treatise. However, unaware that Zheng had sought a preface from his mentor, 
Xie only had time to include Zheng’s suggestions on the treatise before it was printed by Yang 
Tingli.214 Zheng also continued to advocate for Yang’s reinstatement in Beijing. Despite his 
popularity in Taiwan, Zheng wrote, word of his accomplishments and indispensability had not 
yet reached the emperor’s ear.215 By presenting his mentor Wang with information about 
Gemalan and Yang Tingli’s career, Zheng Jiancai hoped that these local issues could find a 
positive reception among Beijing’s official circles and effect change back home. 
While Zheng was lobbying for Gemalan and Yang Tingli in Beijing, Xie Jinluan also 
sought out influential voices to promote his completed treatise. Fortuitously, he enlisted Liang 
Shangguo (1750-1818), a high official in the central court at Beijing, to the Gemalan cause. 
Formerly, Liang and Xie were neighbors, living within the same village. They were also fellow 
Aofeng Academy alumni. While employed in the Hanlin academy, Liang developed a reputation 
for keeping tabs on events back in his home province, and for sharing his views on contemporary 
problems in documents sent to territorial officials and in memorials sent to the throne. Liang 
seems to have been especially concerned about violence in his native province. For instance, in 
1800, Liang reported in a memorial that members of the Heaven and Earth secret society had 
infiltrated the military stationed in his home prefecture, and that local officials were covering up 
the problem.216 Because of his hometown connections, Aofeng Academy affiliation, and 
willingness to memorialize the emperor to address contemporary Fujian problems, Liang must 
have appeared to Xie to be a natural ally on the Gemalan issue. 
 
213 Zheng Jiancai, “Shang Wang Sean xiansheng,” LTWJ. 
214 Zheng Jiancai, “Shang Sean xiansheng shu,” LTWJ. 
215 Ibid. 




Liang found Xie’s treatise persuasive and took up the cause. Like Xie, he couched his 
arguments in strategic and ethical terms: the incorporation of Gemalan was necessary in order to 
eliminate the pirate threat, and the Qing had a moral obligation to civilize Gemalan and its 
people. Liang also spotlighted two other arguments that were implicitly embedded within Xie’s 
treatise. The first was that Gemalan’s incorporation would greatly increase the amount of 
cultivated land in Taiwan, leading to greater regional prosperity for settler-cultivators and 
enhanced food security for chronically low-producing Fujian. The second was to “civilize” 
obstreperous aborigines living there, and to transform them into non-violent, taxable cultivators. 
Convinced by these arguments, the Jiaqing court moved to incorporate Gemalan as a 
subprefecture (ting).  
After the Jiaqing emperor sanctioned the incorporation of Gemalan, official sources 
obscured Xie’s contribution. Years later, Gao Shuran—a guwen prodigy, friend of Aofeng 
Academy director, Chen Shouqi, and admirer of Xie—viewed a rare copy of Xie’s treatise stored 
in a friend’s collection.217 Praising the treatise, Gao lamented that the original edition of Xie’s 
treatise had been lost, and that future generations would forget Xie’s role in bringing Gemalan 
into the map.218  
Why do official accounts of the Gemalan saga omit Xie and his text? One explanation 
might be that as a lowly county instructor, Xie operated outside the normal parameters of official 
activity and communication. Indeed, the instructor himself seems quite aware that he could be 
perceived as exceeding the bounds of his authority. The preface to Xie’s treatise recounts a 
conversation between Xie and an unnamed guest in which the visitor is said to have remarked:  
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My! This is fruitless labor. You are an educational official. You have no 
responsibility for the people or the state, and now you’re commenting on political 
affairs and what is best for the people. You must be very careful, or it will appear 
that you are overstepping your authority.219 
 
The interlocutor’s criticism was an accusation with which the instructor was familiar. Xie 
answered his critic by invoking a wider principle:  an educational official could—and ought 
legitimately—to do more. Instructors were not about composing poetry or writing empty clichés, 
argued Xie, but instead being actively engaged in the investigation of things in order to benefit 
the state and people. Although an educational official could not formally rule on policy itself, 
they could—and ought—to investigate local conditions and advocate for the implementation of 
suitable policies.220 By arguing that county instructors could tackle policy questions, Xie asserted 
the legitimacy of his voice in shaping local political affairs.  
 Both Xie and Zheng used their posts as county instructors to justify their local activism. 
Redefining their responsibilities beyond the instruction of students, they argued for a more 
expansive role to play in local society that entailed reporting on local conditions, transmitting the 
sentiments of county residents, and even altering the maritime frontier. The instructors used their 
orthodox educational lixue orientation and local status to undertake an informational campaign 
through the publication and transmission of a treatise. Contacts with associates of the Aofeng 
Academy allowed the Gemalan issue to gain support in official circles in Beijing, and ultimately 
win a positive reception at the Qing court. Seizing upon the flexibility of their posts, Fujianese 
identity, and influence through the Aofeng Academy, Xie and Zheng pioneered new strategies to 
achieve local goals at the central level. In the end, the local activism of the instructors was not 
lost on future generations of scholar-officials: Xie’s text was eventually incorporated into Wei 
 





Yuan’s compendia of statecraft essays, the Huangchao jingshi wenbian, immortalized amongst 
other texts that “rectified the world.” It is also important to note that the empowerment of the 
instructors to seek local change and to exert a level of control was a phenomenon that extended 
to many parts of empire during the early 19th century. Most notably, in Suzhou local elites were 
assuming more and more managerial roles and Yan Ruyi was pioneering new governing 
technologies to combat rebellion in his home province of Hunan.221 The efforts of Zheng and Xie 
to bring Gemalan into the map therefore reflect an emerging empire-wide trend in which local 
elites became emboldened to handle tasks that were once the sole purview of officials.  
 
Defending Students in Southern Fujian   
After their stints in Taiwan, Zheng and Xie were posted to counties in mainland Fujian. 
Xie Jinluan was transferred to Anxi County, a mountainous inland region in Quanzhou 
prefecture, famous for both tea production and inter-lineage feuds (xiedou). As Xie settled into 
his new post, a local man named Lin Hei was murdered in a nearby village. To Xie’s horror, 
Anxi County shengyuan were blamed for the death, and the county magistrate arrested seven of 
them.222 The case of the accused students exposed tensions within the county and sparked intense 
disagreement between Xie as the county instructor and the local magistrate. The conflict also 
compelled Xie to transcend the boundaries of his official post by creating a guide to help future 
officials tasked with managing Fujian’s unruly south and to lay out an alternative vision of local 
governance in which instructor and shengyuan acted autonomously to stabilize local society. 
Published and distributed by the Aofeng Academy, the treatise underscored a localist vision for 
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administration in southern Fujian, and turned the Aofeng Academy into an information center on 
local affairs for Qing officials. 
The two southernmost prefectures in Fujian, Quanzhou and Zhangzhou, were notorious 
for violence. A combination of mountainous terrain, scant arable land, a high degree of 
commercialization and extensive trade networks, and a weak government presence made 
powerful lineage groups defining feature of southern Fujian local society; these groups would 
often clash in violent confrontations due to intense competition over scanty local resources, 
frequently killing the combatants.223 Added to this volatile social milieu was the presence of 
shengyuan. Local officials across the empire frequently complained about shengyuan and their 
predilection for troublemaking by resisting tax collection, organizing and leading local uprisings, 
and contributing to bureaucratic backlog and inflaming local tensions by acting as songshi or 
“litigation masters.”224 No less a thinker than Gu Yanwu accused shengyuan of abandoning their 
original function as students preparing for a life of learning and public service in favor of 
fomenting trouble.225 Students of Qing history trained in American universities know well about 
the short-lived rebellion of Zhong Renjie a shengyuan from Jiangxi.226 For officials in Fujian, as 
elsewhere, shengyuan constituted a demographic that was prone to local troublemaking and 
criminal activity.227 As an instructor, Xie was responsible for the shengyuan in his county and 
their behavior. A murder case implicating his students would endanger his position, undermine 
the status of shengyuan, and threaten the social order. 
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Xie raced to save his accused students. He first investigated the situation and then sent 
confidential reports to the Fujian educational authorities detailing an alternative set of facts for 
the case. In his version, Lin Hei died as a result of a feud between two lineages in Chiling and 
Yaoyang. The murder occurred during a festival during the first month of the year when locals 
welcomed deities. Participants disguised their faces like demons, banged on drums, and 
brandished weapons. During the procession, a large group of these demon-faced men from 
Yaoyang forcibly occupied houses and towers in a third village where Lin Hei was shot and 
killed. Lin’s companions alleged that he was killed by one of the demon-masked individuals, but 
could not identify the murderer by name, so they accused seven shengyuan from Yaoyang at the 
magistrate’s yamen. Yet according to Xie, however, the presence of these the shengyuan at the 
site of Lin’s murder could not be proven. Moreover, Xie wrote, the demon-faced men were 
lowlifes; it would be inconceivable for a shengyuan to participate in such activities.228 Xie’s 
defense of the shengyuan was of course self-interested. As the county instructor, he was 
responsible for the shengyuan and had to answer for their behavior; charging them with murder 
or even suggesting that they engaged in demon masquerades placed Xie’s career in real jeopardy. 
In order to save the shengyuan and his reputation, Xie employed a new tactic: lobbying for the 
innocence of the shengyuan to higher authorities while spotlighting his expertise on local 
governance and exposing the fecklessness of officials through the publication of another treatise 
on governing strategies for southern Fujian. 
Xie’s treatise was both a rebuke to the shengyuan-blaming magistrate of Anxi County 
and an indictment of the administration of local officials serving in southern Fujian. Titled, “A 
discourse on governing methods for Quanzhou and Zhangzhou,” the treatise explained to an 
 




imaginary audience of civil administrators posted to the region how a combination of deviant 
social customs and poor governance lead to southern Fujian’s seemingly intractable violence. It 
also provided a guide for officials on how to govern the unruly prefectures. Xie thus highlighted 
his own status as an authoritative—and native—witness to the region’s cultural and moral 
failings and to official mismanagement, while his claim of possessing a legitimate and essential 
voice centered on his status as an educational official. Asking rhetorically, “How can an 
educational official (jiaozhi) speak of methods of governing?”229 His predictably self-interested 
response: to highlight the role of educators as social activists and as mentors to a new morally 
essential generation of students to stabilize a frequently violent social milieu.  
 While providing a coherent explanation for southern Fujian’s violence rooted in the toxic 
interplay of officials and commoners, Xie’s treatise was a deeply political document that placed 
a special social mission upon shengyuan and county instructors.  Xie argued that it was the 
destiny of shengyuan, properly educated, to grasp the reins of moral reform, and so transform the 
cultural dysfunction of southern Fujian. Managed by the county instructors, both shengyuan and 
instructors would restore orthodox order to the fractured social landscape and do so free from the 
machinations of local commoners and mismanagement of local magistrates. In Xie’s view, it was 
official and local harassment of shengyuan that kept southern Fujian in a permanent state of 
dysfunction.  
The conflict over shengyuan strongly indicates a potentially adversarial relationship 
between instructors and magistrate. Certainly, the tension can be understood as a kind of “turf 
war” that was fought over the conduct and local roles of shengyuan. In regards to governing 






argued whereas an educational official realized his influence through moral persuasion, a 
magistrate governed through law and punishments. Clearly, he saw moral persuasion as a more 
effective instrument, particularly in violent and litigious southern Fujian. Xie understood the 
dynamic between instructor and magistrate as two travelers crossing a river in a leaky boat. One 
of the travelers (the magistrate), instead of sealing up the leaks, takes a hammer and smashes 
holes into it, drowning them both.230 Although Xie maintained that both the magistrate and 
instructor depended on the other, he contended that the governing style of magistrates in 
southern Fujian ultimately inhibited a stable and moral order from emerging. For Xie, a well-
governed county needed the laws and punishments of the magistrate, as well as the moral order 
bestowed by county instructors upon local shengyuan.  
Several years after Xie’s death in the spring of 1820, Zhao Shenzhen, the new governor-
general of Fujian and Zhejiang, paid a visit to Chen Shouqi, Xie’s old friend and Aofeng 
Academy classmate, and by then the director of the Aofeng Academy. Chen was an Aofeng 
Academy director deeply invested in pressing local issues—the economy of Fujian in 
particular—who wrote about the salt and rice trades to resident governors and governors-general 
that sought his advice. In this instance, Chen, acting once again as a consultant in local Fujianese 
affairs, offered his assistance to the new governor. As Chen recalled, Zhao was extremely 
dejected over the dysfunctional circumstances in Quanzhou and Zhangzhou and sought out 
Chen’s advice on how to deal with it.231 Chen remembered his old friend Xie and his treatise. 
Producing a copy, he showed it to the governor-general, impressing the official deeply.232 
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 Zhao was fascinated by Xie. The governor-general agreed that Xie’s experience as a 
native Fujianese working in an official capacity gave him greater insight into the political and 
social workings of Quanzhou and Zhangzhou than officials from outside Fujian. 
 This text is the words of a Fujianese. It is [written by] a Fujianese who loves the 
Fujianese people and knows of their hardships. It is complete. In loving the 
Fujianese and knowing the Fujianese, it is complete. Listening to Xie’s words, 
one can understand me; [yet], these are not the words of a governor-general, but 
the words of a Fujianese. And my words are the words of a high official that has 
just arrived in Fujian.233 
 
The governor-general declared that what Xie wrote in his tract mirrored his own feelings on the 
problems and solutions for Quanzhou and Zhangzhou. Since the insights were articulated by a 
Fujianese native, Zhao evidently felt that aligning his opinions with an “insider” gave him more 
confidence his administration would move in the right direction.234 Because the treatise was 
housed inside the library of the vaunted Aofeng Academy and endorsed by Chen, its head, Zhao 
would have been reassured that Xie was no crank. The governor-general was equally impressed 
with Xie’s status as a mere county instructor. Although Xie had “no responsibility for governing 
people,” he was moved to act by the suffering in southern Fujian, compelling him to “act like a 
father and mother official.”235 In short, Zhao implied that Xie was behaving like a magistrate—or 
as a magistrate ought to behave. 
 In the spring of 1823, Zhao ordered that Xie’s text be printed and distributed around 
Fujian. He requested that Chen Shouqi, the Aofeng Academy head, carve the blocks, print copies, 
and circulate copies of Xie’s treatise. Thus, in addition to becoming Fujian’s premier center of 








texts dealing with local Fujianese affairs. The alliance of local and official interests met in the 
publication of Xie’s treatise with the addition of prefaces and new chapters written by Zhao and 
Chen. The revised text was distributed to prefects and magistrates with instructions to first read it, 
absorb its message, and then place the copies in county schools and lineage ancestral halls, 
presumably to encourage county students and warn obstreperous lineages.236 Through such a 
distribution program undertaken by the Aofeng Academy, Zhao hoped that officials, lineage 
members, and shengyuan would have a common understanding of the challenges facing southern 
Fujian—and potential solutions to address them.  
Reception of Xie’s treatise was not always positive, however. For instance, Guo 
Shangxian, a retired high-ranking official from Putian County, who wrote about the challenges 
facing the governance of southern Fujian regarded Xie’s treatise as a superficial and clichéd 
presentation of the issues afflicting Zhangzhou and Quanzhou.237 Yet, the treatise became 
something of a touchstone for future generations of Qing officials who sought advice on how to 
deal with the problematic southern regions. It was reprinted as late as 1868 and once again 
distributed to Fujian officials, students, and lineages, becoming an enduring text on governance 
in Fujian over the 19th century.238  
 The case of the accused shengyuan compelled Xie to use the crisis as an opportunity to 
criticize local governance in southern Fujian and proffer suggestions for reform. Seizing upon his 
“local expertise” as a fellow Fujianese, he argued for an alternative governing relationship that 
reserved a significant role for shengyuan and county instructors to stabilize local society, and do 
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academy, and to officialdom, it increased in authoritative weight through the added prefaces of 
Chen, the academy director, and Zhao, the governor-general. The Aofeng Academy and its well-
connected head were instrumental in bridging Xie’s claim to local expertise and his later official 
endorsement. The academy’s role in publishing, circulating, and distributing officially endorsed 
local literature like Xie’s treatise elevated it as a center for mediating local and imperial interests, 
and transforming the academy into a think-tank of sorts for giving policy prescriptions to local 
Qing officials. 
  
“The Instructor Speaks”: Xie Jinluan’s activist vision for cultivating students and officials 
As Xie approached the end of his life, he “grew tired of official duties,” as the author of 
his tomb inscription put it, and planned to retire.239 Before leaving his post at Anxi County, he 
wrote a final text. Entitled Jiaoyu yu (“The instructor speaks”), it was ostensibly a manual on 
how to train students, and summed up Xie’s philosophy and practice of education. Its main goal, 
however, was to inculcate would-be officials with a sense of moral mission and underpin their 
administrations with a muscular orthodox foundation. With this last text, Xie created a program 
to cultivate morally grounded and results-oriented local officials—the kind of personnel needed 
to address pressing issues in early 19th century China. 
Emphasizing practicality, action, and moral cultivation, the text presented Xie’s vision 
for a moral and activist educational program. Xie first provided both students and future county 
instructors an educational plan: what books to read, how to understand those books, how to write, 
which writing styles to use, and how to cultivate oneself morally. The proposed curriculum 
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heavily tilted towards Song-learning.240 Reflecting its strong lixue bent, the text emphasized 
students’ moral cultivation and their practical roles in local communities. Xie warned students 
not to “shut their doors and read,” but to actively study current events to put knowledge into 
practice.241 Xie thus created an educational program to cultivate future activist scholars and far-
sighted officials.  
The other major concern of the text was to address the proper conduct of the county 
magistrate. Regarding this official as the most consequential figure in the day-to-day 
management of the empire, Xie was keenly aware of that official’s beneficial or baleful influence 
on local affairs. The quality of magistrates was therefore an essential priority for the 
reproduction of competent administration, and their proper training was a central goal of Xie’s 
final text.242 Besides providing future officials with the proper orthodox orientation in the 
educational realm, Xie included instruction on practical affairs, such as managing grain, money, 
and taxes, promoting the livelihoods of county residents, funding the county through lawsuits 
and customary fees, improving local customs, writing proper reports, managing staff disputes, 
and avoiding corruption. Perhaps reflecting on his experience with the arrest of the Anxi county 
shengyuan, Xie argued that it was essential for the magistrate to be clear-eyed and exercise 
vigorous control over the county functionaries.243 By providing and educational and practical 
foundation to students ambitious to become officials, Xie, a lowly county instructor, aspired to 
improve the quality of future magistrates and their administration. 
Even though Xie remained a county instructor, he apparently did not feel that it was 
presumptuous to advise and train future magistrates. His experiences in Taiwan and Fujian 
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exposed him to the failings of local officials. Where those magistrates failed, Xie took the 
initiative: first to organize the defense of Jiayi County, campaign for the incorporation of 
Gemalan, and then to struggle against a supposed injustice against shengyuan and rectify 
“degenerate” customs in Anxi County. Certainly, Xie felt he could intervene when a magistrate 
was deficient or in error, but he may have also considered that his post of instructor was on a 
comparable level as a magistrate. In his report to the prefect alerting him to the arrest of the 
shengyuan in Anxi County, Xie lamented that in ages past, both magistrate and instructor were 
selected based on the quality of their scholarship, and that instructors were not inferior to county 
officials.244 In the conclusion of Jiaoyu yu, he reminded his readers that while a county 
magistrate is merely concerned with the day-to-day district minutiae and has no concern about 
events beyond their county borders, the instructor, concerned with putting his learning into 
practice, must have a broad curiosity about current and local affairs.245 For Xie, having a broad 
perspective and the leisure to focus on specific issues allowed county instructors to tackle 
problems outside the magistrate’s purview, making instructors a vital figure in the improvement 
of local affairs.  
After his death, Xie’s manual gained a wide following among educational and official 
circles. Published in six provinces through the Tongzhi period (1861-1875) by admirers and 
Aofeng Academy alumni, it was placed in the libraries of several academies, including 
Aofeng.246 The enthusiastic reception and extended publication of Xie’s text does him credit as 
an orthodox scholar and activist with a reputation that gradually extended beyond the borders of 
Fujian. The spread and continuing popularity of the text into the late 19th century indicates the 
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cultural reach of the Aofeng Academy and its publications, championed by famous alumni such 
as Lin Zexu who adored Xie’s text. Praising the book for being focused on practical use, scholars 
entering a physically ravaged and morally exhausted post-Taiping world in the 1860s embraced 
the text as a handbook for educational and moral reconstruction for a new crop of students and 
officials to be trained in in orthodox norms. 
  
Enshrining activism and modeling local political engagement 
By the close of the Jiaqing reign, Xie and Zheng were famous across their home province. 
Their actions and texts on the Gemalan issue and the case of the accused shengyuan had 
solidified their reputations as activists and experts in local affairs, and they were increasingly 
regarded as models of political and moral action in elite circles in Fuzhou. After their deaths in 
1825, their old friend and classmate, Chen Shouqi, now the head of the Aofeng Academy, 
successfully lobbied for Xie and Zheng to be included in the shrine of local worthies, signifying 
the clout of the academy and its associates to arbitrate cultural affairs in Fujian.247 As the 
Daoguang reign (1820-1850) commenced, Xie and Zheng influenced a new generation of 
scholars and officials who would become active in elite Beijing politics and during the politically 
contentious years of the Opium War. 
One significant admirer was Yao Ying (1785-1853), a leading light in the Qing’s “inner 
Opium War.” Yao was a prolific guwen-style belletrist, and a towering member of the Spring 
Purification circle, a faction of scholars who self-consciously modeled themselves on the late-
Ming Donglin clique. He fashioned himself as an uncompromising official, working in lower-
 
247 Seunghyun Han has shown that local elites became increasingly involved in the production of cultural forms that 
were once the prerogative of the Qing government during the Jiaqing reign, particularly the enshrinement of local 




level provincial posts to prove himself as an activist official and win national recognition.248 Yao 
began his career as minor official in Fujian and Taiwan in the early Daoguang reign, including as 
the assistant prefectural magistrate of Gemalan, which had be brought into the map due to the 
efforts of the two instructors.  
Journeying to Fujian in 1816 to take up the post of magistrate of Longxi County, Yao 
heard tales of the two instructors and their exploits. He was fascinated with the instructors’ role 
in the defense against pirate raids of the early Jiaqing reign, and was impressed with their 
initiative to bring about the incorporation of Gemalan, signifying the power of moral action to 
bestow practical state and local benefits.249 In 1820, Yao met Zheng in person, as the old 
instructor arrived in Taiwan County to once again resume his old post. Perhaps sensing a kindred 
spirit in this new magistrate, Zheng handed over his collected works to Yao to read and edit. 
When Zheng died a short time later, Yao took care of the arrangements to transport the body 
home and wrote funeral epitaphs in his honor.250 
 Yao Ying’s admiration for the two instructors should be interpreted through his own 
political orientation. Concerned that “passive” and “pliable” officials were could not turn the tide 
of an empire entering an advanced age, Yao advocated for the cultivation of a new crop of 
officials with a robust moral orientation and vigorous personality to tackle pressing problems, 
even at the risk of offending superiors.251 Zheng and Xie fit Yao’s prescription for robust action 
to achieve meaningful change. He was most impressed with the instructors for their role in 
bringing Gemalan into the map, even at the risk of overstepping their bounds as county 
instructors and offending the sensibilities of regular officials. He credited Xie’s treatise as the 
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prime factor that led to Gemalan’s incorporation, providing Taiwan with a bulwark against 
enemies from the sea and affording it with enhanced food security thanks to its abundant grain 
production.252 He was also moved by the instructors’ support of Yang Tingli despite their low 
official status and “jealousy” of other Qing officials, demonstrating for Yao the inherent strength 
of like-minded scholars and officials who banded together to promote a common cause.253 
Between personally contributing to the defense of Taiwan during the pirate raids of the early 
Jiaqing period, offering military strategy to the prefectural authorities, incorporating Gemalan, 
and supporting other activist officials, Zheng and Xie demonstrated to Yao what activists could 
achieve at the local level, provided they had the right moral orientation and political drive. 
 Many years later after Zheng’s death, Yao Ying enlisted the example of Zheng Jiancai to 
assist Taiwan during the Opium War. With the Spring Purification circle adherents ascendant at 
the Daoguang court, Yao was assigned to the vital position of Taiwan Intendant in 1837, and 
remained at that post through the duration of the conflict.254 As British ships prowled the seas off 
the Qing coasts, Yao requested that Yang Tingli and Zheng Jiancai receive sacrifices in the 
shrine to worthy officials.255 Extolling Zheng for his achievements in practical learning, his 
attention to current affairs, and his experience in fighting a maritime enemy, Yao bolstered 
gentry support by invoking the memory of the long-dead but still-popular instructor as he dealt 
with the threat of foreign invasion and persistent local disturbances.256  
 Yao’s admiration for the two instructors was also shared by his protégé, Zhang Jiliang 
(1799-1843). Zhang was an eccentric poet-scholar from western Fujian and an Aofeng Academy 
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alumnus with a passion for guwen-style prose.257 Cultivated by Yao Ying with whom he shared a 
literary and intellectual bond, he was introduced to literati circles in Beijing, and transformed the 
literary preferences of the Spring Purification circle members with his “emotional, direct, even 
perhaps primitive poetic expressions.”258 Zhang shared with Yao an urge to cultivate a robust 
moral orientation among officials and literati.259 Before his foray into Beijing’s political and 
literary circles, he drew moral and political inspiration from the two instructors, both of whom 
were fellow Fujianese and Aofeng Academy alumni. 
Like Yao Ying, Zhang saw in the instructors the embodiment of his moral and literary 
ideal—men whose moral orientation compelled them to address pressing problems and to 
undertake meaningful and effective action. The young poet-prodigy particularly esteemed Xie’s 
treatise on governing Zhangzhou and Quanzhou and his manual for training students, Jiaoyu yu, 
and admired Zheng Jiancai for his defensive action during the pirate incursions and for declining 
the position of magistrate in Jiangxi.260  
Zhang’s connection with the instructors was not merely an intellectual affinity. In the 
closing years of the Jiaqing era, Zhang struck up an intimate friendship and literary exchange 
with two instructors before their deaths. In 1818, during the provincial examinations, they 
climbed the peak facing the Aofeng Academy together, where Zheng recalled exciting anecdotes 
from his experiences battling pirates in Taiwan.261 The younger scholar, impressed, composed a 
commemorative poem declaring that the instructor, having a higher purpose in mind, was willing 
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to brave the dangerous sea journey to satisfy his aspirations.262 Sensing the frustrated ambition of 
the talented young scholar, the instructors encouraged their friend, predicting that he would shine 
in the near future.263 After the deaths of the two instructors, Zhang bemoaned the loss of his 
mentors. He composed memorials, reminiscences, and poems to commemorate the instructors for 
their deeds in life and for their impact as political models on younger scholars like himself.  Ha 
also worshipped at Xie’s grave years after his death.264  
Zhang, like Yao, saw his moral and political orientation manifested in the lives of the two 
instructors. Here were two men who did not win the jinshi examination or achieve recognition on 
a national level, who yet were able to impact local issues on a level that far exceeded their 
nominal position through the force of their personalities. As Zhang and Yao embraced an ethics 
of moral action in the Daoguang period and helped remake literati politics in Beijing through the 




Through intellectually vigorous lixue orientations, the assistance of the Aofeng Academy 
network, their publications, and their own prodigious energies, Zheng Jiancai and Xie Jinluan 
transcended the normative boundaries of their roles as instructors and transformed themselves 
into local activists. Punching above the weight of their official posts, the instructors exercised an 
outsized influence in the direction of affairs in Fujian and Taiwan, remaking the map of the 








southern Fujianese prefectures of Quanzhou and Zhangzhou, and lobbying for the enhanced 
participation of instructors and shengyuan in local society. For their activism and literary 
production, they were enshrined as local worthies, and celebrated as models of local action, 
particularly by the associates of the Aofeng Academy. 
Although they cultivated reputations as local experts, much of the instructors’ success 
was due to their production of information and their relationship to the Aofeng Academy. The 
mediation of the academy and its status as an orthodox center of scholarship granted the 
instructors an authoritative voice by providing them with the prestige of a well-regarded 
institution. The pivotal role of the academy in elevating the instructors’ writings, publishing their 
treatises, and disseminating their “locally expert” information not only made the instructors’ 
writings palatable to Qing officials, but also made their proposals worth implementing. In short, 
without the influence of the academy and its authority, the writings of Zheng and Xie might have 
been dismissed as the hackneyed scribbles of backwater cranks, and therefore without value to 
Qing officials. With the implied assurance of the academy, Qing officials benefitted from a 
source of information that was outside the usual bureaucratic channels and free of its limitations. 
The publications of Zheng and Xie therefore constituted a method of obtaining relevant 
information on pressing problems and possible solutions that official sources of information 
could not provide during a challenging moment for the dynasty. Though extra-bureaucratic by 
nature, this new source of information wielded an authoritative voice, and, more importantly, 
aligned itself with Qing interests. For Qing officials serving in Fujian or in Beijing, it was useful, 
respectable, and non-threatening. In turn, Zheng and Xie (and by extension, the Aofeng 
Academy and its associates) enhanced their local influence by aligning themselves with Qing 




relationship with the Qing bureaucracy, the instructors carved out a broad space for vigorous 
local activism at the turn of the 19th century.   
The instructors’ virtuosity in the production of information and their drive to enhance 
local control also reflects broader patterns in the changing orientation of Chinese elites beginning 
in the Jiaqing reign. As the Jiaqing court loosened informational controls with the opening of the 
yanlu, it also gave greater sanction to elites to manage local affairs and even exercise influence 
over things such as rebel pacification and borderland management—areas that had stymied the 
Qing militarily and threatened to ruin it financially. As previously mentioned, the case of Yan 
Ruyi—his intellectual blossoming in the jingshi-infused atmosphere of the Yuelu Academy, his 
extensive writings on new structures to combat rebels in Hunan and pirates in Guangdong, and 
his alignment with Qing interests—closely mirrors the trajectory of Xie Jinluan and Zheng 
Jiancai. All three of these activists worked in borderland areas that witnessed violence and 
fraying imperial control. By empowering local elites like Yan, Zheng, and Xie to deal with 
problems on its frontiers, the Qing state enhanced its ability to deal with its troubled borderlands 
without added imperial investment, but also may have fundamentally changed its relationship to 




















Lin Shumei: The Creation of a Local Expert 
 
 In 1831, Lin Shumei presented his family’s Japanese sword to the circuit intendant, Zhou 
Kai, in his yamen in Xiamen. The blade had been in Lin’s family for generations, having been 
acquired sometime during the mid-Ming Wakō raids that menaced the Chinese coasts. 
Thereafter, the sword signified the Lins’ hereditary affiliation with the navy for hundreds of 
years.265 As he admired the ancient sword in his hands, Zhou also esteemed its young owner, his 
protégé, who, up until that point, had spent nearly his entire youth sojourning in the far-flung 
garrisons of the Fujian littoral. Here before him, Zhou mused, was someone who could handle 
both wen and wu.  
This chapter examines the life, education, and career of Lin Shumei (1808-1851), and his 
development as a self-styled expert in local Fujianese and military affairs. Born into a military 
family, he spent his early years traveling with his father, a naval officer, on the high seas to Qing 
military outposts, which imbued him with a wealth of practical knowledge. Yet, becoming a 
recognized local expert was predicated on his acquisition of scholarly patrons, his affiliation with 
northern Fujianese and Aofeng Academy literary circles, and rigorous training in guwen-style 
prose. By securing a network of northern and eventually southern Fujianese scholars, by 
equipping himself with the literary technology of guwen, and by participating in the creation of a 
southern literary circle headquartered in Xiamen, Lin transformed himself into an expert in local 
affairs and an authority in maritime defense. Through his scholarly networks and his literary 
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virtuosity, he attracted the patronage of Qing officials posted to Fujian and implemented his 
ideas for governance in a region wracked with domestic turmoil and facing international conflict. 
 
Beginnings 
Lin Shumei’s early life was defined by the dictates of the Qing navy. He was born in 
1808 in a Jinmen village called Houpu, the sixth son of Chen Chunpu. The Chens of Houpu were 
a military family, and a part of Jinmen’s heavy naval presence, a continuing legacy of the Qing’s 
conquest of the southeast coastal regions and Taiwan during the mid-17th century. Jinmen itself 
lay just a few kilometers away from the neighboring island of Xiamen, the headquarters of the 
Fujian navy. The island was truly a naval citadel. Xiamen was the base of the Fujian naval 
commander, who ranked just below the governor-general, reflecting the Qing state’s overriding 
concern with security on its unstable southeastern maritime reaches.266 Native Fujianese tended 
to be appointed to the most important naval posts in the province, including the powerful naval 
commander, and the Qing court often sided with these military commanders when civil officials 
or even governors-general complained that they were being deferential to their fellow 
provincials.267 From behind the walled citadel on Xiamen island—the offices of the local civil 
authorities on Xiamen were conspicuously sited outside the walls—the naval commander 
oversaw garrisons on Jinmen, Haitan, Nan’ao, Penghu and Taiwan, and the sailors mainly hailed 
from the southern Fujianese prefectures of Quanzhou and Zhangzhou.268 The naval garrison in 
Jinmen was central to the Qing efforts to secure its southeastern coasts, protect the vital military 
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and merchant center at Xiamen, and defend the vital link to Taiwan. From his yamen in southern 
Jinmen, the regional commander  (zongbing) of the garrison managed ships, patrols, and sailors; 
those numbers could be cut or increased as the situation demanded.269 As Lin Shumei was born 
in the middle of the pirate crisis of the early 19th century, the number of sailors stationed in 
Jinmen ballooned to more than one thousand.270 
Chen Chunpu, Lin Shumei’s birth father, was part of the rapidly increasing number of 
sailors sent to confront the pirate fleets in the seas off Fujian and Taiwan.  He served as a mid-
ranking naval officer in the Green Standard Army in the Jinmen garrison. Shumei was the last of 
Chunpu’s six sons. After her marriage, Chunpu’s paternal cousin was childless, so Chunpu 
offered to have Shumei adopted out as her son. Like his natal family, Shumei’s adopted family 
had a strong military tradition. The father of Shumei’s adopted mother, Chen Bigao, served as a 
naval waiwei. Stationed in Taiwan in the late Qianlong period, he fought rebel forces during Lin 
Shuangwen Rebellion, and was ultimately killed in action by rebels in Fengshan County. Bigao 
was granted posthumous titles and enshrined within the Manifest Loyalty Shrine in Taiwan 
County, but he left behind a wife and daughter who soon faced poverty.  
Shumei’s adopted mother was married to a man named Lin Tingfu. Like the Chens, the 
Lins of Houpu village in Jinmen were a small and undistinguished lineage. Originating from 
Longxi County in Zhangzhou prefecture on the Fujian mainland, they moved to nearby Tong’an 
County in neighboring Quanzhou prefecture during the Jiajing period (1521-1567). Their 
founding ancestor of the Jinmen branch, Guoyuan, settled on the island with his son in 1678 after 
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escaping a flood, and members of succeeding generations frequently pursued careers in the Qing 
navy.271 By the time Lin Shumei was born in 1808, the southeastern coastal region from 
Guangdong to Zhejiang was menaced by the huge pirate fleets of Cai Qian and Zhu Fen, and the 
sailors from the Jinmen garrison patrolled the seas and did battle with the corsair fleets. 
A naval career also appealed to Lin Shumei’s adoptive father, Tingfu. When he was 
seventeen sui, his family had descended into hard times, yet the young man did not lack for 
ambition. At the turn of the 19th century the presence of the Cai and Zhu pirate fleets prompted 
Lin Tingfu to regard a career in the Qing navy as a means to secure steady employment and a 
chance to win merit and promotion. Fighting under commanders Li Nansheng and Xu Songnian, 
Tingfu engaged in great naval battles around Taiwan and Fujian to destroy the pirate fleets, and 
won distinction for capturing and killing brigands and burning their ships. By the time Shumei 
was born, Lin Tingfu was already a mid-ranking officer in the navy. Over the mid-Jiaqing and 
early Daoguang reigns, Tingfu was steadily promoted, eventually securing the post of vice 
admiral. 
 Serving in naval garrisons from Guangdong to Jinmen to Tianjin, Lin Tingfu patrolled 
the seas under his jurisdiction, fought small-time bandits, put down local rebellions, and won 
honorary distinctions for himself and for his deceased parents. He also oversaw the construction 
and delivery of warships to various naval garrisons.272 Qing warships required massive amounts 
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of money, material, and labor to build and maintain. In 1725, after the end of the Zhu Yigui 
rebellion in Taiwan, the Yongzheng Emperor established military shipyards called jungong 
chang to produce warships for the navy on mainland Fujian and Taiwan.273 The ships required 
lumber from the camphor tree, which had a degree of resistance to rot and insects.  Such trees 
tended to grow at very high elevations in Fujian and Taiwan, making their harvest and transport 
dangerous and expensive. In the early 19th century, pirate incursions forced the Qing navy to 
produce a new class of warship, called the Tong’an ship after the home county of Xiamen and 
modeled after the ships comprising its merchant fleets.  These were larger and heavier than other 
naval vessels in order to confront the state-of-the-art ships in the fleets of Cai Qian and Zhu Fen. 
The larger ships, in turn, required more lumber from the increasingly scarce camphor tree to 
produce and maintain.274 The difficulty of producing the necessary camphor lumber was 
described by an unnamed dissenter who decried the expansion of Tong’an ship production in the 
mid-19th century compendia of statecraft, the Da Qing jingshi wenbian: 
According to the details of the magistrate responding to the decree to 
obtain 20 tree trunks for masts, at Nancheng they search for trees, fell 
them, and send them to the [prefectural capital]. They built bridges and 
opened roads, using thousands of people. Each truck requires [the labor] 
of 250 people. They lift it and carry it to the waterside. But if the stream is 
dried up, the trunks don’t move. Again, they receive a call for 180 trunks 
and transport them to Zhangzhou. For each trunk they fell, they must 
tunnel through the mountains, and dam the water to build bridges. They 
use thousands of people to pull the carts. During exhausting days, they can 
only move a few li. Although the energy of a myriad of people is 
exhausted, year in and year out, they still cannot move [the tree trunks]. 
They work all day, hoping that soldiers will come and help. It’s all 
because of the orders to supervise and build Tong’an ships. The Tong’an 
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ship wood is from the mountainous counties where is it cut into boards, 
and then transported. Then we come to the wood for the masts. Skilled 
workers must go into the mountains to select appropriate specimens. From 
one end to the other end of the trunk, the workers use hatches to knock 
against the wood and produce a sound to make sure not one inch is curved 
or rotten. Only then can it be considered to be of any quality. If trees are 
cut down with no regard for quality, they might have defects and cannot 
be used. Or maybe some trees are cut down along the roadside and are 
incomplete. When they arrive at the final destination only one or two out 
of ten can be used. And the people’s energy is needlessly exhausted.275 
 
As a military official overseeing the production and delivery of warships, Lin Tingfu would have 
had to deal with the costs of securing ship-making materials, overseeing construction, and 
providing regular maintenance for weathered and sea-battered ships. His adopted son gleaned his 
knowledge of ships and sailing from him. 
In his very early life, Shumei was cared for by his adoptive mother and grandmother 
while his father was posted and transferred to various naval garrisons along the coasts.276 After 
Tingfu’s wife died, however, Tingfu began to share his peripatetic lifestyle with his adopted son 
and took the boy with him to various military postings. From the ages of eight to twenty-three sui 
Shumei accompanied his adoptive father to at least eight different naval garrisons in Fujian and 
Taiwan. Constantly moving to different garrisons could be a harrowing experience when sailing 
on the unpredictable seas. In the summer of 1824, Shumei was on a sea voyage with his father 
when their ship suddenly encountered a violent storm that interfered with their navigation and 
threatened to sink the ship itself. Rushing to plug the leaks (including a leak in the ship’s shrine 
to the Empress of Heaven [Tianhou, or Mazu]), they survived the night, and in the morning 
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relied on the gradations in the ocean’s colors from green to blue to white to navigate to the port 
of Luermen in Taiwan.277  
While serving as his father’s assistant in various garrisons, Shumei learned first-hand 
about Qing naval operations and the management of ships and personnel by observing his 
father’s duties as a military officer. Living with his father among military men and listening to 
their stories, he both earned a first-hand education in military affairs, and a narrative account of 
the recent and ongoing violence along Fujian’s maritime.  Shumei later recalled that as he and 
his father sailed into the port of Luermen in Taiwan, Tingfu suddenly became animated, and 
began to narrate his part in the naval battle that had failed to destroy Cai Qian’s fleet at the very 
same place some years previously. After listening to his father’s account, Shumei next proceeded 
with his father to Fengshan County to quell a local uprising.278 From an early age, Shumei was 
impressed that state and illicit violence constituted an elemental part of the maritime world.  
Although capturing and killing pirates and putting down local uprisings was a 
fundamental part of the Lin “family business,” not all aspects of a military career were 
predicated on violence. Tingfu also saw himself as a booster of local culture through the 
donation of funds and sponsorship of infrastructure in much the same vein as a sojourning civil 
official. In 1825, while stationed in the Penghu naval garrison off the coast of Taiwan, Tingfu 
appreciated the hardscrabble agricultural reality of the Penghu islanders who had to contend with 
salty soil, and frequent droughts and famines. He and two other military officials funded the 
construction of Penghu’s first shrine to the Dragon God, a water deity that locals could 
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supplicate for rain.279 Other times, a naval officer like Tingfu might assist foreign envoys in 
distress. In 1827, a tribute ship from the Kingdom of Ryukyu encountered a storm and nearly 
wrecked in Tingfu’s jurisdiction in Haicheng on the Fujian mainland. Tingfu sent soldiers over 
to protect the embassy until they were fit to return to Ryukyu. Ten years later, as Shumei was 
working in the staff of a magistrate in southern Taiwan, he would recall his father’s assistance to 
the stricken embassy as he was also called upon to rescue an envoy from Ryukyu in danger of 
being killed by Taiwanese aborigines.280 
While traveling and working with his father, Shumei also acquired a mariner’s 
knowledge of sailing, naval geography, seaways, and tides. Both father and son used their 
specialized knowledge to contribute to the military and geographical literature dealing with 
Fujian’s maritime frontier. When stationed in coastal garrisons in Taiwan and on mainland 
Fujian, Shumei and his father collaborated on mapping projects to document and make legible 
the strategic geography of Taiwan and Fujian, and delineate the essential seaways connecting the 
island to the mainland. Both father and son were highly influenced by the pioneering work of 
Xie Jinluan, the activist instructor, and Yang Tingli, the former prefect of Taiwan, and their 
efforts to incorporate and map Gemalan in northeastern Taiwan to keep it out of pirate control 
(See Chapter 3). Recognizing the close link between maritime security and accurate geographic 
understanding, Tingfu, serving as the Regional Vice Commander of Taiwan, made his own map 
of Gemalan’s strategic geography to contribute to the complete compendia of Taiwan’s 
geography, the Quan Tai yutu (The Complete Map of Taiwan). Four years later, stationed in 
Min’an, the maritime gate of Fuzhou, Tingfu dispatched his son to collect books on naval 
planning in preparation for a text to outline the strategic and defensive geography of the Fuzhou 
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area. Shumei sought out Xie Jinluan’s son and asked for assistance from another local lineage to 
find surviving copies of Xie Jinluan’s Hazinan jilue. In this text, Xie Jinluan argued for the 
creation of a new maritime sea route between Min’an and Gemalan in order to move personnel, 
material, and grain quickly between the capital of Fujian and the strategically vital and 
agriculturally rich new frontier—a position that Tingfu also came to advocate. Shumei recovered 
Xie Jinluan’s text without its maps, but, combining them with the maps produced by his father 
for the Quan Tai yitu, reprinted the text as the “Brief Sketch of Min’an” (Min’an jilue).281 
Praised by his future teacher for its brevity and methodological approach, Shumei intended this 
text to supplement omissions in the prefectural gazetteer.282 
As Lin Shumei traveled the sea-lanes with his father to far-flung coastal garrisons and as 
he developed skills as a military observer, sailor, and mapmaker, he also acquired a historical 
perspective on his home province as perceived from its coasts. As Shumei traveled to different 
locations along the Fujian and Taiwan littoral and lived in its garrisons, he read up on their local 
histories, visited their sites, and composed poetry on local themes. Through his inquiries into 
local history, he developed a particular affinity for the tombs and writings of loyalist martyrs 
who faced the collapse of their dynasty, namely those from the Southern Song and Southern 
Ming. As a young man of sixteen sui living in the Nan’ao garrison, Shumei sought out the tombs 
of Empress Yang and Lu Xiufu, who died as the Yuan forces closed in and the Southern Song 
boy emperor was drowned in the sea. Visiting their tombs and other sites associated with the end 
of the Southern Song regime in Nan’ao, Shumei recorded his impressions of their tragic and 
loyal deaths in poetry.283 Lin Shumei’s acquisition of local historical knowledge of Fujian’s 
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coastal regions was also an artifact of contacts he made sailing to different coastal locales. While 
residing in the garrison in Taiwan’s Anping garrison 1824, Lin met Lu Jiulian, a fellow native of 
Jinmen, and a descendent of Lu Ruoteng (1600-1664), a Southern Ming martyr and who loyally 
served in rump Ming regimes in Fujian until his death. Lu Jiulian introduced Lin to his 
ancestor’s writings by showing him an incomplete copy of one of his texts. Fascinated by the life 
and loyal example of Lu, Lin sought out surviving copies of Lu Ruoteng’s written corpus from 
the collections of private individuals living across the coastal regions and edited them. As Lin 
continued to follow his father to various garrisons, he sought out physical artifacts associated 
with Lu. While his father was stationed in Penghu, Lin struck out to rediscover Lu’s original 
gravesite somewhere at the base of Penghu’s Taiwu Mountain, composing yet another poem to 
document his impressions.284 
Lin Shumei’s understanding of Fujian’s history—bound up intimately with his 
experiences on the coasts and with his own affinity for exemplars of loyal martyrdom during the 
Southern Song and Ming periods—found a contemporary parallel with his fascination with 
members of Fujian’s military elite. Born during the ravages of the pirate fleets of Cai Qian and 
Zhu Fen, he grew up among veterans of those sea wars, and who now comprised the middle and 
top leadership of the Qing navy, and with whom he and his father routinely socialized. Moreover, 
his island of Jinmen and the sister island of Xiamen were the home islands of the navy’s top 
commanders during the pirate crisis, and were now celebrated as local heroes. The supreme 
commander of the Qing navy, Li Changgeng, was a native of Tong’an County, just across the 
water from Xiamen. Li’s dogged pursuit of an aggressive sea war, political troubles with the 
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Manchu governor-general, and his death at the hands of the pirates earned him plaudits from 
activist scholar-officials like Ruan Yuan, Wang Qisun, and the eventual head of the Aofeng 
Academy, Chen Shouqi, whose eulogies extolling him would eventually find their way into Wei 
Yuan’s Da Qing jingshi wenbian. Jinmen was home to Li’s lieutenant, Qiu Lianggong, who 
would take over for Li as top commander after his martyrdom, and whose memorial arch to his 
mother dominated the landscape inside the Jinmen citadel. Veterans and military commanders 
featured prominently in Lin Shumei’s biographical writings and would remain a central subject 
for him through the Opium War. 
Within this naval world, Shumei’s education was first practical: he learned how to sail 
and navigate, how to create maps and read topography for strategic purposes, and how to fight 
pirates and rebels. Yet, his peripatetic lifestyle did not confine him narrowly to the military. It 
also opened up opportunities to meet scholars across Fujian, make literary connections, and to 
acquire a deep interest in local history of the coastal regions. Although imbued with a wealth of 
practical military knowledge at an early age, he needed to ally himself with the elite literati 
world of northern Fujian to become a recognized “expert.” 
 
Collecting Educational Patrons, Guwen, and Scholarly Networks 
After the death of Lin Tingfu at the age of fifty-nine sui in 1830, Shumei’s days of 
traveling from naval garrison to naval garrison were over. No longer serving as his father’s 
assistant, he was free to build his own career. Lin sensed an opportunity to put his wealth of 
military and local knowledge to use, but he first needed access to Fujian’s elite educational 
networks and a literary pedigree that would attract the attention of people hoping to use his 




with a social network and train him in guwen-style prose, the scholarly style fast becoming 
associated with activist scholar-officials. He also gained dual intellectual homes within the 
scholarly circles of Fuzhou and associates of the Aofeng Academy and in southern Fujian 
amongst the scholars of the newly revamped Yuping Academy in Xiamen, ensuring his place 
among Fujian’s established and emerging literary networks. Lin’s search for patrons and a social 
circle would enmesh him within a pan-Fujianese scholarly network and arm him with the literary 
technology of guwen-style prose.  He would thus gain the notice of official employers as 
domestic and international turbulence loomed. 
Before Lin could begin his literary transformation, he needed to take care of his dead 
father’s estate and provide for his surviving family. He first accompanied his father’s coffin from 
the Min’an garrison outside Fuzhou back home to Jinmen, and supervised the funeral and 
division of his father’s property.285 After attending to these matters, Lin began to consider his 
livelihood, and commenced to seek out patrons outside the military sphere who could pave his 
way into elite Fujianese circles. His previous travels with his father to different coastal locales 
did not restrict his social world to contacts within the Green Standard forces; on the contrary, his 
maritime journeys facilitated his social connections to educated elites in Taiwan, Penghu, and 
Fuzhou as he developed literary strengths and acquired a deep interest in Fujian’s local history. 
His sojourning lifestyle even allowed him to begin learning guwen-style prose at the Xingwen 
Academy in Haitan while his father served in its garrison. While there, he initiated connections 
with the staff working on the revised Fujian provincial gazetteer in Fuzhou under Chen Shouqi, 
the head of the Aofeng Academy. These connections would prove useful as Lin south to 
 




Reinvent himself as an expert in local affairs, comfortable in both the military and litrary 
spheres.  
 Lin Shumei found his most significant patron in the person of Zhou Kai (1779 – 1837), 
the circuit intendant of Quanzhou, Xinghua, and Yongding prefectures, a post whose yamen was 
situated in Xiamen. A native of Fuyang County in Zhejiang with extensive experience in official 
service and as an instructor in several academies, Zhou had acquired a reputation as a vigorous 
administrator and promoter of local public works and also manifested a strong preference for 
guwen-style prose. Importantly, his guwen intellectual pursuits earned him membership in the 
“Xuannan poetry circle” of activist officials and literati in Beijing, along with other prominent 
members like Lin Zexu, Wei Yuan, and Gong Zizhen.286 He had a particular interest in 
promoting women’s economic activities through sericulture, and his essays on that subject were 
later published in Wei Yuan’s Da Qing jingshi wenbian.287 Like many other officials who served 
in southern Fujian, Zhou was dismayed by what he described as the “degenerate” customs of this 
complex social milieu. He frequently trafficked in stereotypes in his writings about the Fujian 
locals, referring to the northern Fujianese as “stupid” and the southerners “incorrigible.” 
Bemoaning the failure of the natives of the province to break out of their cycles of violence and 
disorder, Zhou blamed weak and corrupt leadership among local Qing officials—a stereotyped 
understanding in itself—but was resolved to bring a vigorous administrative approach to his post 
to smash smalltime pirates, assuage the ravages of famine, and reform customs through the 
cultivation of local talent.288  
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In 1830, the exact year of Lin Shumei’s father’s death, Zhou arrived in his yamen in 
Xiamen as the famously rice-deficient region confronted drought and famine and the beginnings 
of a concomitant spike in petty piracy. Indeed, smalltime piracy in the waters around Fujian, 
communal conflict, and uprisings in Taiwan were an overriding concern for Qing officials 
throughout the 1830s. Cheng Zuluo, the governor-general of Zhejiang and Fujian from 1832 to 
1836 and a native of Anhui, was himself preoccupied with unrest along the coasts. His 
memorials to the Daoguang Emperor routinely expressed concern about the construction of 
armed ships used by individuals to rob merchants and coastal communities, problems with 
smuggling, and the execution of prominent pirates in Fuzhou or Beijing. He was also deeply 
frustrated with the military, accusing them of being lax in capturing pirates or land-based 
bandits, and neglecting military training. In an attempt to assuage disappointment with the 
military, he punished military officials for perceived dereliction, reorganized garrisons and 
beefed up coastal defenses.289  
Shen Ruhan, the prefect of Quanzhou and an admirer of the Ming philosopher, Wang 
Yangming, and another colleague of Zhou Kai, relished the opportunities granted by the pirates 
and local disorder in order to cast himself as an expert in military strategy. He published his 
ideas and experiences in two texts, the Rongma fengtao ji (“The tempest of the war horse”) and 
Wubei guyu lu (“Record of defense preparation from the horse stable”). His writings including 
anecdotes that highlighted the difficulty in hunting down and capturing pirates who could easily 
shed their name and change their livelihood and location. In one of the prouder moments 
described in his collections, Shen pursued and apprehended the pirate, Zeng Wu, who had 
afflicted the coast for years, eluding capture by the Qing authorities. Tracking down the pirate’s 
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mother and wife (Zeng was locally renowned for his filial piety towards his mother), Shen 
learned that he and his brother had been concealing their identities as papermakers in Dehua 
County. Armed with this information, Shen captured the pirate and his brother. After the pirate’s 
wife and mother tearfully identified him, Cheng Zuluo, the governor-general, sent him to Beijing 
for execution.290 Though quite evidently proud of his ability in pursuing criminals, Shen also 
regarded himself as a sensitive observer of the delicate economic and social balance between 
Taiwan and Fujian. He understood the central role Taiwanese rice and merchant shipping played 
in Quanzhou, from ensuring subsistence, to ameliorating piracy, to the grain’s role as ballast in 
merchant ships. If Taiwanese rice was insufficiently stockpiled, or if the winds shifted and 
prevented the merchant ships from making their ocean crossings, it would be difficult for local 
people to sustain themselves during the winter, and Shen would have to deal with yet another 
wave of smalltime pirates. 291 For Qing territorial officials in Fujian like Cheng, Shen, and Zhou 
Kai, the relationship between rice supply and maritime security was a constant source of anxiety. 
Zhou Kai, the circuit intendant charged with managing three prefectures from his office 
in Xiamen, the grain entrepôt of Fujian, took a similarly proactive approach to tackling pirates 
and safeguarding the rice supply. In 1834, the year after putting down a bloody uprising in 
Taiwan, Zhou accompanied the Qing naval forces to nearby Jinjiang County to smash pirate 
bands allegedly run by a powerful local lineage there dealing in opium. Following the anti-pirate 
campaign, he then returned to Xiamen to reconstruct the local granary whose stones had been 
carted away, leaving the land exposed to the salty spray from the sea. His efforts earned him 
plaudits from Cheng Zuluo as a capable and adaptable administrator for the maritime frontier.292 
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Zhou took cues from his fellow officials, such as Cheng and Shen, to instigate a vigorous 
military approach to combating local piracy and securing sufficient rice stores. Despite his 
preoccupation with local military affairs, Zhou also had ambitions to renew the intellectual 
milieu of southern Fujian and attract and promote local literary talents in order to promote moral 
transformation of the region through education.  
Indeed, a major component of Zhou Kai’s administrative program was the reinvigoration 
of southern Fujianese intellectual life through the renewal of Xiamen’s Yuping Academy, 
guwen-style education, the promotion of southern literary talents, and the publication of 
gazetteers for Xiamen and Jinmen. To that end, he sought out and attracted a following of 
scholars from Fujian’s southern maritime region to come to Xiamen. Scholars from southern 
mainland Fujian, of Xiamen, Jinmen, and Penghu, including Lin Shumei, became Zhou’s 
protégés and studied at the Yuping Academy. For Zhou Kai, inducting promising scholars into 
his retinue was often a function of managing routine affairs on the maritime frontier and contact 
with prominent local scholars, such as when overseeing famine relief. In 1831, Penghu suffered 
one of its frequent bouts of drought and famine, and Zhou sailed to the archipelago to disburse 
relief. While making a tour of inspection, Zhou met Cai Tinglan, a talented student who Lin 
Shumei had met earlier when his father was stationed in the Penghu garrison. At the meeting, Cai 
presented Zhou with a poem that described Penghu’s hardship and outlined policy proposals for 
relief.293 Impressed by the young scholar and his poem, and surprised that a place with “no 
schools” could produce such a talent, Zhou determined that Cai would make a valuable addition 
to his southern Fujian literary circle. It was Cai’s experience and ability to speak to the issues 
affecting the Fujianese littoral as well as his literary talent that made him a compelling protégé 
 





for Zhou. Lin Shumei with his military background, deep geographic and local historical 
knowledge, and literary talent was another; in Lin, Zhou found an acolyte that “could do wen as 
well as wu.”294  For Zhou, acquiring protégés like Lin and Cai was emblematic of his effort to 
promote the intellectual life of the littoral through a combination of guwen-style literary talent 
and practical troubleshooting. 
Zhou centered his educational and literary projects on the Yuping Academy. One of two 
academies in Xiamen, it was built in the northeastern corner of Xiamen’s walled city in 1752, 
and was constructed by an alliance of civil officials, military officers, and prominent gentry. It 
housed Xiamen’s shrines to Zhu Xi and Wenchang, and its educational program emphasized 
Cheng-Zhu lixue learning. The academy received regular attention from officials posted to 
Xiamen over the next decades. In 1788 and 1813, its finances were updated and Zhu Xi’s 
regulations for learning reemphasized.295 Upon taking office in the 1830s, Zhou was initially 
inclined to construct a new school, but encountered resistance from the local gentry. The Yuping 
Academy directors, however, invited him to inspect and make needed repairs to their school. 
After touring the complex, Zhou was dissatisfied with the condition of the buildings, as well as 
the convoluted system for funding and implementing its repairs. He then embarked on an 
ambitious project to not only reconstruct the physical structures of the academy but also to 
expand the physical plant of the complex itself. Suspicious of the academy directors and annoyed 
at their inefficiencies, Zhou declared that each building must be funded separately. Moreover, he 
delegated the funding and reconstruction of the buildings to his entourage of literary protégés, so 
that one man managed the renovation and fundraising for a specific academy structure. Once 
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constructed, Zhou’s Yuping Academy attracted talented scholars from across Fujian’s maritime 
region.296 
In addition to updating the physical profile of the Yuping Academy, Zhou Kai also 
altered its intellectual tenor by emphasizing the instruction of guwen-style prose. The center of 
guwen-style prose learning was the Tongcheng school (Anhui), which heavily emphasized Song 
learning.297 Those associated with the Tongcheng school considered guwen prose to be a free and 
unrestrained vehicle for “literati expression,” especially when explaining political opinions.298 
Zhou himself was an enthusiastic supporter of guwen, but he learned not from an adherent of the 
Tongcheng school, but from Zhang Huiyan (1761-1802), a literary prodigy from Jiangsu. 
According to Benjamin Elman, Zhang Huiyan and his contemporary, Yun Jing, were emblematic 
of the Yanghu school of guwen prose in Changzhou. Although Zhang’s intellectual sensibilities 
conformed to the Han learning trends (his classical learning was particularly focused on the 
Zhouyi), the Yanghu school of guwen prose was not itself narrowly oriented to Han learning. 
Because its members were primarily concerned with blunting the poisonous effects of Heshen in 
the Qianlong Emperor’s administration, their intellectual orientations could include Han and 
Song Learning partisans, stimulating a “convergence of Changzhou statecraft traditions, literary 
currents, and New Text Studies.”299 Due to the Yanghu school’s overriding concern with literary 
fellowship and political expression, the Han Learning proponents of the Yanghu school could 
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use guwen prose—itself a Tang and Song dynasty literary form—without too much shame.300 
Zhou Kai himself did not appear to manifest much interest in the literary debates over Song and 
Han learning. His writings do, however, demonstrate some criticism of Han Learning kaoju 
scholarship as being neglectful of practical affairs in favor of tackling obscure scholarly 
topics.301 Indeed, practicality and vigorousness were key qualities in his approach to 
administrating the southern Fujian maritime world and virtues of local literary prodigies he 
surrounded himself with, like Lin Shumei. 
As Zhou Kai unofficially presided over the revamped Yuping Academy, and lectured to 
his literary entourage, he had to consider a suitable academy head. For this job, Zhou looked to 
northern Fujianese intellectual circles, and particularly those with a formal or unofficial 
relationship to the Aofeng Academy and its intellectual traditions.302 Zhou was eager to recruit 
Gao Shuran (1774-1841), widely considered to be Fujian’s foremost talent in guwen-style prose. 
Gao’s father, Gao Teng, attended the Aofeng Academy in Fuzhou where he was taught by Zhu 
Shixiu, the academy head.303 A native of the northern Fujian county of Jianning, Zhu was 
dedicated to the study of guwen-style prose. He examined and evaluated examples of the literary 
genre from the late Zhou through the Ming before determining that the literary styles of Sima 
Qian and Han Yu comprised its central progenitors, while deriding the scholarship of the 
Tongcheng school as shallow and superficial. From the mid-Qianlong era, Zhu and his disciples 
dominated guwen-style prose in Fujian, and considered the prose form essential to rectifying 
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one’s body and mind.304 Gao Teng would later go on to serve as an instructor (xundao) in Fujian, 
and taught Shuran, his son, to revere the former Aofeng Academy head and emulate his prose 
style. Though Gao Shuran did not attend the Aofeng Academy himself, he was closely associated 
with Aofeng Academy heads and students with whom he shared literary fellowship and pursued 
scholarly projects.305 His mastery of guwen-style prose also allowed him to forge relationships 
with officials posted to Fujian who shared his literary sensibilities. Foremost among those extra-
provincial relationships was with the activist scholar-official Yao Ying of the Beijing-based 
Spring Purification Circle (see chapter 3). With Yao Ying and Zhang Jiliang, the poet-prodigy 
and Aofeng Academy student who would go on to reshape activist literati circles in Beijing, and 
his Aofeng Academy connections, Gao was at the forefront of Fujian’s scholarly scene.306 
In 1835, Zhou Kai ordered Lin Shumei to invite Gao Shuran to teach at the revamped 
Yuping Academy in Xiamen. Ever since Lin Shumei studied guwen-style prose with Zhou Kai 
beginning in 1831, he began to split his time between Xiamen in the south and Fuzhou in the 
north, building connections with intellectual circles in both regions, and forged an especially 
close friendship with Zhang Jiliang. In 1835, Lin’s connections with Fuzhou and Aofeng-based 
literati increased when Zhou ordered him to learn guwen-style prose from Gao Shuran. It was 
literary brotherhood at first sight. Gao had a firm belief in the relationship between study, 
thought, and action, and using guwen-style prose to rectify one’s heart and mind, as well as use it 
to promote local Fujianese figures.307 His favored literary topics also accorded with Lin’s: they 
both shared a penchant for recording the biographies of vigorous Fujianese military figures and 
activist literati, such as the famed instructor, Xie Jinluan. A few years later during the Opium 
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War, Gao’s writings acquired new political urgency when he offered up a strategy to combat the 
British and eulogized local Fujianese who perished while resisting them. Gao was impressed 
with his new student’s action-oriented exploits and desire to study without exhibiting interest in 
attaining examination success. He edited and provided commentary on Lin’s writings, and 
adorned Lin’s collected works with a preface.308 Perhaps more important than instruction from 
Gao Shuran were the connections to activist literati in northern Fujian circles. While learning 
from Gao, Lin continued to solidify his relationships with northern Fujianese scholars, 
particularly Zhang Jiliang and Xie Xiaozhi, the son of the activist instructor, Xie Jinluan, with 
whom he discussed world affairs, and with other students attending the Aofeng Academy.309 
When Lin declined Zhou’s invitation to teach at the Yuping Academy, it was initially a hard sell. 
Gao had been working with Chen Shouqi, the Aofeng Academy head, on the new Fujian 
Provincial Gazetteer as co-editor; when Chen died in 1834, Gao became the new chief editor.310 
Gao, however, changed his mind after being struck down by an illness, and Lin Shumei took it 
upon himself to watch over his care and recovery. Impressed with his new student’s filial 
attitude, Gao agreed to teach at the Yuping Academy. 
The arrival of Gao Shuran transformed the school into a southern literary powerhouse. 
Gao, Zhou Kai and his scholarly protégés formed something of literary salon, touring the scenic 
sites of Xiamen where they held banquets and poetry parties.311 Members of this group also 
produced a collection of twelve paintings to celebrate the island’s famous sites, as well as to 
commemorate Zhou Kai’s exploits in managing the maritime frontier, from repairing the 
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granaries to combating pirates in Fujian and rebels in Taiwan.312 Zhou Kai and his Yuping 
Academy group also embarked on ambitious projects of local history with the first-time 
compilation of two gazetteers, the Xiamen gazetteer and the Jinmen gazetteer.313 Previously, 
Xiamen had only a facsimile of a gazetteer, called the Lujiang zhi and published in the mid-
Qianlong reign, but Zhou was dissatisfied with its emphasis on recording poetry and songs while 
omitting the island’s history, geography customs, and biographies of prominent officials and 
residents.314 Due to their centrality in the economic life and security of southern Fujian, it was 
increasingly recognized that Xiamen and Jinmen should have their own gazetteers—and, as 
Zhou mused, to serve at least serve as tools as governance for officials stationed in such a 
sensitive post. Perhaps inspired by Gao Shuran’s work on the Fujian Provincial Gazetteer, Zhou, 
his Yuping Academy literary circle, and Lin Shumei compiled the Xiamen and Jinmen 
gazetteers. Lin, along with other Yuping Academy scholars, also began to scour Xiamen and 
Jinmen for writings carved into stele or other media to enhance the study of the islands’ history 
and document its past events.315  
Most importantly, the Yuping Academy group functioned as a literary support network 
for Zhou Kai’s protégés who read, edited, commented upon, and wrote prefaces for each other’s 
work. Zhou Kai and Gao Shuran added their own prefaces and commentaries to their students’ 
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works and raised their students’ regional profiles by recommending them to other officials. One 
of these protégés, Cai Tinglan, the promising scholar from Penghu, had earlier impressed Zhou 
Kai by presenting his policy proposals for relieving a famine in poetic form. In 1835, when 
sailing home to Penghu after taking exams in the mainland, Cai’s ship encountered a tempest. He 
was presumed dead, but miraculously reappeared in Xiamen a year later. After encountering the 
storm, his ship had floated for ten days before drifting to Vietnam where he befriended local 
officials and scholars who assisted him by arranging his travel home overland. With Zhou Kai’s 
encouragement, Cai recorded and printed his experience in a collection that was part travelogue 
that examined Vietnam’s geography, customs, and government, and in part a hagiography that 
elevated Cai as a “true”—Chinese and orthodox—scholar who impressed and overawed his 
“submissive” Vietnamese scholarly hosts. Zhou Kai used Cai’s text and poetry to promote him to 
other officials stationed in Taiwan and used him as symbol of an emerging southern Fujian 
intellectual renaissance:  a man from a “rough and poor” place like Penghu who impressed 
Vietnamese officials and was rising fast among literary circles.316  
Like Cai Tinglan, Lin Shumei and his writings attracted the attention of Zhou and Gao. 
Under their tutelage, Lin was able to present the practical knowledge he had gained from his 
peripatetic youth in elegant guwen-style prose. His newfound guwen virtuosity symbolized his 
intellectual fellowship with a host of activist scholar-officials posted to Fujian and Taiwan and 
solidified his relationship with northern Fujian and Aofeng Academy literary circles. By being 
conversant in guwen-style prose, enmeshing himself in literary groups in northern and southern 
Fujian, and gaining patronage from academic celebrities like Zhou Kai and Gao Shuran, Lin 
 




strategically positioned himself as an in-demand maritime and defense expert just as the littoral 
entered a period of domestic and international turmoil.  
 
The Creation of Lin the Maritime Expert 
As Lin Shumei spent the 1830s seeking patronage from Zhou Kai, learning guwen from 
Gao Shuran, working on the Jinmen gazetteer with the Yuping Academy group, and traveling to 
Fuzhou to make connections with northern Fujian literary circles, he deliberately began to hone 
his reputation as an expert in managing local affairs. To that end, he sought out positions as an 
official secretary (muyou) in the employ of officials in Fujian tasked with resolving the 
troublesome issues of governing a complex and often violent place and organizing troops to 
defend Xiamen during the Opium War. Now armed with the ability to produce eloquent guwen-
style prose, a literary technology that signified his fellowship in elite Fujian intellectual circles 
and beyond, and ensconced within a wide network of officials and activist Fujianese scholars 
from Xiamen in the south to the heart of the province’s intellectual culture of Fuzhou in the 
north, he set out to not only assist his employers in handling practical affairs, but also to print 
and popularize his ideas for local organization, administrative improvement, and empowering the 
latent energies of locals and merchants to solve Fujian’s problems.  
 In the fall of 1836, Lin again crossed the sea to Taiwan to serve as a muyou on the staff of 
Cao Jin, the newly appointed magistrate of the southern county of Fengshan. Cao Jin (1786-
1849), a native of Henan, had earlier been transferred to Fengshan from Min County (Fuzhou). 
He was a newcomer to Taiwan and its complex social milieu, and so was eager to recruit local 
experts. This sense of urgency was heightened by a new round of social unrest rocking the 




attacking counties and officials.317 Cao Jin needed a local expert to help him quell the disorder 
afflicting his county and prevent future violence. Lin’s mentor Zhou Kai also was on his way to 
Taiwan, having been transferred to the sensitive post of Taiwan circuit intendant to coordinate 
the island-wide response to the violence.318 With “pacification” of rebels a routine component of 
Qing administration in Taiwan, Cao Jin required staff that knew how to organize defense. With 
his military background and close connections to the ranking civil officials in Taiwan, Lin 
Shumei was an attractive acquisition for the magistrate. 
 After arriving in Fengshan, Lin surveyed the county and drew up a list of 
recommendations for Cao Jin to relieve its immediate problems and to plan for its long-term 
needs. For Lin, the most pressing was social relief and organization. To that end food should be 
disbursed to hard-up county residents, and grain collected in anticipation of future shortages. To 
facilitate robust social organization, he urged that the county be arranged into baojia units 
according to the precepts of Zhu Xi. For Lin, baojia was a boon for the state and people: it cut 
down on administrative fees and responsibilities, while leaving the residents in charge of 
controlling their own without having to deal with troublesome yamen runners and their abuses. 
Lin asserted that the county should seek out and arrest bandits and rebels, but appeared to even 
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more concerned with the potential to abuse “innocents” when rooting out malefactors and the 
ease of falsely incriminating people as bandits.319 In Lin’s support for baojia organization and 
his apprehension over troubling innocent residents or falsely implicating them in crimes, he 
seems to have channeled the concerns and ideas of Zheng Jiancai, the activist instructor from 
Chapter 3, during the reconstruction after the pirate raids decades earlier. After the immediate 
problems facing Fengshan were addressed, Lin urged Cao to promote moral cultivation of 
Fengshan residents through the promotion of transformation through study (jiaohua) and through 
the repair of shrines for the loyal dead (officials and people) of the county who perished in 
previous unrest. Beyond that, the magistrate should strive to clear Fengshan’s harbors and bays 
from physical obstruction to help promote people whose livelihoods depended on the sea, while 
clearing the area of haunts that would attract pirates. Lin ended with a recommendation to make 
peace between warring Cantonese and Fujianese villages.320 
 While drawing up his program, Lin also tackled Fengshan’s pressing need for adequate 
defenses. In order to meet the county’s immediate needs, he opted to organize the Fengshan 
residents into tuanlian units. As the son of naval officer, he had personal experience with 
military affairs, but linked his supposed expertise to self-study of ancient military classics, 
particularly Gu Yanwu and Qi Jiguang. Of these military texts, Lin identified the works of Qi 
Jiguang, the late Ming general who battled the Wakō in Fujian, as efficacious for local military 
defense organization, and considered his texts to be especially suited for warfare along the 
southeastern coasts and its particular topography.321 Curiously, Lin’s discussion of tuanlian 
never mentioned the influence of Yan Ruyi, the Hunanese scholar who used the works of Qi 
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Jiguang and Gu Yanwu to devise tuanlian units to fight combatants during the White Lotus 
Rebellion. Yan’s military success with the tuanlian units in the Hunanese highlands earned him a 
spot in the staff of Nayancheng, the governor-general of Guangdong and Guangxi, to combat the 
pirate menace of the early and mid-Jiaqing period, and even compelled him to write his 
philosophy of war on the Guangdong coast in his Yangfang jiyao.322 Whether or not Lin 
encountered Yan Ruyi’s texts, he approached tuanlian similarly in his proposal for county 
renewal which contained detailed guidelines that would transform Fengshan county residents 
into an effective fighting force, concentrating on recruitment of suitable candidates, harnessing 
their ambition, training and tactics, discipline, and deployment. 
 Cao Jin was impressed with Lin’s proposal and approved it. While organizing local 
defenses, Lin, like his father, the naval officer, and his mentor, Zhou Kai, also took an offensive 
action and initiated “pacification” campaigns. Cao Jin twice sent Lin, a detachment of 
government troops, and local braves trained by Lin into the county’s far reaches to purge the 
villages of leftover rebel remnants, pacify a new outbreak of communal strife between Fujianese 
and Cantonese villages, and to encourage the residents with moral suasion. Lin and the troops 
first entered the southern region of Longjiao, which was peopled by a complex array of Fujianese, 
Cantonese, and aborigines, who sometimes intermarried and sometimes fought each other, and 
who were widely understood to be one of the focal points for social upheaval within the 
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county.323 Certainly these expeditions were punitive in nature, and served as a signal to 
intimidate the residents from future disorder. Yet, Lin also treated them as fact-finding missions 
to map out the county’s southern topography, locate the position of Fujianese and Cantonese 
villages, and recorded the distribution of aboriginal settlements and their customs.324  
His record and map, earning plaudits from his mentors, Zhou Kai and Gao Shuran, was 
designed to enhance the state’s ability to project power over its unruly areas, and help 
consolidate its control. In a second expedition, Lin led troops on something of a civilizing 
mission to help jumpstart his social reorganization of the county. Journeying with the troops he 
trained to root out bandits in hiding in various Fengshan villages, he made yet another mapping 
expedition to positively locate the settlements, their routes, and distances between them. He then 
registered the village residents into baojia units and distributed copies of the Xiaojing (The 
Classic of Filial Piety) and the Song-dynasty text, Xiangyue (Community Compact), in the hope 
that these texts would help the residents cultivate the proper relationship and attitude between 
themselves and the civil authorities, and provide them with model for orthodox social 
organization.325 
After Lin Shumei tackled Fengshan’s pressing military matters, organized its locals into 
tuanlian groups, and embarked on a suppression campaign to the remote southern reaches of the 
county, he turned his attention toward reducing future outbreaks of violence. Like his mentor, 
Zhou Kai, Lin noted a causal relationship among Taiwan’s frequent cycles of drought, increased 
rice prices, famine, and eruptions of banditry, communal strife, and rebellion. In this 
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understanding, it was economic factors that lay at the heart of Taiwan’s pathology of violence. 
For Lin, the key to ending this violence was reducing the impact of droughts on local agriculture. 
To that end, creating effective waterworks that could blunt the impact of droughts would end the 
violence. Both Zhou Kai and his protégé believed that ensuring a stable environment for 
agriculture was the key to reducing violence, and both were eager to make improvements in 
water stability for Taiwanese cultivators. Zhou Kai favored teaching cultivators how to construct 
sturdy wells. Lin, however, argued that was both inefficient and ultimately ineffective. A well 
could only benefit a family, or, at best could only provide water for a small village; it could not 
provide sufficient water to irrigate crops nor protect them from the effects of drought.326 What 
Taiwanese cultivators actually required, Lin argued, was a channel. 
 Lin proposal for such a big infrastructure project was initially met with skepticism by 
Cao Jin and the Taiwan prefect, Xiong Yiben.327 That a viable channel could be constructed and 
funded from within the county appeared doubtful to the officials. To convince them, Lin drew up 
a plan, created a map of the proposed water routes, and regulations for its funding and 
maintenance. He proposed that the canal take advantage of the nearby river to acquire its water, 
and several sluicegates be constructed to maintain a stable and equitable water level to benefit 
various villages and to expel stagnant water. Lin used the Fengshan gazetteer and the county’s 
natural topography to map out the water routes to help ensure maximum reach to the county’s 
villages and proposed to make use of existing waterworks and streams to minimize costs. 
Officials, property owners, and local elders would take charge of the management and its 
construction by Fengshan locals and oversee its future maintenance to prevent the embankments 
from collapsing. It would be funded by regular fees from cultivators who drew water from the 
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canal to water their fields, according to water usage.328 The project in the end was completed 
after two years of labor. Afterwards, a proud Lin Shumei wrote to Cao Jin about the 
accomplishment, and his vision for how the magistrate might capitalize on the channel project to 
promote other projects to benefit the county. He was sure that the channel would induce a 
massive surge in Fengshan’s agricultural productivity, which would then have a transformative 
effect on the county’s education and economy. He alleged that with the effects of drought 
reduced, county residents would repair their broken-down schools and spend more time studying, 
which in turn would lead to moral and spiritual transformation. The roads and bridges that were 
built as a necessary adjunct to the canal’s construction would open up closer links to neighboring 
Taiwan County, enriching the area through closer and more efficient commercial interaction. He 
envisioned the economic productivity of the county’s women improving once mulberry, cotton, 
and ramie were grown along the channel’s banks, and their fibers woven into cloth. The 
cultivation of these plants would spur local industry, and spare the county the need to import 
such items from the mainland.329 Lin anticipated that his channel would blunt future outbreaks of 
violence in Fengshan through the encouragement of economic production and the development 
of closer commercial links to the rest of Taiwan.330 
 Though Lin’s efforts in Fengshan stemmed from a desire to enact policies that would 
strengthen Qing administration and control over the fractious county and benefit it economically, 
they were also part of a calculated effort to bolster his reputation as a local expert. Lin compiled 
his written work on his actions in Fengshan in guwen-style prose and presented it to Zhou Kai 
and Gao Shuran for editing and commentary. By transmitting his written texts to his patrons who 
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could recommend their protégé and testify to his abilities, Lin was able to acquire a name for 
being able to draw up effective (and stylish) proposals and put them into effect, particularly 
when it came to matters of defense and economic improvement. Beyond detailing his policies in 
Fengshan, he continued to hone his reputation through composing manuscripts addressing the 
strategic maritime geography of Taiwan, the tides, warships, and naval patrols. That he could 
package his writings in elegant guwen-style prose linking him to a literary brotherhood that 
included activist officials and literati made Lin an in-demand authority in maritime Fujianese 
affairs on the eve of the British attack. 
  The outbreak of the Opium War in 1839 solidified Lin as a maritime military expert. As 
British warships moved up the coast from Guangdong to Fujian to Dinghai off the coast of 
Zhejiang, Qing officials in Fujian desperately sought advice on how to handle the foreign threat. 
Lin found himself suddenly in demand as a maritime defense expert and traveled up and down 
Fujian to meet with Qing officials eager to formulate a response. In the summer of 1840, the 
governor-general of Fujian and Zhejiang invited Lin to meet with him to discuss the situation 
and hear his perspective. Similar to his actions in Fengshan county, Lin assessed the situation, 
and drew up a detailed plan in his cherished guwen style. Though initially self-deprecating, he 
insinuated that real talents who knew the maritime world were hard to find, slyly promoting 
himself. He was convinced that the real target of the British naval war was not Dinghai, which 
had recently fallen to their forces, but Xiamen and Tianjin. He devised a comprehensive plan to 
defend Fujian, but geographically, he emphasized the centrality of Xiamen and Taiwan to the 
overall scheme. Lin’s plan was based upon his understanding of the effort to combat the huge 
pirate fleets of Cai Qian and Zhu Fen in the early and mid-Jiaqing period, as well as Fujian’s 




mid-Ming. For Lin, what appeared to be effective in blunting the impact of the corsair fleets on 
the coasts a few decades earlier could be applied in the fight with the British.  
The central tenets of Lin’s plan pertained to ensuring food security and the training of 
local braves. The stability of rice imports from Taiwan again emerged as a top concern for Lin. 
He urged the governor-general to resist the temptation to obtain rice from Jiangxi transported by 
soldiers or purchasing it from neighboring Zhejiang as had been done in the past. But this only 
made the rice moldy and caused the merchant to lose money in the venture. Instead, he 
encouraged the governor-general not to disrupt the merchant networks already in place that 
purchased and transported rice from Taiwan to the mainland, arguing that allowing the 
merchants to pursue profit was the most effective means to guarantee a steady and stable supply 
of rice to feed Fujian’s population and to succor its soldiers. He also called for the training of 
local braves from among Fujian’s villages to guard its many strategic points instead of relying on 
official Qing soldiers to do the job because locals were naturally vested in protecting areas near 
their homes.331 In short, the crux of Lin’s strategic message hinged on harnessing the latent 
energies of the Fujian maritime merchants and population to thwart the British, and to safeguard 
the Xiamen-Taiwan connection. 
 As the war progressed, Lin conferred with other Qing officials as they haplessly managed 
the province’s defenses. He drew up separate plans for the defense of Xiamen and Jinmen for the 
circuit intendant, again emphasizing Fujian, not Zhejiang, as the real target of British aims, the 
need to ensure the island’s food security, and the training of local braves to guard the islands.332 
With the circuit intendant and the new governor-general, he also devised battle plans, identified 
ambush points, located the placement of troops and cannon, explained how to discipline the 
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troops and braves with rewards and punishments, argued for the use of spies, the repair of forts, 
the use of the historical example of the mid-Ming pirate campaigns, and the reading of 
translations of European works on firearms.333 Lin often grew frustrated when he felt his policies 
were ignored by the Qing officials, and despaired when a British attack finally smashed artillery 
emplacements on Xiamen and drove Qing troops off the island.334 For his part, Lin also took it 
upon himself to raise tuanlian units on Xiamen. He was joined by his old friend from the literary 
circles of Fuzhou, the poet-prodigy, Zhang Jiliang, whose zeal compelled him to take part in the 
defense of his home province while his mentor the eminent Tongcheng guwen wonder, Yao 
Ying, oversaw the Qing response in Taiwan as circuit intendant.335 Together, Zhang and Lin 
raised a tuanlian unit and planned an ambush at the White Deer Grotto, a place where the 
Yuping Academy literary group frequently held nighttime banquets, yet never got a chance to 
battle with British troops before their unit was ordered to disband.  
 As Lin raised tuanlian units on Xiamen, he caught the eye of other Qing magistrates and 
circuit intendants on the Fujian mainland whose counties faced the sea and the possibility of 
British attack. They invited him to offer military advice on defense matters, including how to 
establish tuanlian units of their own. Though by this time, Lin had established himself as an 
expert in Fujian military affairs, it was his ability to write elegant guwen prose and association 
with northern Fujian literary circles that made him particularly attractive to counsel-seeking 
officials, credentials that indicated he was not some crank. Though Zhou Kai had died a few 
years earlier in 1837, the influential Gao Shuran was still recommending him to officials posted 
to Fujian, assuring them of his abilities in practical affairs and guwen-style prose. The magistrate 
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of Longxi county had initially heard of Lin and his reputation for military and administrative 
expertise during his work for Cao Jin in Fengshan county but received an introductory letter 
from Gao Shuran as well as an attachment of Lin’s prose. Lin’s practical talents were bolstered 
by his abilities to compose guwen prose in a tradition learned from Gao and Zhu Shixiu, the 
Aofeng Academy head that convinced the magistrate to raise tuanlian units to thwart the 
invaders.336 Another circuit intendant concurred, citing the testaments of the magistrate and Gao 
Shuran to Lin’s practical talents and guwen virtuosity.337 Lin was becoming increasingly well-
known for his facilities with military planning and guwen scholarly refinement; indeed, the one 
reinforced the other. Strong abilities in the prose form associated him with literary circles in 
northern Fujian who could recommend him to officials in need of advice, and link him 
intellectually, if not professionally to guwen-prose activist officials fighting the British, like Yao 
Ying and Lin Zexu. 
 The end of the Opium War in 1842 and the Qing surrender led a despondent Lin Shumei 
to use his guwen talents for the purpose of writing biographies and reminiscences for military 
officials (many of whom were friends and associates of his) and others who had perished in the 
war. He shuttled to and from Xiamen and Fuzhou, eulogizing the loyal dead and meeting with 
Fuzhou and Aofeng Academy friends (Zhang Jiliang had died in 1843). He also visited the tomb 
of the Southern Song martyr, Li Gang, which had become a pilgrimage site for activist Aofeng 
scholars, such as Zhang Jiliang, contemplating the events of the Fujianese hero’s life and his 
own.  
Over the 1840s Lin continued to split his time between taking care of his family in 
Xiamen and Jinmen and pursing literary projects with his friends and associates in Fuzhou. It 
 





was through the northern Fuzhou literary circles, and his reputation as a protégé and student of 
his friend Zhou Kai and the guwen master Gao Shuran, that Lin came to the attention of Lin 
Zexu, himself a product of the Aofeng Academy and Fuzhou literary circles. In early 1850, an 
ailing Lin Zexu returned to Fuzhou after serving as the governor-general of Yunnan and Guizhou 
to recuperate from an illness. There he met with Lin Shumei and queried him about the state of 
maritime affairs in Fujian, to which Lin provided him with another of his point-by-point policy 
prescriptions.338 The elder Lin took a liking to Shumei, and the two men struck up a literary 
fellowship, presenting poems to the other.339 As a sign of intimacy and respect, Lin Zexu 
presented Shumei with his own fox-fur coat, and composed a poem for Shumei’s mother in 
honor of her birthday.340  
Soon after, Lin Zexu was made the governor of Guangxi, and made preparations to head 
south. Lin Zexu then invited Shumei to be on his staff to help him handle pressing affairs in that 
province. Although Shumei styled himself as an expert in coastal defense, Lin Zexu likely 
thought that his military insight and experience in organizing tuanlian units would come in 
handy there: a mysterious group calling itself the God-Worshippers had started small-scale 
disturbances in Guangxi, and Lin Zexu had orders to quash it. Perhaps Lin Zexu thought that 
both he and Shumei could use their experiences in dealing with defense on the Fujian and 
Guangdong coasts and organize local defenses and help stamp out the malefactors. But it was not 
to be. The still sick Lin Zexu died on the journey south. A distraught Lin Shumei returned home, 
composing a lament to the dead governor. He died the following year at the age of 44 sui. 
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Zhou Kai’s assessment of Lin Shumei—someone who could handle both wen and wu—
was central to the creation of Lin the expert. Lin’s story is fundamentally about political 
entrepreneurship and acquiring the essential credentials to become influential in Fujian. 
Although Lin was born into a naval family and had significant military expertise, won through 
first-hand experience and travel throughout the littoral, these credentials were not sufficient to 
elevate him to the status of an expert on local affairs. For his expertise to be truly credible to 
Qing officials, Lin needed proficiency in the literary technology of guwen-style prose which 
legitimized his membership in certain literati circles. With such membership also came important 
scholarly contacts among the graduates of Aofeng and influential northern Fujian circles 
connected to national scholarly networks that valued certain literary trends. 
 Lin’s rise to prominence as an expert exemplifies the far-reaching impact of the Aofeng 
Academy in shaping education in Fujian, elevating literary trends, and mediating essential 
scholarly and official contacts. His case demonstrates that experts be made through capitalizing 
on association with Aofeng-approved literary forms and contacts. Aofeng’s powerful 
legitimizing force birthed a cadre of local experts who provided Qing officials with guidance and 







In the hot summer of 1853, Wei Tingfang escorted the coffin of his dear friend, Liu 
Jiamou (1814-1853) back across the sea from Taiwan to be buried at home in Fuzhou. Liu was a 
product of the Aofeng Academy, and like many generations of his fellow alumni, he served as a 
county instructor in Taiwan. Maintaining relationships with his fellow Aofeng alumni and a 
close friend of Lin Shumei, the self-made maritime expert, Liu was popular among his admirers 
for his advocacy on behalf of the residents of his county.  He generally was regarded as a 
sympathetic observer of their daily life and culture. He combined his local advocacy and 
observations in a collection of poetry, “Sea sounds poems” (Haiyin shi), which were intended to 
be intoned in the local dialect, constituting a tribute to local Taiwanese daily life, sounds, and 
speech.  
 In early 1853, Liu continued at his post as instructor, but it was shaping up to be an 
ominous year. Southern Fujian was wracked by a sudden uprising from a mysterious group 
known as the Small Swords (Xiaodao hui), loose affiliates of another group menacing southeast 
China, the Taiping. While elite Fujianese and Aofeng graduates serving as county instructors in 
south Fujian rushed to smash the Small Swords, organized pirate fleets terrorized Taiwan. When 
the pirates raided Taiwan county, Liu, like other county instructors before him, manned the walls 
to repel the invaders. Yet, luck was not on his side. As he assumed the defenses, Liu died of 
disease. It was not to be the last tragedy to befall the dead instructor, however. Pirates boarded 
the ship carrying Liu’s coffin, and threw his writings into the sea. As they were about to throw 




xiangdao Liu laoshi jing de ci xiachang). When the pirates heard Wei invoke the name and 
profession of the deceased, they refrained from throwing Liu’s corpse into the sea.341 
 Although this story as related by Wei Tingfang should not be taken at face value, there is 
something intriguing in the way the pirates showed deference to a deceased county instructor. 
Read as a parable, Wei appears to suggest that Liu’s name and position carried with it some kind 
of authority that everyone would recognize. Could it be that lowly county instructors had the 
power to overawe even brigands?  
 By the time of Liu Jiamou’s death, alumni of the Aofeng Academy had reoriented 
themselves to focus on local affairs for more than fifty years. Initially founded for the purpose of 
raising generations of lixue-enthusiast officials in tune with the philosophical orientation of the 
Qing court, the Aofeng Academy’s commitment to lixue bestowed upon its alumni the value of 
practical action. In particular, the academy’s lineage of enshrined Fujianese worthies from the 
Song to the Qing provided Aofeng students with compelling models of action and a legitimate 
political voice. The administrative decay in the late Qianlong period and concomitant maritime 
crises on the coasts convinced charismatic Aofeng heads to reorient their studies and energies to 
local interests and assist Qing officials in providing answers to urgent local problems on the 
Fujian and Taiwan coasts. 
 In keeping with a renewed localist orientation, Aofeng alumni frequently pursued careers 
as county instructors, positions that had a high degree of influence on the local level as the Qing 
state became increasingly distracted from various crises beginning in the early 19th century. 
Charged with county education and preparing students for the examinations, these lowly 
bureaucrats had the also leisure to pursue sideline projects in their counties. These projects were 
 




of a practical nature intended to support and stabilize local society, such as improving 
waterworks or promoting agriculture. In times of turmoil, county instructors assumed leadership 
roles in organizing local defense. Not only did they take an active part in manning the county 
defenses and organizing local militia, but, like Chen Jincheng, they also developed military 
strategies to defend their home province from Western imperialists, and successfully lobby 
ranking officials to endorse their proposals. They also served as local advocates for the residents 
of their counties, and even took it upon themselves to act as local watchdogs to fight official 
corruption, even at the cost of severe punishment and banishment as in the cases of Lin Yuhua 
and Wu Yulin. 
 County instructors could also be highly ambitious and politically savvy.  As we saw in 
Chapter 3, Xie Jinluan and Zheng Jiancai, two county instructors and Aofeng alumni, 
transformed the geography of the maritime frontier by championing the incorporation of 
Gemalan in order to keep pirates of out Taiwan. Xie and Zheng accomplished this feat by 
working closely with Qing officials, publishing and circulating a compelling treatise through the 
Aofeng Academy network, and using the national reach of the Aofeng Academy network to 
lobby in Beijing. They also protected their students from capricious magistrates and tackled 
Fujian’s endemic problem of communal feuding. Finally, Xie even wrote a treatise on study and 
local governance, which achieved wide acclaim, and found a place in the libraries of many 
academies in the 19th century. For their achievements, the Aofeng Academy head enshrined Xie 
and Zheng as local worthies to serve as new models of local political action for new generations 
of Aofeng students. 
 Individuals who did not attend the Aofeng Academy could utilize the literary formats 




born into a naval family on Jinmen, pursued mastery of guwen-style writing, a literary 
technology that allowed him to be taken seriously as an expert in military and maritime affairs. 
His success as a self-made expert and as a political entrepreneur was predicated on his virtuosity 
with literary forms made popular through Aofeng and he maintained relationships with many 
alumni. Eventually, he became an advisor to another Aofeng alumnus, Lin Zexu, who recruited 
him to fight against the Taipings. 
 By the middle of the 19th century, the academy activists’ drive to tackle pressing local 
problems had been ongoing for more than sixty years. The celebrated “prosperous age” of the 
18th century in Fujian and Taiwan, bookended by a protracted Qing conquest and the Qianlong 
emperor’s tenth “perfect victory” over a rebellion in Taiwan in 1787, was considerably shorter 
than other parts of the empire. The maritime frontier and its vulnerabilities— its susceptibility to 
natural disasters and famine, its obstreperous social ecology, and exposure seaborne threats of 
pirates and imperialists—was a barometer of the empire’s health, and even before the dawn of 
the 19th century, the state was failing it. What’s more, the academy activists knew it. In the 
absence of efficacious state action, the academy activists’ attempts to address issues afflicting the 
maritime frontier instigated a localist orientation that (usually) worked in cooperation with the 
state, but as the decades wore on, the state appeared increasingly irrelevant.  At the same time, 
the state’s role was beginning to shrink in other regions where local gentry assumed managerial 
roles, elites raised private militias, and people celebrated local culture. The great mid-century 
rebellions that finally tipped the balance of power between state and local society and swept 
away both the Qing dynasty and the imperial system in 1911 may have had its antecedents with 
the academy activists laboring on the maritime frontier in the early 19th century.  After all, for 




away. As Liu Jiamou mounted the county walls and observed the pirates arrayed below him, he 
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